PEOPLE OF MI V MELVIN JACKSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 6, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
MELVIN JACKSON, a/k/a EUGENE BROWN,
No. 243815
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-010118
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Saad and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from jury convictions of possession with intent to deliver
less than fifty grams of heroin, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), carrying a concealed weapon, MCL
750.227, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He
was later sentenced to concurrent prison terms of two to twenty years on the controlled substance
conviction and two to five years on the CCW conviction, to be served consecutively to the
mandatory two-year term for felony-firearm. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences
but remand for correction of the presentence report. This appeal is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for
lack of a speedy trial. Whether a defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial is a
constitutional issue that is reviewed de novo on appeal. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 111;
605 NW2d 28 (1999). However, the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 459; 564 NW2d 158 (1997).
A criminal defendant has a right to a speedy trial. People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583,
602; 617 NW2d 339 (2000). Whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial
involves consideration of four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay,
(3) defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Cain, supra at 112. If
the delay is less than eighteen months, the burden is on the defendant to prove that he was
prejudiced by the delay. A delay of eighteen months or more is presumptively prejudicial and
the burden is on the prosecutor to rebut the presumption. Id.
Charges were issued against defendant in November 1997. He was not actually tried
until May 2001, a delay of forty-two months. Although the delay is substantial, “[t]he length of
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the delay is insufficient in and of itself to require dismissal.” People v Simpson, 207 Mich App
560, 564; 526 NW2d 33 (1994).
The reasons for the delay were mostly the fault of defendant. The first trial date in
August 1998 had to be adjourned because defendant failed to appear for the special conference
scheduled two weeks earlier. He failed to appear for the new conference date and was missing
for a month. Defendant failed to appear for the final conference in November 1998 and was
missing for seven months. Trial was rescheduled for March 20, 2000 but could not go forward
because defendant discharged his attorney. Trial was rescheduled for January 2001 and
defendant failed to appear. Trial was rescheduled for February 22, 2001 but could not go
forward because defendant discharged his attorney.
Defendant waited until the day of trial to assert his right to a speedy trial. Defendant’s
failure to assert his right in a timely manner weighs against a finding that he was denied a speedy
trial. People v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 112; 503 NW2d 701 (1993).
The right to a speedy trial protects “three interests of the defendant: (1) prevention of
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused; (3)
limitation of the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” People v White, 54 Mich App
342, 351; 220 NW2d 789 (1974). “In considering the prejudice to the defendant, the most
serious inquiry is whether the delay has impaired the defendant’s defense.” Simpson, supra at
564.
The record indicates that defendant was out on bond at times while the case was pending.
He was also incarcerated at various times, but there is some indication in the record that his
incarceration was due in part to a sentence imposed in another case rather than his failure to post
bond in this case. According to the presentence report, he was only incarcerated pending trial in
this case from January 30, 2001 forward. In his motion, defendant did not assert that his defense
was prejudiced in any manner due to the delay and there is nothing in the record to indicate
otherwise.
Although the delay was substantial, it was mostly attributable to defendant’s actions.
Because defendant did not assert his right in a timely manner and there is no indication that his
defense was prejudiced by the delay, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant’s motion. Simpson, supra.
Defendant next contends that he is entitled to resentencing because he was not given the
proper number of days’ credit for time served.
Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state
and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or
unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, the trial court in
imposing sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such
time served in jail prior to sentencing. [MCL 769.11b.]
This statute authorizes credit for time served on the offense of which the defendant is ultimately
convicted. If a defendant is incarcerated because of a sentence on another conviction, he is not
entitled to credit. People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 125-126; 575 NW2d 84 (1997).
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The presentence report indicated that defendant was jailed pending trial on the instant
charges from January 30, 2001 onward. The trial court found that any other periods of
incarceration were due to a conviction in a different case. Defendant disputes this but has
presented no evidence to show that he was incarcerated during those periods due to an inability
to furnish bond for the instant offenses and there is nothing in the record to show that such was
the case. Therefore, defendant has failed to establish any error in the calculation of his sentence
credit.
Defendant lastly contends that he is entitled to resentencing because he was sentencing
on the basis of inaccurate information. The sentencing court’s response to a claim of
inaccuracies in the presentence report is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Spanke,
254 Mich App 642, 648; 658 NW2d 504 (2003).
A defendant has a “due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate
information.” People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 173; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). A presentence
report is presumed accurate unless effectively challenged by the defendant. People v Callon, 256
Mich App 312, 334; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). Whether a flat denial of an adverse factual assertion
constitutes an effective challenge or whether an affirmative factual showing is required depends
on the nature of the disputed matter. Id. Once the defendant raises an effective challenge, the
prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the facts are as asserted. People
v Ratkov (After Remand), 201 Mich App 123, 125; 505 NW2d 886 (1993).
The sentencing court must respond to a challenge to the accuracy of the presentence
report, but has wide latitude in how it responds. Spanke, supra. It may determine whether the
information is accurate, accept the defendant’s version, or disregard the challenged information.
Id. If the court chooses to disregard the information, it must indicate on the record that it did not
consider the information in determining the defendant’s sentence. If the court finds the
information is irrelevant or inaccurate, the presentence report shall be amended and the
inaccurate or irrelevant information must be stricken. Id. at 649; MCL 771.14(6).
The report indicated that defendant’s prior history included a 1955 arrest for larceny in
Kansas for which he was sentenced to two years and a 1961 arrest for soliciting in Canada.
Defendant said the report was incorrect. The court noted that the information regarding the 1955
and 1961 charges was so vague that it did not clearly establish that defendant had been convicted
and thus the information could remain as is. Defense counsel agreed. Because defense counsel
agreed with the court’s decision not to change the information regarding the 1955 and 1961
convictions, any claim of error has been waived. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206; 612 NW2d
144 (2000).
The report also indicated that defendant had a 1993 conviction for attempted larceny in a
building in Romulus for which he was sentenced to probation. He challenged the information as
“incorrect” and denied “that this was him who was convicted of the attempt of larceny in a
building.” The court found that the Romulus conviction was in the computer records “under his
name, under his date of birth” and declined to delete it. The court resolved the challenge to the
1993 Romulus conviction by verifying it in its computer records. Defendant has not shown that
the records were wrong or that the information regarding the conviction was otherwise incorrect.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in resolving that challenge.
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The presentence report showed a 1985 conviction out of Troy, a 1993 conviction out of
Birmingham, and a 1993 conviction out of Troy. At sentencing, defendant challenged “the
offense in 1985 in Troy . . . and the conviction in Birmingham in ninety-four” as incorrect. On
appeal, defendant contends that the 1993 convictions out of Birmingham and Troy “were the
same case.” Defendant failed to challenge the accuracy of the report regarding the 1993 Troy
convictions. Defendant only challenged a 1994 conviction in Birmingham. However, the
presentence report did not reference a 1994 conviction out of Birmingham and thus there was
nothing for the court to resolve. Assuming defendant intended to challenge the 1993
Birmingham conviction and counsel simply misspoke when he said 1994, defendant has not
shown a right to relief. While he contends that the Birmingham conviction was the same as the
Troy conviction, he has not briefed the merits of this claim, which is therefore deemed
abandoned. People v Kent, 194 Mich App 206, 210; 486 NW2d 110 (1992).
The presentence report indicated on the face page that defendant had a GED. It stated on
page one that defendant went through ninth grade but “stated that he earned his GED while in the
Army.” Defendant said the report was incorrect because he graduated from high school and had
some college credits. The trial court noted the objection. It crossed out GED on the face page of
the report and wrote in next to the heading Education, “High School Northern H. School Det.” It
failed to address defendant’s claim regarding his college credits. Therefore, remand for
correction of the presentence report is appropriate. MCL 771.14(6); Spanke, supra at 650.
Given, however, that the court had the benefit of the appropriate information before passing
sentence and that defendant does not claim that his sentence was disproportionate, resentencing
is not required. People v McAllister, 241 Mich App 466, 474; 616 NW2d 203 (2000).
Defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed but the matter is remanded for
correction of the presentence report. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Bill Schuette
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