IN RE MOEN/LEMERE/MILLER MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KEISHA MOEN, JAYDEN
MOEN, BRIAN LEMERE, MICHAEL LEMERE,
and NADIA MILLER, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 13, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 250274
Mackinac Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-005526-NA
LAURA STURGEON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
THOMAS MOEN, BRAD LEMERE, and JOSEPH
MILLER,
Respondents.
Before: Gage, P.J., and O’Connell and Zahra, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant Sturgeon appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating
her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
The termination of Sturgeon’s parental rights followed a long, sad history of domestic
abuse by respondent Miller, serious mental instability, homelessness, and an acknowledged
inability to cope with the normal stress of parenting. Circumstances that led to the termination
petition regarding the youngest child included renewed abuse by Miller which resulted in a
cigarette burn to the infant, eviction from her residence, and another altercation with Miller that
resulted in police intervention.
Sturgeon first argues that the trial court erred in admitting inadmissible hearsay and
opinion testimony. We disagree. This issue was not raised in the trial court and is not preserved
for appellate review. Therefore, our review is limited to plain error that affected Sturgeon’s
substantial rights. In re Osborne (On Remand, After Remand), 237 Mich App 597, 606; 603
-1-
NW2d 824 (1999). The evidence challenged on appeal relates to allegations in the jurisdictional
petitions that had been admitted by Sturgeon at the initial disposition hearing for her three older
children and the separate initial disposition hearing for her youngest child. Because the court
essentially based its decision on the same grounds that were established in the initial
dispositions, the applicable court rule does not require the petitioner to present only legally
admissible evidence. MCR 3.977(G)(2). This rule allows a petitioner to provide updates
through reports, and does not require the level of validated expertise and first-hand knowledge
mandated by the rules of evidence. All the challenged evidence was fair, reliable, and
trustworthy. In re Hinson, 135 Mich App 472, 474-475; 354 NW2d 794 (1984). We find no
plain error on this record.
Sturgeon next claims that she was denied her right to effective assistance of counsel and a
fair trial because her attorney failed to object to inadmissible hearsay and opinion testimony and
failed to move for rehearing or a new trial. We disagree. Because there was no improper
admission of hearsay or opinion testimony, Sturgeon was not deprived of effective assistance by
her attorney’s failure to object. Sturgeon’s second argument arises from her inexplicable failure
to appear at the termination hearing. The trial court left open the possibility of reopening the
proofs if Sturgeon’s absence was due to an emergency or incapacity, but Sturgeon never made
this showing on the record. Because the record does not provide Sturgeon’s explanation for her
absence, she fails to rebut the presumption that her attorney’s failure to move for the reopening
of proofs was a matter of strategy rather than incompetence. Id.
The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s termination
of Sturgeon’s parental rights. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 362-365; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Further, the court did not clearly err in finding that termination of Sturgeon’s parental rights was
not clearly contrary to the children’s best interests. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
-2-
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