IN RE SPELL/COPELAND MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ASHLEY YA SHONE’Y SPELL,
BRIAN AARON SPELL, DEVIN MAURICE
COPELAND, and TAIJI LAILA COPELAND,
Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 10, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 249114
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-411912
SEAN NOEL COPELAND,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
SAIEDIA ROCHELL, a/k/a ROCHEAL SPELL,
and ISHOLA SOLOMON ADEWALE,
Respondents.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., Gage and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Sean Noel Copeland appeals as of right from the trial court’s order
terminating his parental rights to the minor children, Devin and Taiji, pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm.
Respondent first argues his attorney was denied an opportunity to review certain medical
records or to present testimony at the jurisdictional phase. However, the record indicates counsel
was afforded an opportunity to review the “voluminous” medical records before trial, but failed
to make arrangements to do so. Moreover, counsel stated on the record that she had no witnesses
to present on the question of jurisdiction.
Respondent also argues the trial court clearly erred in finding that the statutory grounds
for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree. We review the
trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 351; 612 NW2d 407
(2000). If the trial court determines that the petitioner has proven by clear and convincing
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evidence the existence of one or more statutory grounds for termination, the court must terminate
parental rights unless it finds from evidence on the whole record that termination is clearly not in
the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 353-354. We review a trial
court’s decision to terminate parental rights for clear error. MCR 5.974(I); In re Sours, 459
Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
We hold that the trial court did not clearly err in finding petitioner established by clear
and convincing evidence the existence of one or more statutory grounds for the termination of
respondent’s parental rights. The instant case arose when six-week-old Taiji was admitted to the
hospital “for seizures and vomiting.” Respondent and the mother were Taiji’s sole caretakers.
X-rays revealed “at least four healing posterior rib fractures, multiple old posterior rib fractures
and one lateral rib fracture indicating traumatic injury.” Further examination revealed that
Taiji’s numerous rib fractures had occurred at different times. Taiji would have been in
“substantial” pain for several weeks as a result of the numerous rib fractures. Taiji had “an acute
fracture of the proximal right arm,” which was probably suffered less than two weeks before
hospitalization. Also, Taiji had a subdural hematoma, or “bleed,” on the left side of her brain, a
“type of injury [which] can occur only with very severe force,” such as “a very erratic
acceleration and deceleration of the head.” An expert witness in child neurology who examined
Taiji concluded that Taiji’s head injury was “non accidental.” The one inconsistency between
Taiji’s condition and shaken baby syndrome was that Taiji did not have any sign of retinal
hemorrhage, while “80-90 percent” of shaken babies have retinal bleeding. However, a pediatric
neurosurgeon testified that while the presence of retinal hemorrhages “would speak strongly
towards [sic] non-accidental trauma,” “[t]he absence of retinal hemorrhages does not rule out
non-accidental trauma.”
Petitioner presented evidence of a history of apparent abuse to children in respondent’s
care. One of respondent’s children, Brittany, died in 1988 when she was just over one-month
old, from injuries consistent with shaken baby syndrome. Brittany’s death certificate lists the
cause of death as “multiple blunt force and whiplash injuries of the head,” and lists the nature of
her death as “undeterminable.” Respondent’s explanation for Brittany’s injuries was that she fell
from an infant swing. However, according to a protective services report made at the time of
Brittany’s death, the family did not tell emergency service personnel “anything concerning a
swing.” Moreover, the EMS workers “did not notice a swing” in the home.
Another of respondent’s children, Sean Jr., was removed from respondent’s home at four
months of age after suffering fractures to seven of his ribs and to his tibia. Respondent said that
Sean Jr. was injured at a photographer’s studio, when the photographer was positioning three or
four-month-old Sean Jr. for a picture. Later, respondent said that Sean Jr.’s “leg swole [sic]
up”[] about a day and a half after the alleged incident, respondent and his wife took the child to
the hospital. Respondent said he “knew nothing about any broken ribs” until a court hearing
regarding Sean Jr., and had no explanation for Sean Jr.’s broken ribs.
Here, evidence of physical abuse to Taiji, clearly and convincingly supports the trial
court’s conclusion that respondent either caused or failed to protect the child from abuse.
Accordingly, there is a reasonable likelihood the children will suffer injury or abuse in the
foreseeable future if returned to respondent’s home. MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (ii). Next,
evidence of undue delay in seeking medical care for Taiji while she was suffering from several
fractures that occurred at different times clearly and convincingly shows that respondent failed to
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provide proper care and custody. Given respondent’s failure to care for Taiji’s severe ongoing
injuries, there is no reasonable expectation that respondent will be able to provide proper care
and custody considering the children’s tender ages. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Last, the evidence
showed that, over the years, three of respondent’s infant children suffered serious, inadequately
explained injuries, and one child died as a result. How a parent treats one child is probative of
“how that parent may treat other children.” In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 588; 528 NW2d
799 (1995). Here, the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable likelihood, based on
respondent’s conduct or capacity, the children would be harmed if returned to respondent’s home
is supported by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Therefore, the trial court
did not err in finding several statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
Finally, we agree with the trial court that the evidence on the whole record indicates that
termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). Here, there is overwhelming
evidence supporting the trial court’s findings that termination of respondent’s parental rights is
proper under several statutory grounds. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not clearly
err in finding termination is in the child’s best interests. MCR 5.974(I); In re Sours, supra at
633.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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