PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES MATTHEW EZEKIEL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 11, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 245004
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-002533
JAMES MATTHEW EZEKIEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Griffin and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of aggravated assault, MCL
750.81a, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and felon in
possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f. He was acquitted of an additional charge of felonious
assault. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of one year for the aggravated assault
conviction and sixteen to sixty months’ imprisonment for the felon in possession conviction, to
be preceded by a two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by failing to give an instruction on simple
assault or assault and battery as a lesser offense to the charge of assault with intent to do great
bodily harm. The prosecution agrees that the trial court erroneously failed to give a lesser
offense instruction on assault and battery, but argues that the error was harmless under the test
for nonconstitutional error, because it was not more probable than not that the outcome would
have been different absent the error. We note that the trial court did instruct the jury on
aggravated assault and that the jury convicted defendant of this lesser offense rather than the
charged offense of assault with intent to do great bodily harm. We review a claim of
instructional error de novo. People v Lowery, 258 Mich App 167, 173; 673 NW2d 107 (2003).
However, to warrant reversal of a conviction based on a trial court’s erroneous refusal to instruct
on a lesser offense, a defendant must show that it is more probable than not that the failure to
give the requested instruction undermined the reliability of the verdict. Id. at 172-173. We
conclude that the trial court did not err by refusing to give an instruction on assault and battery
and that any error in failing to instruct on simple assault does not warrant appellate relief.
An instruction on a requested lesser offense should be given if (1) the lesser offense is a
necessarily included lesser offense, i.e., all of its elements are contained within the elements of
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the charged offense, (2) conviction of the greater charged offense would require the jury to find a
disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser offense, and (3) a rational view of the
evidence would support conviction of the lesser offense rather than the charged offense. People
v Cornell, 466 Mich 335, 356-359; 646 NW2d 127 (2002).1
The elements of assault with intent to do great bodily harm are (1) an attempt or threat
with force or violence to do corporal harm to another, i.e., an assault, and (2) an intent to do great
bodily harm. People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 239; 575 NW2d 316 (1997). Thus, assault
and battery is not a necessarily included lesser offense of assault with intent to do great bodily
harm because battery is not an element of the latter crime.2 Accordingly, the trial court properly
refused to give a lesser offense instruction on assault and battery with regard to the assault with
intent to do great bodily harm charge.
In contrast, simple assault is plainly a necessarily included lesser offense of assault with
intent to do great bodily harm, inasmuch as an assault is one of the elements of the greater crime.
However, we conclude that any error in refusing to instruct on simple assault does not warrant
reversal in light of the absence of substantial evidence to warrant a conviction for that offense.
The crime of aggravated assault, of which defendant was convicted, consists of assaulting a
person without a weapon and inflicting serious or aggravated injury. MCL 750.81a(1). Serious
or aggravated injury for purposes of this statute includes injury that causes disfigurement.
People v Norris, 236 Mich App 411, 415 n 3; 600 NW2d 658 (1999); People v Brown, 97 Mich
App 606, 611; 296 NW2d 121 (1980).
In the present case, Dominque “Don” Govan and Crystina Jones testified that victim
Elnora Jones’ teeth were chipped during the incident. Other witnesses also testified to seeing
Elnora with chipped teeth later on the day of the incident. No witness testified to Elnora having
been assaulted, but not suffering chipped teeth as a result.3 In Cornell, supra at 365-367, our
Supreme Court held that an error in refusing to instruct on a lesser offense did not warrant relief
where there was not “substantial evidence” to support a conviction of the lesser offense as
opposed to the greater offense. We similarly conclude in this case that there was no substantial
evidence to support a conviction of simple assault, rather than aggravated assault, in light of the
testimony of multiple witnesses indicating that Elnora’s teeth were chipped during the assault, a
1
Although the Cornell decision was given limited retroactive effect, Cornell, supra at 367, the
trial in this case occurred after Cornell was decided. Accordingly, Cornell is applicable to this
case.
2
In this regard, the prosecution is incorrect in indicating that assault and battery is subsumed
within assault with intent to do great bodily harm.
3
Defendant’s brief on appeal is misleading insofar that it indicates that Dedarue Penn-Jones
(mother of Crystina and Elnora) testified that Elnora’s “teeth were chipped like they had been
chipped before,” which might suggest that Penn-Jones indicated that Elnora’s teeth were not
chipped during the incident. Penn-Jones actually testified that she saw that two of Elnora’s teeth
were broken on the day of the incident and only described one tooth as having previously been
chipped. Further, she said that the previously broken tooth had been fixed before the day of the
incident.
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form of disfigurement, but no description by a witness of an assault without Elnora’s teeth being
chipped. Thus, the trial court’s failure to instruct on the lesser offense of simple assault does not
warrant appellate relief.
Defendant also briefly argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a requested lesser
offense instruction on assault and battery or simple assault with regard to the felonious assault
charge of which defendant was acquitted. However, because defendant was acquitted outright of
the felonious assault charge, it is apparent that any error in this regard does not warrant relief
because it is not more probable than not that it undermined the reliability of the verdict. Cornell,
supra at 367; Lowery, supra at 172-173.
II
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and,
therefore, the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict. We disagree. In
determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution to decide whether it would warrant a reasonable juror in
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 640; 664 NW2d 159
(2003).
First, contrary to what defendant contends, the trial court did not err by failing to consider
the credibility of the witnesses when ruling on his motion for a directed verdict. People v
Schultz, 246 Mich App 695, 702; 635 NW2d 491 (2001). Likewise, in considering the
sufficiency of the evidence, we must make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.
Gonzalez, supra at 640-641.
As discussed previously, aggravated assault consists of assaulting an individual without a
weapon and inflicting serious or aggravated injury. MCL 750.81a(1). Such injury may include
disfigurement. Norris, supra at 415 n 3; Brown, supra at 611. Don’s testimony that defendant
hit Elnora in the mouth, causing her teeth to chip, was sufficient to support defendant’s
conviction of aggravated assault.
Felon in possession of a firearm consists of a person previously convicted of a felony
possessing a firearm before certain statutory requirements are met. MCL 750.224f. Here, Don
and Trina Govan both testified that they saw defendant holding a gun. The parties stipulated that
defendant had been previously convicted of a felony and that “the statutory requirements for
eligibility to carry a firearm have not been achieved.” Thus, there was sufficient evidence to
support defendant’s conviction of felon in possession of a firearm.
Felony-firearm consists of the possession of a firearm during the commission of or
attempt to commit a felony. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). In
this case, the predicate felony for the felony-firearm charge was felonious assault, which consists
of (1) an assault (2) with a dangerous weapon and (3) with an intent to injure or place the victim
in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery. Id. Don’s testimony that defendant pointed
a gun at him and made a remark to the effect that he was going to kill Don was sufficient
evidence to support a conclusion that defendant assaulted Don with a dangerous weapon with an
intent to place Don in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery and that defendant
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possessed a firearm at the time. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s
felony-firearm conviction.4
Defendant alternatively argues that his convictions are against the great weight of the
evidence. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on the great weight
of the evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 269; 662
NW2d 836 (2003). Defendant’s arguments rest on alleged inconsistencies in witness testimony.
However, in considering a claim that convictions are against the great weight of the evidence,
unless testimony was so far impeached as to be deprived of all probative value or the jury could
not believe it, or the testimony contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical
realities, a court must defer to the jury’s determination. People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215,
219; 673 NW2d 800 (2003).
It is apparent that defendant has provided no basis for reaching this high threshold.
Indeed, some of defendant’s suggestions of contradictory testimony are simply unfounded. For
example, defendant suggests that it was contradictory that some witnesses testified to seeing him
wearing underwear while others saw him wearing black clothing. Actually, Don and Crystina
testified that defendant was wearing underwear during the incident in which he initially
confronted the children and assaulted Elnora, while Lindbergh “David” Davis and Trina
described him as wearing black clothing at a later point when he emerged from the house. This
is not contradictory, given that defendant could have put on additional clothing inside the house
after the incident. Admittedly, there were some actual or apparent inconsistencies in witness
testimony. However, they largely involved minor details over which it is not surprising that
witnesses might have some difficulty with recollection. At a bare minimum, Don’s testimony
regarding the incident strongly supports defendant’s convictions and there is no basis for holding
that it was so impeached as to be deprived of probative force. The substantial lack of
recollection of the event by Elnora and the lesser difficulties with memory suffered by Crystina
could reasonably be attributed to the trauma of the event and their young age. It is also not
surprising that perceptions of an unexpected and rapidly moving event as described by Don and
Crystina would vary to some degree, perhaps explainable by Don’s and Crystina’s different
vantage points at various times. In sum, defendant has not established that his convictions are
against the great weight of the evidence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
4
Although defendant was acquitted of felonious assault, this did not preclude a felony-firearm
conviction. Our Supreme Court has expressly held that an acquittal by a jury of the underlying
felony to a felony-firearm charge does not require setting aside the jury’s conviction on the
felony-firearm charge. People v Lewis, 415 Mich 443, 446; 330 NW2d 16 (1982). Juries are not
held to rules of logic. Id. at 449.
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