JOANN P BROWN V OLIVER/HATCHER CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOANN P. BROWN and DAVID P. BROWN,
Personal Representative of the Estate of DAVID
JAMES BROWN, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
February 10, 2004
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 244740
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 00-00136-NO
OLIVER/HATCHER CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT, INC, and SERVICE IRON
WORKERS, INC, REQUESTED,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., Gage and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order granting defendants, Oliver/Hatcher
Construction and Development, Inc (Oliver/Hatcher), and Service Iron Workers, Inc, Requested
(Service Iron), summary disposition. This case arises from the death of an iron worker, David
James Brown (decedent), who fell to his death during construction of the Warren Business
Center Project. We affirm.
Oliver/Hatcher was the construction manager of the project. Under contract with
Oliver/Hatcher, Service Iron provided the structural steel aspects of the project building. Under
contract with Service Iron, American Erectors, Inc, (American Erectors) erected the structural
steel that Service Iron fabricated. American Erectors employed decedent as an iron worker for
the project.
A. Standard of Review
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the
factual sufficiency of the complaint. Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466
Mich 155, 163; 645 NW2d 643 (2002). A motion for summary disposition should
be granted when, except in regard to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue in regard to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment or
partial judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10), (G)(4); Veenstra, supra
at 164. In deciding a motion brought under this subsection, the trial court must
consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence
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submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Veenstra, supra at 164. . . . The decision whether to grant a
motion for summary disposition is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
[Id. at 159.] [Kelly-Stehney & Assoc, Inc v MacDonald’s Industrial Products,
Inc, 254 Mich App 608, 611-612; 658 NW2d 494 (2003), lv gtd 468 Mich 942
(2003).]
B. Analysis
Generally, “a general contractor is not liable for a subcontractor’s negligence.” Hughes v
PMG Building, Inc, 227 Mich App 1, 5; 574 NW2d 691 (1997); see also Ormsby v Capital
Welding, Inc, 255 Mich App 165, 173; 660 NW2d 730 (2003). However, there are exceptions to
this general rule, including:
(1) when the general contractor retains control over the work; (2) where there are
readily observable and avoidable dangers in common work areas that create a
high degree of risk to a significant number of workers; and (3) where the work is
inherently dangerous. [Ormsby, supra at 173 (internal citations omitted).]
1. Doctrine of Retained Control
To be liable for injuries to employees of subcontractors under the retained control
exception, the general contractor’s retention of control must have had, at a minimum “’some
actual effect on the manner or environment in which the work was performed.’” Ormsby, supra
at 183 quoting Candelaria v BC General Contractors, Inc, 236 Mich 67, 76; 600 NW2d 348
(1999) (emphasis in original). There must be a high degree of actual control; supervisory and
coordinating authority over the job site is insufficient. Id. at 185. The general contractor must
not only possess control over the job site, but must exercise it and thus affect the manner or
environment in which work is performed. Id. at 185-186.
Plaintiffs argue that defendants’ failure to communicate the actual height in which
decedent was working affected American Erectors decision not to employ fall protection. In
other words, had either defendant told American Erectors that decedent was working over thirty
feet above ground, American Erectors would have employed fall protection as required by
OSHA and MIOSHA, and decedent would not have fallen to his death.
The gravaman of plaintiffs’ complaint is that defendants failed to properly oversee and
enforce safety standards. “The contractor must ‘retain at least partial control and direction of
actual construction work, which not equivalent to safety inspections and general oversight.’”
Ormsby, supra at 185-186 quoting Samodai v Chrysler Corp, 178 Mich App 252, 256; 443
NW2d 391 (1989) (emphasis in original). Here, there is no showing that defendants retained
control over actual construction work. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary
disposition of plaintiffs’ claim against defendants based on the retained control exception.
2. Common Area
A general contractor may be held liable if it failed to take “reasonable
steps within its supervisory and coordinating authority” to guard against “readily
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observable, avoidable dangers in common work areas which create a high degree
of risk to a significant number of workmen.” Funk v General Motors Corp, 392
Mich 91, 104; 220 NW2d 641 (1974), overruled in part on another ground Hardy
v Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc, 414 Mich 29, 323 NW2d 270 (1982).
Thus, for there to be liability, there must be: (1) a general contractor with
supervisory and coordinating authority over the job site, (2) a common work area
shared by the employees of several subcontractors, and (3) a readily observable,
avoidable danger in that work area (4) that creates a high risk to a significant
number of workers. Groncki v Detroit Edison Co, 453 Mich 644, 662; 557 NW2d
289 (1996). It is not necessary that other subcontractors be working on the same
site at the same time; the common work area rule merely requires that employees
of two or more subcontractors eventually work in the area. Phillips v Mazda
Motor Mfg (USA) Corp, 204 Mich App 401, 408; 516 NW2d 502 (1994);
Erickson v Pure Oil Corp, 72 Mich App 330, 337; 249 NW2d 411 (1976).
[Hughes, supra at 5-6.]
Plaintiffs assert that the relevant common work area relevant is the area in which
decedent landed from his fall. The trial court disagreed, holding that this area is not pertinent to
the common work area exception because the safety measures plaintiffs allege were absent
would have been in place on the roof. We hold that the area pertinent to the common work area
exception is the area where the work is being performed. The purpose of the common work area
exception evidences this conclusion.
[t]he common work area formulation was an effort to distinguish between a
situation where employees of a subcontractor were working in isolation from
employees of other subcontractors and a situation where employees of a number
of subcontractors were working in the same work area. [Plummer v Bechtel
Constr Co, 440 Mich 646, 667; 489 NW2d 66 (1992).]
Here, plaintiffs do not allege that decedent worked in the area where he fell, and
therefore, the trial court’s holding was proper. Moreover, plaintiffs have not claimed that the
roof was a common work area shared by the employees of several subcontractors. Therefore, the
trial court did not err in granting summary disposition of plaintiffs’ claim against defendants
based on the common work area exception.
3. Inherently Dangerous Doctrine
In Frances S Schoenherr v Stuart Frankel Development Co, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d
___ (issued December 23, 2003), slip op pp 2-3, this Court addressed the requirements for
applying the inherently dangerous exception:
Under the doctrine, liability may be imposed when “the work contracted
for is likely to create a peculiar risk of physical harm or if the work involves a
special danger inherent in or normal to the work that the employer reasonably
should have known about at the inception of the contract.” The risk or danger
must be recognizable in advance, i.e., at the time the contract is made. The Court
[has] emphasized that liability should not be imposed where a new risk is created
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in the performance of the work and the risk was not reasonably contemplated at
the time of the contract.
Similarly, liability should not be imposed where the activity involved was not
unusual, the risk was not unique, “reasonable safeguards against injury could
readily have been provided by well-recognized safety measures,” and the
employer selected a responsible, experienced contractor. [Citing Rasmussen v
Louisville Ladder Co, Inc, 211 Mich App 541, 548-549; 536 NW2d 221 (1995),
(emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).]
To support the contention that decedent’s work fit this definition, plaintiffs assert that
decedent was working thirty feet above ground and without the benefit of safety harness, in
violation of MIOSHA and OSHA requirements. Here, as in Schoenherr, it cannot be disputed
that the activity in which plaintiff was engaged was not inherently dangerous because “the work
being performed was not unusual, the risks were not unique, and well-recognized safety
measures could have been provided.” Schoenherr, supra at 3. Plaintiffs assert that the existence
of MIOSHA and OSHA regulations indicate that it must be inherently dangerous to work thirty
feet above the ground. However, the regulations indicate only that well recognized safety
measures existed to provide reasonable safeguards against falling from high elevations.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition of plaintiffs’ claim against
defendants based on the inherently dangerous exception.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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