IN RE KIMBERLY PRANSCH MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KIMBERLY PRANSCH, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 17, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 252614
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-373401
MISHELLE REDD,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
LYLE PRANSCH,
Respondent.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Gage and Owens, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her
parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) and (l). We affirm. This
appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This is the second time respondent-appellant has appealed an order terminating her
parental rights to this Court. The first appeal involved an order terminating respondentappellant’s parental rights to three older children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and
(j). We affirmed the termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights in that case. In re
Trudell, unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 8, 2004
(Docket Nos. 246877 and Docket 246908).
Although her appellate arguments in this case are often confusing, it appears that
respondent-appellant challenges only the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence
established the statutory ground set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). We review the trial court’s
decision to terminate parental rights for clear error. MCR 3.977(J); In re Sours Minors, 459 Mich
624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). A review of the record shows that clear and convincing
evidence was presented that established the likelihood of harm to the child if returned to the
home of respondent-appellant. A Child for Clinic Study report found that there had been no
-1-
improvement since the prior termination in respondent-appellant’s insight of the circumstances
that led to that termination. This lack of improvement raises concern that respondent-appellant
would repeat her neglectful and unsafe parenting practices of the past. In addition, respondentappellant did not have independent housing and did not have employment. Therefore,
termination was properly based on subsection 19b(3)(j). It was not disputed that respondentappellant’s parental rights to three other children were previously terminated, and therefore
termination was also proper under subsection 19b(3)(1).
Furthermore, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondentappellant’s parental rights was not contrary to the child’s best interests. In re Trejo Minors, 462
Mich 341, 353-354, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Because of the high probability that
respondent-appellant had not changed her past parenting patterns of neglect, the minor child was
at a high risk of harm. Thus, termination was not contrary to the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Donald S. Owens
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.