PEOPLE OF MI V KEVIN EUGENE MARTIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 17, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244073
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 01-011234-FH
KEVIN EUGENE MARTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Meter and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction of possession of less than twenty-five grams
of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v), entered after a bench trial, and his sentencing as a fourth
habitual offender, MCL 769.12. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant’s vehicle was stopped as it drove through an area in which narcotics
transactions were known to take place. Two officers observed defendant reach to the area in
back of the front passenger seat. A search of the vehicle revealed a pill bottle containing white
powder in the map pocket on the back of the front passenger seat. The parties stipulated that the
pill bottle contained cocaine.The trial court found defendant guilty of possession of less than
twenty-five grams of cocaine, and sentenced him to nine months in jail, with credit for one day.
The trial court did not make a finding regarding defendant’s status as a fourth habitual offender.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial, we view
the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and determine whether a
rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. The trier of fact may make reasonable inferences from direct or circumstantial
evidence in the record. People v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 268-270, 275; 380 NW2d 11 (1985);
People v Vaughn, 186 Mich App 376, 379-380; 465 NW2d 365 (1990).
Possession of a controlled substance may be actual or constructive. Mere presence is
insufficient. An additional link between the defendant and the controlled substance must be
shown. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences based on the evidence are sufficient
to prove possession. People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 515; 583 NW2d 199 (1998).
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Drug profile evidence may be admitted if: (1) it is offered as background or modus
operandi evidence, and not as substantive evidence of guilt; (2) other evidence is admitted to
establish the defendant’s guilt; (3) the appropriate use of the profile evidence is made clear to the
jury; and (4) no expert witness is permitted to opine that, based on the profile, the defendant is
guilty, or to compare the defendant’s characteristics with the profile in a way which suggests
guilt. The admission of drug profile evidence is subject to a harmless error analysis. People v
Williams, 240 Mich App 316, 320-321; 614 NW2d 647 (2000).
First, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of drug profile
evidence. We disagree. Defendant failed to object to the admission of this evidence; therefore,
absent plain error, he is not entitled to relief. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597
NW2d 130 (1999). A police officer offered drug profile evidence as background evidence, but
also was permitted to opine that based on the profile, defendant was conducting narcotics
transactions from his vehicle. This opinion evidence was improperly admitted; however, we
conclude that because the case was tried to the court rather than a jury and because other
evidence was introduced to establish defendant’s guilt, the error was not plain but rather was
harmless. A judge sitting as the factfinder is presumed to understand the law and to be able to
ignore evidentiary errors and decide a case based solely on properly admitted evidence. People v
Taylor, 245 Mich App 293, 305; 628 NW2d 55 (2001). The trial court referred to the drug
profile evidence when it found that defendant knowingly possessed cocaine, but also relied on
the evidence that just before his vehicle was stopped, defendant reached his arm to the back of
the front passenger seat. The bottle containing cocaine was found in the map pocket on the back
of the front passenger seat. This evidence supported an inference that defendant was attempting
to conceal the bottle because he knew it contained cocaine. Fetterley, supra. Reversal is not
warranted under the circumstances. Carines, supra; Williams, supra.
Next, defendant argues that his conviction must be reversed, or that he is entitled to
resentencing, because he was not arraigned on the information charging him as a fourth habitual
offender, and because the trial court did not determine his status as a habitual offender prior to
imposing sentence. We disagree. A notice of intent to seek sentence enhancement based on
habitual offender status must be filed with the court and served on the defendant within twentyone days after the arraignment or the filing of the information. MCL 769.13(1). Defendant was
not entitled to be arraigned on the supplemental information charging him as a habitual offender.
The existence of a defendant’s prior convictions is determined by the court either at sentencing
or at a pre-sentencing hearing. MCL 769.13(5). The prior convictions may be established by
any relevant evidence, including information contained in the presentence report. MCL
769.13(5)(c); People v Green, 228 Mich App 684, 700; 580 NW2d 444 (1998). Due process is
satisfied if the sentence is based on accurate information regarding the existence of prior
convictions and if the defendant had the opportunity at sentencing to challenge the information.
People v Williams, 215 Mich App 234, 236; 544 NW2d 480 (1996). The presentence report
listed defendant’s prior convictions. The trial court acknowledged defense counsel’s statement
that the guidelines took into consideration defendant’s status as a habitual offender. The trial
court was aware of defendant’s prior convictions. Defendant had the opportunity to challenge
the information upon which his status as a habitual offender was based, and did not do so. His
sentence did not violate due process. MCL 769.13(5)(c); Green, supra; Williams, supra.
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To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms. Counsel must have made errors so serious that he was not performing as the “counsel”
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20;
People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Counsel’s deficient performance
must have resulted in prejudice. To demonstrate the existence of prejudice, a defendant must
show a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would
have been different. Id., 600.
Defendant argues that trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of drug profile
evidence and to his sentencing as a habitual offender deprived him of the effective assistance of
counsel. We disagree. Defendant has not shown prejudice in that he has not established that had
counsel objected to the introduction of the drug profile evidence, the result of the proceedings
would have been different. Carbin, supra. Defendant’s sentence as a fourth habitual offender
was proper. Counsel was not required to advocate a meritless position. People v Snider, 239
Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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