IN RE HAKALA/OLSON MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CODY HAKALA and ASHLEY
OLSON, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 22, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 250461
Dickinson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000506-NA
KERRI OLSON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
EDWARD OLSON, JR.,
Respondent.
In the Matter of CODY HAKALA and ASHLEY
OLSON, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 250482
Dickinson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000506-NA
EDWARD OLSON, JR.,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
KERRI OLSON,
Respondent.
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Before: White, P.J., and Markey and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent-mother Kerri Olson appeals as of right the
termination of her parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i),
(c)(ii), (g) and (j), and respondent-father Edward Olson, Jr., appeals as of right the termination of
his parental rights to his daughter pursuant to the same statutory grounds. We affirm.
Respondents challenge the trial court’s findings concerning the statutory grounds for
termination. To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 632-633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If the court
determines that a statutory ground for termination has been established, the court must terminate
parental rights unless there exists clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in
the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407
(2000). We review the trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights for clear error. In re
Trejo, supra at 356-357; In re Sours, supra at 633. The decision “must strike us as more than
just maybe or probably wrong . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Due
regard is given to the special ability of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses
before it. See MCR 2.613(C).
The children came into care because respondent-father threw his stepson, lied about the
incident, and instructed respondent-mother to lie and his stepson to withhold information when
asked about the injury. Respondent-mother was aware that on several occasions respondentfather’s discipline was excessive, yet she did not intervene. She accommodated the court’s nocontact order between respondent-father and her son by leaving her son with a babysitter for
days at a time. When the court later ordered respondent-father to leave the home, respondentmother left their daughter with a babysitter for an excessive period of time so that she could be
with respondent-father.
During the year that this case was pending, respondents failed to fully comply with the
court’s orders, particularly with respect to cooperating with the caseworkers. Respondents
deceived caseworkers with respect to an injury that respondent-father caused to respondentmother. Respondent-mother also deceived a caseworker concerning her contacts with
respondent-father and was untruthful in her responses to a diagnostic survey concerning
domestic abuse that she completed for Caring House. Both respondents refused to provide their
phone numbers. They also refused and failed to cooperate with services. While they complied
with some of the orders, some of the time, the court properly regarded their failure to
substantially comply with the court’s orders and case service plan as evidence of their inability to
provide proper care and custody. In re Trejo, supra at 360-363. Moreover, their failure to
substantially comply with the court’s orders and case service plan was an indication that the
neglect that had been shown would continue because they did not demonstrate a willingness to
change. In re Miller, 182 Mich App 70, 83; 451 NW2d 576 (1990).
Respondent-mother contends that the trial court erred in finding a reasonable likelihood
of harm if the children were returned to her care because there was no evidence that she was
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abusive. Although she did not abuse the children herself, and recognized at times that her
relationship with respondent-father was abusive, she ultimately decided to end divorce
proceedings and resume her relationship with him because he “might not be that violent,” and
she “didn’t want to be on [her] own.” While respondent-father might have made some limited
progress, there was no basis to conclude that he would suddenly become nonviolent, noncontrolling and non abusive. The trial court’s conclusions that, to her children’s detriment,
respondent-mother elected to choose respondent-father over the children, and that there was a
reasonable likelihood the children would be harmed if returned to respondents’ care were
supported by the record.
Respondent-father contends that there was no evidence suggesting a likelihood of harm to
his daughter if she were returned to his care. However, his mistreatment of his stepson is
evidence of how he would be likely to treat his daughter. In re Schmeltzer, 175 Mich App 666,
678; 438 NW2d 866 (1989).
Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j)
were each established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to both respondents.1 In re
IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 450; 592 NW2d 751 (1999).
Because a statutory ground for termination was established, the court was required to
terminate respondents’ parental rights absent clear evidence on the whole record that termination
was not in the children’s best interests. In re Trejo, supra at 354; MCL 712A.19b(5). No such
“clear evidence” existed in this case. Respondents’ relationship was unstable and abusive, and
neither respondent demonstrated a willingness to place the needs of the children first.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald S. Owens
1
The trial court also cited § 19b(3)(c)(ii) as a statutory basis for termination, but it did not
specify what “other conditions” caused the children to come within the court’s jurisdiction.
Because only one statutory ground is required to support termination of parental rights, it is
unnecessary to consider whether termination was appropriate under § 19b(3)(c)(ii).
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