PEOPLE OF MI V DANIEL JOHN HUTCHINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 29, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 246175
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 02-002733-FH
DANIEL JOHN HUTCHINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Saad and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant Daniel John Hutchins of three counts of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct involving a person aged thirteen to fifteen years, MCL 750.520d(1)(a). The trial
court sentenced defendant as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to three concurrent
sentences of seven years to twenty-two years and six months in prison. Defendant appeals his
convictions and sentences, and we affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the jury to pose questions to
witnesses after those questions were first screened by the trial court. Defendant acknowledges
that he failed to object to this procedure at trial; accordingly, we will review this issue for a plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.1 As defendant himself concedes, juries are
permitted to ask questions of witnesses should the trial court wish to allow the jury to do so;
whether a jury will be permitted to submit questions is left to the discretion of the trial court.
People v Heard, 388 Mich 182, 187-188; 200 NW2d 73 (1972). Because the trial court had the
discretion to allow the jurors to submit questions, we hold that its decision to do so did not
constitute error, and therefore, that there is no plain error requiring reversal.2
1
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761-763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Reversal is not required
unless there is plain error, defined as a “clear or obvious” error, that affected the outcome of the
trial. Id. Reversal is required only where the plain error results in the conviction of an actually
innocent defendant, or where the error seriously affects the fairness or integrity of the
proceedings. Id. at 763.
2
Defendant acknowledges that it is permissible to allow jurors to ask questions of witnesses, but
asks us to do away with this long-standing practice. Were we possessed of the authority to
(continued…)
-1-
Defendant also maintains that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel
because counsel stipulated (1) to the existence of defendant’s prior felony conviction of
unauthorized driving away of an automobile (“UDAA”), MCL 750.413, and (2) that the
prosecutor had the right to impeach defendant on the basis of that conviction pursuant to MRE
609. Defendant failed to move for a new trial or a Ginther3 hearing in the trial court, which
“precludes review of the issue unless the appellate record contains sufficient detail to support the
defendant’s claim.” People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620
NW2d 19 (2000). Defendant must show that his counsel’s performance “was below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms” and that a reasonable
probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for
counsel’s errors. Id. at 659. Defendant must also “overcome a strong presumption that the
assistance of his counsel was sound trial strategy.” Id. Evidence of a prior conviction may be
used to impeach the credibility of a witness under the following circumstances: (1) “the crime
contained an element of dishonesty or false statement,” or (2) if the crime (a) “contained an
element of theft,” (b) was “punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year,” and (c) the trial
court “determines that the evidence has significant probative value on the issue of credibility
and, if the witness is the defendant in a criminal trial, the court further determines that the
probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect.” People v Nelson, 234 Mich
App 454, 460-461; 594 NW2d 114 (1999), quoting MRE 609(a). Here, we hold that defendant
has not overcome the “strong presumption” that his trial counsel’s decision was “sound trial
strategy.” Sabin (On Second Remand), supra at 659. Defendant testified in his own defense, and
the prosecution sought to impeach defendant with the evidence of his UDAA conviction on
cross-examination; as a result of defense counsel’s stipulation, the prosecution stated that there
was no need to examine defendant regarding the conviction. Accordingly, defense counsel’s
decision could reasonably be interpreted as a strategic move to keep the prosecutor from asking
defendant about the conviction in open court. Moreover, in light of the other evidence against
defendant, were we to find the performance of defendant’s trial counsel to be ineffective, we
would nevertheless hold that defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance.
Further, defendant contends that the trial court made a clerical error in entering its
judgment of sentence. During sentencing, the trial court stated that it was sentencing defendant
as a second habitual offender, but the judgment of sentence indicates that defendant was
sentenced as a third habitual offender. Defendant asks us to remand this case to the trial court
for correction of this alleged clerical error. However, our review of defendant’s presentence
investigation report indicates that defendant was, indeed, convicted of two prior felonies, and
that the judgment of sentence is therefore correct. Because a court speaks through its written
orders and not through its oral pronouncements, People v Vincent, 455 Mich 110, 123; 565
NW2d 629 (1997), and because the judgment of sentence correctly reflects defendant’s habitual
offender status, we hold that there is no need to remand this case.
(…continued)
overrule the binding precedent of our Supreme Court, which we are not, we would decline to do
so here.
3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973)
-2-
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Bill Schuette
-3-
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