PEOPLE OF MI V GLENN BERNARD GREEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 8, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247395
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 02-022070-FH
GLENN B. GREEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Gage and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction for witness intimidation, MCL
750.122(7)(c). Defendant was sentenced to 38-180 months in prison. We affirm. This appeal is
being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The victim and defendant were engaged to be married, but the relationship ended after a
domestic violence incident occurred, in which defendant attacked the victim and fractured her
face. Defendant was charged with aggravated domestic assault, MCL 750.81(a). The victim was
subpoenaed to testify against him at trial. However, beginning at 5:00 a.m. on the morning of
trial, the victim received three or four phone calls from defendant, threatening to kill her if she
testified. Despite these threats, the victim appeared for court to testify that morning. Defendant
never appeared, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. A bench trial was ultimately
conducted, and defendant was convicted of aggravated domestic assault.
On the date of the initial assault trial, the victim received additional threatening phone
calls after returning home from court. Defendant remarked to her that he was “going to get her,”
and that “couldn’t nobody stop him.” The victim became scared and reported these threatening
calls to the police. Defendant was charged with witness intimidation under MCL 750.122(7)(c)
for making the threatening phone calls. A preliminary examination was conducted, and a jury
convicted him of the offense. This appeal follows.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing both the
victim and a police detective, as well as defendant himself to testify about the nature of the prior
assault conviction. The decision to admit certain other acts evidence under MRE 404(b) “is
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within the trial court’s discretion and will only be reversed where there has been a clear abuse of
discretion.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).1 “An abuse of
discretion occurs when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the court acted,
would conclude that there was no justification or excuse for the court’s ruling.” People v Taylor,
252 Mich App 519, 521; 652 NW2d 526 (2002), citing People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713,
715; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor failed to provide adequate notice of his intent to
introduce the prior acts evidence at trial, as required by MRE 404(b)(2). Defense counsel was
presumptively aware before trial that information pertaining to the prior assault would be
presented at trial because evidence concerning the charge was used against defendant in the
preliminary examination, and is contained in the police report. Thus, the prosecutor’s disclosure
at trial of his intent to use the prior acts evidence satisfies the reasonableness requirement of
MRE 404(b).
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the prior acts evidence is
determined by applying MRE 404(b)(1). The trial court admitted evidence of the assault as an
exception to MRE 404(b)(1) because it was related to defendant’s state of mind, motive, and
intent, as well as the victim’s perception or ability to interpret defendant’s acts as a threat. We
find that this admission was proper based on an application of the VanderVliet test, which
delineates four factors to be met before prior acts evidence is admissible. People v VanderVliet,
444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114 (1993).
First, the prosecutor did not rely on a character or propensity theory, but rather a theory
of motive and common plan. Secondly, the relevance of the prior acts evidence is “demonstrated
by reasonable inferences that make a material fact at issue more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” Knox, supra, 469 Mich 509, quoting Crawford, supra, 458
Mich 387. Evidence of the underlying assault charge allowed the factfinder to draw a reasonable
inference with respect to why defendant might have made the threatening phone calls, namely to
prevent the victim from testifying against him.
The evidence is further relevant because the charged act of witness intimidation is
sufficiently similar to the prior assault conviction, thus manifesting a “common plan, scheme or
system.” People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 62; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). Defendant
displayed a scheme of violence towards the victim by threatening her life on several occasions.
Defendant remarked to her that she would not get away with leaving him after his “big
investment” in their relationship. These facts indicate that defendant conceived a plan to
threaten the victim and cause her great bodily harm. We find that the threatening phone calls
were made in furtherance of this plan.
1
Defendant urges this court to adopt the three-part standard of review used by the United Sates
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit other acts
evidence. However, it is established that this Court reviews such decisions for an abuse of
discretion. Crawford, supra, 458 Mich 383; People v Taylor, 252 Mich App 519, 521; 652
NW2d 562 (2002).
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Third, the probative value of the evidence regarding the prior assault was not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Unfair prejudice occurs “when there is a tendency
that the evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury, or when it would be
inequitable to allow use of the evidence.” Taylor, supra, 252 Mich App 521-522. The
prosecutor asked the victim to briefly describe the assault “without going into any great detail.”
Defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by admission of this evidence. Conversely, the probative
value of the evidence is great. Without the evidence, defendant’s motive becomes far less
apparent, and the seriousness of his threats becomes diminished. In turn, the factfinder would be
left with a “chronological and conceptual void” regarding the events leading up to the phone
calls. VanderVliet, supra, 444 Mich 55. The jury was entitled to know the nature of the
underlying assault against the victim in order to fully appreciate the gravity of defendant’s
threats. Since defendant had assaulted her once before, the victim had every reason to fear for
her life when defendant stated on the phone, “if you go to court you are a dead B.”
Finally, also in accord with VanderVliet, the trial court allowed only a limiting instruction
on the assault charge to keep out information that may bias the jury. The trial court instructed
the jury on the evidence of other offenses pursuant to CJI2d 4.11.
Because the VanderVliet factors have been met, and an unprejudiced person considering
the facts on which the court acted would be unable to find that there was no justification or
excuse for the court’s ruling, the trial court did not err in admitting the prior acts evidence.
Taylor, supra, 252 Mich App 521.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial
when it permitted his two brothers to be called as witnesses, even though they were never listed
on the prosecutor’s witness list. Defendant cites MCL 767.40a(3), which states: “not less than
30 days before the trial, the prosecuting attorney shall send to the defendant or his or her attorney
a list of the witnesses the prosecuting attorney intends to produce at trial.” Although the
prosecutor omitted the brothers from his witness list, this is not dispositive of the issue because
MCL 767.40a(4) provides “the prosecuting attorney may add or delete from the list of witnesses
he or she intends to call at trial at any time upon leave of the court and for good cause shown or
by stipulation of the parties. Indeed, this Court has commented “the statute clearly vests the trial
courts of this state with the discretion to permit the prosecution to amend its witness list at any
time.” Callon, supra, 256 Mich App 327, citing People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281, 289; 537
NW2d 813 (1995).
Defendant argues that the prosecutor did not establish good cause for calling the brothers.
The prosecutor argued below that the testimony of the brothers would be relevant and contain
information favorable to his case. This was sufficient to establish good cause to support the late
addition, and the trial court properly permitted both witnesses to be called. Because defendant
had notice of the potential witness, the technical violation of MCL 767.40a(3) does not bar
admission of the relevant evidence. Callon, supra, 256 Mich App 327. Notice of the brothers’
testimonies is imputed to defense counsel because both brothers were included on his witness
list. Indeed, defense counsel even spoke to the witnesses before deciding not to call them at trial.
To establish that the trial court abused its discretion, defendant must demonstrate that the
court’s ruling resulted in prejudice. Callon, supra, 256 Mich App 328. In their testimony, the
brothers claimed not to have made any threatening phone calls to the victim on the date of the
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trial. They also denied having any knowledge of defendant’s whereabouts at the time those calls
were placed. However, there is simply no evidence to suggest that this testimony affected the
outcome of the case. Irrespective of their testimony, the victim testified unequivocally that she
recognized defendant’s voice on the other end of the phone. Thus, it cannot be said that allowing
the brothers to testify prejudiced defendant. The trial court’s decision to allow the prosecutor to
call the brothers was not “so grossly contrary to fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of
will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias.” Callon, supra, 256 Mich App
326. Nor would “an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted . . .
say that there was no justification or excuse for the ruling.” Id. In terms of MCL 769.26, it does
not “affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in scoring OV 10 at fifteen
instead of zero, and that the current sentence departs from the correct guidelines range. Whether
the sentencing guideline variables have been properly scored is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). A sentence that is
within the guidelines range must be affirmed, except where there is an error in scoring or
inaccurate information is relied on to determine the sentence. MCL 769.34(10); see also People
v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 261; 666 NW 2d 231 (2003).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion because the aggravated domestic assault falls
squarely within the statutory definition of “predatory conduct,” warranting a score of 15 points
for OV 10. MCL 777.40(3)(a) defines predatory conduct as “preoffense conduct directed at a
victim for the primary purpose of victimization.” Defendant waited for the victim at a bus stop
on her way to work for the primary purpose of injuring her. In People v Witherspoon, 257 Mich
App 329, 336; 670 NW2d 434 (2003), this Court found similar conduct to be predatory within
the meaning of the statute.
The guidelines minimum range is 19 to 38 months based on a total of 25 OV points and
20 PRV points. MCL 777.64. The trial court imposed a sentence of 38 to 180 months in accord
with the appropriate minimum sentencing guidelines range. Resentencing is not warranted
because the sentence imposed is within the statutory sentencing guidelines.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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