IN RE DAMIAN STEVENS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DAMIAN STEVENS, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 8, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 252862
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-260401-NA
ANGEL FARR,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MALCOLM GUYTON,
Respondent.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Wilder and Meter, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331,
337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The principal condition that led to adjudication was respondentappellant’s lack of parenting skills and inability to provide safe and competent care for the minor
child without the ongoing support of an adult caregiver. The record clearly indicates that the
essential impediment to progress for respondent-appellant is her intellectual functioning, which
is in the mildly retarded/borderline range. Testimony indicated that respondent-appellant
appeared unable to assimilate or apply the information taught in the three parenting courses she
has taken. Her ability to keep the minor child safe during supervised visits showed no
improvement during the course of this matter, and respondent-appellant did not progress beyond
supervised visits. Her parenting skills and understanding of child development remain limited.
A psychological evaluation completed shortly before the termination trial indicated that
respondent-appellant is unlikely to benefit from further parenting education in the near future.
Although respondent-appellant asserts on appeal that she will have the support of extended
family in caring for the minor child, respondent-appellant’s mother, whom she lived with at the
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time of the termination trial, currently had two minor children, respondent-appellant’s siblings,
removed from her own care. Given this evidence, the trial court did not clearly err by
terminating respondent-appellant’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). We conclude
that termination under statutory subsection (g) was also supported by the evidence. Respondentappellant’s placing the minor child at risk of physical harm despite repeated interventions and
reminders clearly constitutes a failure to provide proper care and custody, and the evidence
already noted also supports the trial court’s conclusion that she will not be able to provide proper
care and custody for the minor child in the reasonable future.
Finally, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was not clearly
contrary to the best interests of the minor child. MCL 712A.19b(5). The evidence at trial
indicated that Damian has done extremely well in his placement with a relative. He is a happy,
contented child and is developmentally on target. At the time of termination, the minor child
was two years old and respondent-appellant clearly remained unable to care for him at that time
or in the reasonable future. We concur with the trial court that further delay of permanency for
the minor child is not in his best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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