LATACHA COOK V ANTONY COOK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LATACHA COOK,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 243839
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-108719-DM
ANTONY COOK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and White and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce. We affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand for correction of the real property distribution based upon the stipulation of the
parties with consideration of the pre-marital contribution by the defendant in accordance with
this opinion.
Defendant’s first issue on appeal is that the trial court erred by granting plaintiff sole
physical custody and joint legal custody with defendant of the parties’ four minor children based
upon a finding of facts unsupported by the record. Defendant argues that the trial court’s
findings of fact were erroneous because there was no testimony to support them. We disagree.
“‘To expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and final adjudication,
all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge
made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of
discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.’” Harvey v Harvey, 257 Mich App 278, 282283; 668 NW2d 187 (2003), quoting MCL 722.28. There are several factors that must each be
considered by the trial court in making a custody determination. Bowers v Bowers, 198 Mich
App 320, 327-328; 497 NW2d 602 (1993); MCL 722.23. A trial court is required to consider
each factor, and to explicitly state its findings for each one. Bowers, supra, 198 Mich App 328.
The trial court’s statement of its findings need not be overly detailed; indeed, it can be “terse,” so
long as it encompasses each of the factors. Id.
We have reviewed the record, and find ample testimony to support the trial court’s
findings of fact, and that the trial court properly considered each statutory factor and clearly
expressed its findings for each one on the record. Defendant’s position is apparently rooted in
defendant’s initial failure to obtain and review the transcripts from the first day of trial in this
case. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has not made a sufficient showing that the trial
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court’s decision was against the great weight of evidence, that it abused its discretion, or that it
made a clear error of law.
Defendant’s next issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that an established
custodial environment existed with plaintiff. We disagree.
“Whether an established custodial environment exists is a question of fact for the trial
court to resolve on the basis of statutory criteria.” Hayes v Hayes, 209 Mich App 385, 388; 532
NW2d 190 (1995); see also Ireland v Smith, 214 Mich App 235, 241; 542 NW2d 344 (1995),
aff’d, modified 451 Mich 457 (1996). “‘The custodial environment of a child is established if
over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for
guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.’” Ireland, supra at 241,
quoting MCL 722.27(1)(c).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ignoring a previous temporary custody order
granting plaintiff and defendant joint legal and physical custody; however, previous orders of
custody are irrelevant. Hayes, supra at 388. “In determining whether an established custodial
environment exists, it makes no difference whether that environment was created by a court
order, without a court order, in violation of a court order, or by a court order that was
subsequently reversed.” Id. The trial court cited testimony from the record that showed that the
children looked to plaintiff for most of the things for which children depend upon parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its decision.
Defendant’s next issue on appeal is that the trial court committed an error requiring
reversal in not recording its in camera interview with the parties’ three eldest children.
Defendant cites this Court’s decision in Molloy v Molloy, 247 Mich App 348, 351-352; 637
NW2d 803 (2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part 466 Mich 852 (2002), which mandated that all in
camera interviews of children in custody cases be recorded and sealed for appellate review.
However, our Supreme Court subsequently issued an order affirming that decision in part, and
specifically vacating that portion of this Court’s opinion holding that such in camera interviews
be recorded. Molloy v Molloy, 466 Mich 852, 643 NW2d 574 (2002). In Foskett v Foskett, 247
Mich App 1, 10-12; 634 NW2d 363 (2001), this Court reversed the trial court’s grant of custody
where the findings of fact relating to the statutory best interest factors were based almost solely
on an unrecorded in camera interview with the child in question. Here, however, the interview
was but one piece of evidence among many others that the trial court considered in reaching its
decision. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court was not mandated to record the in camera
interview, and did not err in failing to do so.
Defendant’s next issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in including the marital home
in the marital estate when dividing property where defendant purchased the home prior to the
marriage with separate funds. We agree.
Generally, the separate property of each spouse in a divorce remains that spouse’s
separate property, and the trial court cannot invade separate property for distribution in a divorce
except under two statutory exceptions: (1) under MCL 552.23, “if the estate and effects awarded
to either party are insufficient for the suitable support and maintenance of either party and any
children of the marriage as are committed to the care and custody of either party, the court may
further award to either party the part of the real and personal estate of either party and spousal
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support out of the real and personal estate,” and (2) under MCL 552.401, where “it appears from
the evidence in the case that the party contributed to the acquisition, improvement, or
accumulation of the property.” See Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490, 495-496; 575 NW2d 1
(1997). Both spouses have an interest in the increase in value of a marital home during the
course of the marriage. Korth v Korth, 256 Mich App 286, 292-293; 662 NW2d 111 (2003),
citing Reeves, supra at 495-496. However, where the marital home is purchased prior to the
marriage by one of the parties using separate property, the down payment, equity built before the
marriage, and any appreciation that occurred before the marriage is separate property of that
party. Korth, supra at 293; Reeves, supra at 496. A trial court errs when it considers the entire
equity of the marital home part of the marital estate in such a situation. Reeves, supra at 496.
In this case, the parties stipulated that defendant purchased the marital home in 1993, two
years prior to the marriage, for $15,500 cash. In 1997, the parties mortgaged the house, with a
balance at the time of trial of $35,898.12. The parties stipulated that the value of the home at the
time of the trial was between $52,000 and $65,000.
The trial court, in its opinion, recognized that the house was purchased with separate
funds, but stated that it would not consider this fact because of plaintiff’s need to care for the
children. However, the trial court awarded plaintiff $350 per week in child support payments
from defendant. Furthermore, the trial court noted that both parties “have about the same
earning potential.” The record evidence shows comparable earnings and the trial court found
only a two hundred dollar per week after tax disparity. The trial court noted that defendant made
slightly more money than plaintiff at the time because he had been employed by
DaimlerChrysler slightly longer (both parties were employed by DaimlerChrysler at the time and
defendant worked more over-time) and that plaintiff would need more financial resources to
support the children, but then immediately proceeded to hold that no spousal support would be
ordered.
While it does not appear that the trial court made any errors in its factual findings, we
agree with defendant that the trial court’s division of property relating to the marital home is
inequitable. The trial court explicitly refused to consider the value of that part of the home that
represented property separate from the marital estate, as defined by Reeves, supra, and Korth,
supra. No record evidence was provided by plaintiff concerning need for additional support
such that the separate property of defendant should be invaded. It is unclear, then, how the trial
court might equitably have reached the conclusion that the portion of the equity lawfully
considered part of the marital estate is insufficient for plaintiff’s support of the children,
especially in light of the trial court’s explicit finding that both parties are approximately equally
situated financially, and in light of the trial court’s award of approximately $1,400 per month for
child support. However, in light of Reeves, supra, and Korth, supra, we do not agree with
defendant that the entire equity value of the home should be considered his separate property.
Defendant’s final issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in valuing the marital home
at $70,000 where the parties stipulated its value to be between $52,000 and $65,000. We agree.
This Court has held that “stipulations of fact are binding, but stipulations of law are not
binding.” Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 426; 664 NW2d 231 (2003). In this case, the
parties were not able to stipulate to an exact value of the marital home, as plaintiff contended that
the property was worth $65,000, and defendant contended the property was worth $52,000;
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however, the parties stipulated that to those figures as the range for the value of the home. The
trial court assigned a value of $70,000, but it appears from its opinion that it had intended to base
its valuation on the testimony of the parties, stating “it’s the Court’s recollection from my notes
that that was the number given by the parties.” However, our review of the record reveals no
testimony that would support such a finding. Indeed the trial court acknowledged that the parties
stipulated that the property was worth not less than $52,000 (defendant’s value), but not more
than $65,000 (plaintiff’s value). Comparable property value estimates were stipulated into
evidence. The trial court was bound by the stipulation to assign a value at or within the parties
valuation. Accordingly, we agree with defendant that the trial court’s valuation of the property is
clearly erroneous.
We reverse the judgment of divorce to the extent that it includes the entire value of the
marital home in the division of property, and to the extent that it valued the home at $70,000; we
affirm the judgment of divorce as it relates to all other issues, including the custody of the
parties’ children. We remand this case to the trial court with instruction to amend the judgment
valuing the home at a price consistent with the parties’ stipulation, and to reconsider the award to
plaintiff of her share of the equity of the home.As stated in Reeves, supra at 497, “After properly
recognizing the parties’ separate estates and the marital estate, the court may consider whether
invasion of defendant’s estate is necessary. Before the court may invade defendant’s separate
estate it must specifically find that one of the two statutory exceptions exists.” In that regard the
trial court may consider additional evidence on remand to determine if invasion of defendant’s
separate estate is necessary, articulate the basis upon which such invasion is necessary, and
determine the appropriate amount. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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