GARY WUNDERLIN V WESTERN MICH UNIV BD OF TRUSTEES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GARY WUNDERLIN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 29, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY BOARD
OF TRUSTEES,
No. 243304
Court of Claims
LC No. 00-017840-CM
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Wilder and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right from a judgment dismissing plaintiff’s wrongful discharge and
due process claims after defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). We affirm.
This Court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary disposition de novo. Beaudrie v
Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129; 631 NW2d 308 (2001). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is
properly granted when the party opposing the motion “has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” MCR 2.116(C)(8); Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 373; 505 NW2d 155
(1993). A motion under this subrule tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone,
unsupported by any other documentary evidence. Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 654; 532 NW2d
842 (1995). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) should only be granted
when the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could
possibly justify a right of recovery. Wade v Dep't of Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 163; 483
NW2d 26 (1992); Abb Paint Finishing, Inc v National Union Fire Ins, 223 Mich App 559, 561;
567 NW2d 456 (1997).
In evaluating a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Where the proffered evidence fails to establish
a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119-120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
Plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition because the
evidence demonstrated that defendant lacked just cause to terminate his employment.
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Specifically, plaintiff admits that he violated certain aspects of the University Procurement Card
Policy but contends that defendant has selectively enforced the policy, and therefore is precluded
from terminating plaintiff for such violations. We disagree.
Ordinarily, where an employer has agreed that an employee may only be discharged for
cause, the trier of fact decides as a matter of fact whether the employee was discharged for cause.
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579, 620-621; 292 NW2d 880
(1980). Without substituting its opinion for that of the employer, generally the trier of fact may
determine whether the employee actually committed the specific misconduct at issue, whether
there was pretext or good cause for the termination, and whether the employer selectively
applied the rules in terminating the employee. Toussaint, supra at 622-624.
Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence established that plaintiff had
been authorized to execute certain multiple-swipe transactions above the $1,000 limit established
by the University Procurement Card Policy, or that at a minimum, his former supervisor and the
purchasing department had acquiesced in the practice; that plaintiff’s purchase of the disputed
tools constituting the basis for plaintiff’s termination was not within the scope of that exception;
that the tools purchase at issue also violated defendant’s policy requiring written bids for
purchases over $2,500; and that plaintiff failed to follow specific instructions to prepare an
inventory of existing tools before purchasing the new tools. The evidence further established
that the violations of the written policies at issue constituted insubordination, subjecting plaintiff
to discipline up to and including termination after review of the circumstances by the human
resources department, and that plaintiff was not terminated until after such review was conducted
by the human resources department. The evidence also established that while at least three other
employees who violated the card policy were terminated by defendant, there was no contrary
evidence that there had been other employees who committed substantially similar violations of
the policy but were not terminated by defendant. On the record before us, there is no genuine
issue of material fact on the questions whether the policies were violated, whether the violations
at issue constituted good cause for termination, and whether the defendant applied its policies in
a consistent fashion. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in granting
summary disposition of plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Next, plaintiff claims that defendant deprived him of his property interest in public
employment without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and under Article 1, § 17 of the Michigan Constitution. Both provisions state that
no person may be deprived “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” US Const,
Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. Due process requires that an individual be given notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. Traxler v. Ford Motor Co, 227 Mich App 276, 288; 576
NW2d 398 (1998). Whether a party was afforded due process of law is a question of law that we
review de novo. Hanlon v. Civil Service Com'n, 253 Mich App 710, 717; 660 NW2d 74 (2002).
We conclude that plaintiff was afforded due process and that his constitutional rights
were not violated. Plaintiff had a meaningful pre-termination hearing on August 4, 2000.
Plaintiff met with his supervisor, discussed his procurement card usage, and had the opportunity
to say anything that he wanted to say in regard to the purchases in dispute. While this hearing
was limited, in that it did not involve the opportunity for discovery prior to the hearing, a limited
pre-termination hearing is acceptable if coupled with adequate post-termination review. Tomiak
v Hamtramck School Dist, 426 Mich 678, 701; 397 NW2d 770 (1986).
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We also conclude that while he did not take advantage of it, plaintiff had available to him
an adequate post-termination review procedure. This post-termination process included three
levels of appeal to the human resources department, a university vice president, and finally, the
president of the university. A grievant is expressly permitted under the policy to retain legal
representation during the process. Plaintiff did not file a timely grievance under this policy, but
now asserts that he failed to do so only because one of the termination decision-makers allegedly
told him at the time of his discharge that he had no recourse. However, plaintiff cites to no
authority establishing that, even if this alleged statement was made by this individual, such a
statement renders defendant’s grievance procedure constitutionally inadequate, and we will not
search for authority to support it. Flint City Council v. Michigan, 253 Mich App 378, 393 n 2;
655 NW2d 604 (2003). Moreover, we reject plaintiff’s argument that the post-termination
procedure was faulty because the reviewers of the grievance were involved to some degree in
plaintiff’s termination. While due process requires an impartial arbiter, Vander Toorn v Grand
Rapids, 132 Mich App 590, 598;348 NW2d 697 (1984), plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to him precludes him from now contending that his due
process rights were violated. Mollett v. City of Taylor, 197 Mich App 328, 344-345; 494 NW2d
832 (1992).
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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