IN RE PARKER/CARTER MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DARLISA PARKER,
CHRISTOPHER PARKER, SHONDREA
PARKER, KEYLA CARTER, and CORLANDIS
CARTER, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 25, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 251257
Muskegon Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-030126-NA
CONSTANCE PARKER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Saad and Schuette, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g).1 We affirm.
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re Jackson,
199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). This Court reviews the trial court’s findings of
fact for clear error. MCR 5.974(I); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999), reh
den 460 Mich 1205; 598 NW2d 351 (1999). A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing
court is left with the firm and definite conviction that a mistake was made. Jackson. Once the
petitioner has established a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence,
the trial court shall order the termination of parental rights unless it finds from evidence on the
whole record that termination is clearly not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re
Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The trial court’s decision regarding the
child’s best interests is reviewed for clear error. Id., 356-357.
1
The trial court’s order also terminated the parental rights of non-participating respondents
Vincent B. Smith and Christopher Carter, the children’s putative fathers. Smith and Carter have
not appealed the trial court’s order.
-1-
We hold that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner established by
clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more statutory grounds for the termination
of respondent’s parental rights. The children were removed from respondent’s custody because
she suffered from mental instability, was homeless, and engaged in domestic violence. Petitioner
offered respondent various services to assist her in addressing these issues; however, at the time
of the permanent custody hearing, which took place nearly two years after the children were
taken into custody, respondent had made virtually no progress in stabilizing her living
conditions. She was incarcerated while awaiting trial on a criminal charge, and acknowledged
that she would be unable to care for the children upon her release. She could not offer a viable
plan for the children while she was incarcerated. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was warranted on the grounds that the conditions that
lead to adjudication continued to exist and were not reasonably likely to be rectified within a
reasonable time, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), and that respondent was unable to provide proper care
or custody for the children and could not be expected to do so within a reasonable time, MCL
712A.19b(3)(g). Furthermore, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that the evidence
did not show that termination of respondent’s parental rights was clearly not in the children’s
best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Bill Schuette
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
