IN RE MURPHY/BIGGS MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of AUNDRE MURPHY, JARQUICE
MURPHY, ANTONIO BIGGS, and JESSIE
BIGGS, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 27, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 250791
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-113313-NA
HENRY BIGGS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Sawyer and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating his parental rights to
his children, Aundre Murphy (d/o/b 2/5/88), Jarquice Murphy (d/o/b 9/30/91), Antonio Biggs
(d/o/b 4/13/93), and Jessie Biggs (d/o/b 9/8/97), under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and
(j). We affirm.
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence. MCL
712A.19b. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). We review the findings
of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 5.974(I); In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 22;
610 NW2d 563 (2000). A finding is clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Jackson, supra at 25. Once a statutory ground for
termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence, the parent against whom termination
proceedings have been brought has the burden of going forward with some evidence that
termination is clearly not in the children’s best interests. Terry, supra at 22. If no such showing
is made and a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court is without
discretion; it must terminate parental rights, unless the court finds from evidence on the whole
record that termination is clearly not in the children’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,
356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); MCL 712A.19b(5).
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the statutory
grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree. MCL
712A.19b(3)(g) provides that the trial court may terminate parental rights to children if it finds
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by clear and convincing evidence that the parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper
care or custody for the children and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able
to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the children’s age.1 In
the instant case, the evidence demonstrated that Aundre had learning disabilities and required
special education at school, as well as asthma that required daily medication. Jarquice had
learning disabilities that qualified him for special education at school, and had ADHD (Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) that required medication three times per day. Antonio had
learning disabilities that qualified him for special education at school, had ADHD that required
medication three times per day, and had a club foot for which he had to wear a brace. Jessie had
ADHD that required medication three times per day, and had a club foot for which he had to
wear a brace. The children all attended weekly individual therapy and attended family therapy
twice per month. Jarquice, Antonio, and Jessie saw a neurologist once per month for their
ADHD. Antonio and Jessie saw a foot specialist approximately once per month, but would
eventually visit a specialist once every six months.
Although the children had remained in foster care for over two and a half years,
respondent had not obtained suitable housing for them at the time of the hearing. Additionally,
respondent had not demonstrated that he would be able to meet the children’s special educational
needs. While respondent attended two parent/teacher conferences when a foster care worker
picked him up and drove him to the conferences, he failed to attend any of the eight other
appointments at the children’s schools, including the Individualized Education Plan meetings for
the three children who received special education services. Respondent also failed to attend any
one of twenty of the children’s medical appointments. Further, while respondent attended six
appointments with the children’s neurologist who treated them for ADHD, he failed to attend
eight of them. Respondent attended fifteen appointments with the family therapist, and missed
three and attended six of eight appointments with the children’s therapist. Additionally,
respondent admitted that he did not have a valid driver’s license, and upon learning this,
respondent’s mother stated that she would no longer let respondent borrow her car to attend the
children’s various appointments.
Following two psychological evaluations of respondent, a clinical psychologist testified
that respondent’s prognosis for successful parenting was poor. This was due in part to
respondent’s mildly retarded comprehension level, which would impact his ability to parent in
that where it would be difficult to parent “normal” children who did not have problems, the
difficulty would be exacerbated with the children in the instant case who had numerous special
needs. Respondent’s impaired comprehension made it difficult for him to understand the nature
of the children’s problems and identify the symptoms of ADHD. Respondent’s mental
limitations would also make it difficult for him to administer the necessary treatment, identify
the children’s needs, and find ways to cope with those needs. Specifically, while respondent had
the ability to mechanically administer medication, it would be difficult for him to determine
whether the medication was working properly.
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Because only one statutory ground is required for termination, it is unnecessary to address the
trial court’s findings with respect to the other statutory grounds.
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Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, we do not believe the trial court clearly
erred in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) was established by clear and convincing evidence.
MCR 5.974(I); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). Termination of
respondent’s parental rights was warranted where the trial court found by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent, without regard to intent, failed to provide proper care or custody for
the children, and there was no reasonable expectation that he would be able to provide proper
care and custody within a reasonable time, considering the children’s age. While we commend
respondent for his successful completion of a substance abuse program, and his attendance at the
family therapy sessions, his failure to attend his children’s numerous doctor’s appointments and
school meetings, and his inability to monitor his children at the level necessary for successful
treatment of their ADHD supports the trial court’s termination of respondent’s parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights because
petitioner failed to appropriately accommodate his intellectual limitations. We disagree. While
claimed violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101, et seq., are not
a defense to termination of parental rights proceedings, the ADA does require the Family
Independence Agency to make reasonable accommodations for those individuals with disabilities
so that all persons may receive the benefits of public programs and services. Terry, supra at 25.
The record reveals that following termination of respondent’s parental rights to other children,
the trial court determined that the FIA had not been clear about its expectations of respondent.
To address the problem during the present termination proceedings, the foster care worker
reviewed the parent/agency agreement with respondent and had him initial the provisions to
indicate his understanding. Moreover, respondent admitted that he understood what was
expected of him and the evidence demonstrated that petitioner took respondent’s intellectual
limitations into account following the first termination proceedings. Id. at 26.
Respondent claims that petitioner did not offer or require him to attend parenting classes
concerning parenting children with ADHD. Respondent argues that petitioner’s requirement that
he attend the children’s appointments with their neurologist and read information about ADHD
given to him by the foster care worker was insufficient to accommodate his disability. However,
respondent does not claim that he failed to attend the appointments with the neurologist because
of his disability. Rather, he stated that he did not attend the appointments because he must have
had something more important to do. Respondent also argues that the service plan was worded
in such a way that he could not understand it. While one of the sentences in the service plan was
complicated, the foster care worker testified that she reviewed the plan with respondent and had
him initial the plan to indicate that he understood it. Therefore, respondent’s argument that the
FIA did not make reasonable accommodations to accommodate his intellectual disability is
without merit.
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by not finding that termination of his
parental rights was clearly not in the best interests of the children. Respondent does not argue
that the trial court clearly erred concerning its findings with regard to Aundre’s best interests;
therefore, respondent has abandoned that issue. Yee v Shiawasee Co Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich
App 379, 406; 651 NW2d 756 (2002). With respect to Jarquice and Antonio, respondent only
argues that the evidence did not show that termination of his rights was in the best interests of the
children, because they sometimes vacillated between wanting to stay with their foster family and
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returning to live with him. With respect to Jessie, respondent argues that the evidence did not
show that termination of his rights was in the best interests of the child, based on the
psychologist’s testimony that he would be the easiest child to manage. However, the trial court’s
finding that a ground for termination had been established is supported by the record. Moreover,
respondent does not argue, and the evidence did not establish, that termination was clearly not in
the children’s best interest. MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra at 356-357. Therefore, even if this
issue was properly preserved, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent’s
parental rights to the minor children.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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