LAWRENCE J BENTON V ROBERT BRIGGS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LAWRENCE J. BENTON, Personal
Representative of the Estate of JAMES
KENNETH MICHAEL HAGGERTY, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
June 10, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross Appellee,
v
No. 246511
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 00-023046-NO
ROBERT BRIGGS,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross
Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Murphy and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the summary dismissal of his negligence action. We affirm.
On January 12, 1998, plaintiff’s decedent was shot through the door of his apartment and
killed. Defendant owned the apartment complex. This negligence action was brought by
plaintiff, as personal representative, alleging that defendant’s failure to provide a proper door to
the apartment was a cause of the fatal injuries. During the course of the proceedings, defendant
filed a motion in limine to exclude as hearsay an eyewitness statement given to police that the
bullet that came through the door killed plaintiff’s decedent. Plaintiff argued in response that the
declarant was deceased and the statement was admissible under MRE 803(5) (recorded
recollection), MRE 803(6) (record of regularly conducted activity), and MRE 803(8) (public
record). The trial court denied defendant’s motion, holding that the statement was admissible
under MRE 803(8)(B) because the statement set forth “matters observed pursuant to duty
imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report” and constituted objective
recorded data.
Defendant then filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10),
arguing that defendant had no duty to protect plaintiff’s decedent from the criminal acts of third
parties and, in the alternative, plaintiff could not establish the requisite factual and legal
causation. In response, plaintiff argued that defendant owed a duty to provide an adequate door,
lock, and door jam to his tenant and the failure to do so proximately caused decedent’s death.
The trial court granted the motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the ground that “plaintiff
has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that the condition of the door and lock were a
proximate cause of Mr. Haggerty’s death.” Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied and
-1-
this appeal followed. Defendant filed a cross appeal from the order denying his motion in
limine.
Plaintiff argues that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the “shoddy,
thin door with inadequate door jam and lock” was a proximate cause of the decedent’s death
because he was forced to stand behind the door to keep it shut after opening the door to a person
with a gun. After de novo review, we disagree. See Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597
NW2d 817 (1999). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
sufficiency of a claim. Id. at 120. The court considers the documentary evidence submitted by
the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmovant to determine whether the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The court may not assess credibility or determine
facts. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161; 516 NW3d 475 (1994).
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
breached a duty owed which was the cause in fact and legal cause of the plaintiff’s damages.
Haliw v Sterling Heights, 464 Mich 297, 310; 627 NW2d 581 (2001); Spikes v Banks, 231 Mich
App 341, 355; 586 NW2d 106 (1998). The cause in fact element is satisfied if the plaintiff
presents substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude that, more likely than not, but for
the defendant’s negligent conduct he would not have been injured. Haliw, supra; Skinner, supra
at 162-165. If cause in fact is established, then the plaintiff must prove that, in light of the
foreseeability of the consequences of the conduct, the defendant should be held legally
responsible for such consequences. Haliw, supra; Skinner, supra at 163. The issue of causation
is ordinarily a factual question for the jury but if the facts bearing on proximate cause are not
disputed and if reasonable minds could not differ, then the issue is one of law for the court.
Reeves v Kmart Corp, 229 Mich App 466, 480; 582 NW2d 841 (1998); Rogalski v Tavernier,
208 Mich App 302, 306; 527 NW2d 73 (1995).
Here, the trial court dismissed the case after finding that there was no genuine issue of
material fact that the allegedly defective door was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s
decedent’s death. We agree. A jury could not reasonably infer from the evidence plaintiff
presented that, more likely than not, but for defendant’s failure to provide a better door and lock,
plaintiff’s decedent would not have been shot and killed. Plaintiff’s expert testimony included
that the shooting was not likely random but the result of decedent’s own criminal activities and
that it may not have been prevented by any door, door jam, or lock. Further, it is not reasonably
foreseeable that providing an inadequate apartment door would result in someone shooting
through it, killing another person standing on the other side of it. See, e.g., Harkins v Northwest
Activity Center, Inc, 434 Mich 896; 453 NW2d 677 (1990). Accordingly, the trial court properly
dismissed this case. In light of our conclusion, we need not consider defendant’s issue on cross
appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.