PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL T MONFORD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 3, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244123
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-003959-01
JEFFREY HOLMES,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244517
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-003959-03
JUNIOUS HALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 247159
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-003959-02
v
MICHAEL T. MONFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Schuette and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a joint trial before separate juries, defendant Holmes was convicted of firstdegree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316, defendant Hall was
convicted of first-degree felony murder, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and
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possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and defendant
Monford was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317. Defendant Holmes was
sentenced to a single term of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction, defendant
Hall was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder
conviction and forty to sixty years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession conviction, and a
consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction, and defendant Monford was
sentenced to a term of twenty to forty years’ imprisonment for the second-degree murder
conviction. Each defendants appeals as of right. Their appeals have been consolidated for this
Court’s consideration. We affirm in all three cases.
I. FACTS
In this case, the victim employed defendants to renovate a house. On one occasion, he
went to the home and they shot and beat him. They restrained him and made a recording of his
voice in which he instructed his wife to pay them $150,000. Some or all of the defendants
disposed of his body in a dumpster, which was emptied with Hall’s other trash during trash
pickup the following day. Each of the defendants made statements to the police, in which they
admitted being present when the victim was first attacked, but providing conflicting accounts of
their roles in the killing. Defendants Monford and Holmes also discussed the killing with other
individuals.
II. MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
Holmes argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict as to
the premeditated murder charge. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review for a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is as follows:
When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict,
this Court reviews the record de novo to determine whether the evidence
presented by the prosecutor, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecutor,
could persuade a rational trier of fact that the essential elements of the crime
charged were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [People v Aldrich, 246 Mich
App 101, 122-123; 631 NW2d 67 (2001)].
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, this Court must view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Wolfe, supra, 440 Mich 515; People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999). This
Court has also explained that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence invokes the
constitutional right to due process of law and, therefore, this Court’s review is de novo. People v
Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001). The standard of review for the
sufficiency of evidence is deferential, and requires a reviewing court to draw all reasonable
inferences and resolve credibility conflicts in support of the jury’s verdict. People v Nowack,
462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
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B. Analysis
Holmes asserts that there was no proof of premeditation or his intent to kill the victim and
that his mere presence was inadequate to establish his guilt under an aiding and abetting theory.
He claims that although he was aware of a plan to beat the victim, codefendant Hall exceeded the
plan by killing him.
The elements of first-degree murder are that the defendant killed the victim and that the
killing was “‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated.’” People v Bowman, 254 Mich App 142,
151; 656 NW2d 835 (2002), quoting MCL 750.316(1)(a). “‘To premeditate means to think
about beforehand; to deliberate is to measure and evaluate the major facets of a choice or
problem.’” People v Plummer, 229 Mich App 293, 300; 581 NW2d 753 (1998), citing People v
Morrin, 31 Mich App 301, 329-331; 187 NW2d 434 (1971). Factors that may be considered in
determining premeditation and deliberation include: “(1) previous relationship between the
defendant and the victim; (2) the defendant’s actions before and after the crime itself; and (3) the
circumstances of the killing itself, including the weapon used and the location of the wounds
inflicted.” Plummer, supra, 300-301 (citations omitted). Circumstantial evidence may constitute
sufficient proof of premeditation and deliberation. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 415;
633 NW2d 376 (2001). Inferences of premeditation and deliberation “must have support in the
record and cannot be arrived at by mere speculation.” Plummer, supra, 301 (citations omitted).
The prosecution relied, in part, on an aiding and abetting theory and suggested to the jury
that any conflict concerning the precise roles the defendants had in the killing was irrelevant in
light of the law of aiding and abetting.
To establish that a defendant aided and abetted a crime, the prosecution
must prove that (1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some
other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that
assisted the principal in committing the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the
commission of the crime or knew the principal intended its commission at the
time he gave aid or encouragement. [People v Norris, 236 Mich App 411, 419;
600 NW2d 658 (1999).]
“Aiding and abetting describes all forms of assistance rendered to the perpetrator of a crime and
comprehends all words or deeds that might support, encourage, or incite the commission of a
crime.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757-758; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The trial court did not err in denying Holmes’ motion for a directed verdict on the charge
of first-degree premeditated murder. In Holmes’ statement to the police, he claimed that the
attack was supposed to have been a “normal beat him down.” But the evidence amply supports
an inference that Holmes knew of, and participated in, a plan to kill the victim. One witness
testified that Holmes and Hall talked about a plan to “do something” to the victim “a lot of
times” and it was “[d]iscussed in many ways.” Holmes admitted that he knew that Hall had
purchased a potato to be used to muffle the gunshots and a knife to be used during the attack.
Holmes also knew that Hall brought a rifle to the house and had tested it to see how loud it was.
Holmes admitted that Hall “was supposed to shoot him once in the penis . . . ,” which further
shows that Holmes was aware that Hall was going to shoot the victim. Holmes admitted that
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after Hall shot the victim twice, Holmes hit him twice with a shovel. Holmes told another
witness that he hit the victim in the ribs with a two by four. After the victim was subdued,
Holmes brought a tape recorder to Hall and moved the victim’s vehicle. The jury could
reasonably infer that Holmes planned to kill the victim hours before the attack began. Any claim
that Holmes did not intend to kill or know that Hall intended to kill the victim after Hall had shot
him twice and Holmes had beaten him is not credible, particularly since the victim knew his
attackers and would have been able to identify them if he had lived.
Holmes also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict
with respect to the felony murder charge, because there was no evidence of an underlying felony.
Specifically, Holmes claims that the evidence of larceny was inadequate.
Contrary to Holmes’ assertions, the underlying felony for the felony murder charge
submitted to the jury was kidnapping, not larceny.1 Because Holmes does not address the
sufficiency of the evidence with respect to kidnapping, he has inadequately briefed this issue.
However, we will address the sufficiency of the evidence of kidnapping to the extent necessary
to resolve Hall’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on this ground.
Hall contends that the evidence of kidnapping was insufficient because the form of
kidnapping presented to the jury required secret confinement, which was not established here
because the victim was held at his own property and other people knew of his location. We
disagree.
Although there are several different forms of kidnapping, see People v Wesley, 421 Mich
375, 383-384, 391; 365 NW2d 692 (1984), the court here instructed the jury concerning the
“secret confinement” form. In People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 305; 519 NW2d 108 (1994), the
Court explained that secret confinement kidnapping does not necessarily require absolute
secrecy. Id., 307. “[A] proper focus is on the channels of communication available to the victim
. . . it is enough that secrecy, or the attempt to maintain secrecy, denied the victim the
opportunity to avail himself of outside help.” Id.
As we read Michigan’s kidnapping statute in light of the authorities, we
conclude that the essence of “secret confinement” as contemplated by the statute
is deprivation of the assistance of others by virtue of the victim’s inability to
communicate his predicament. “Secret confinement” is not predicated solely on
the existence or nonexistence of a single factor. Rather, consideration of the
totality of circumstances is required when determining whether the confinement
itself or the location of confinement was secret, thereby depriving the victim of
the assistance of others. That others may be suspicious or aware of the
confinement is relevant to the determination, but is not always dispositive. [Id.,
309.]
1
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendants on the count of felony murder based on
larceny.
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Hall emphasizes that the place of confinement was the victim’s own property. But that
fact is not dispositive. The Jaffray Court recognized that secret confinement kidnapping may
occur when a victim is confined to his home. Jaffray, supra, 312 n 37. Therefore, the fact that
the victim owned the property is not critical to the analysis of whether secret confinement was
established.
Hall also argues that the confinement was not secret because other people knew that the
victim was at the Calvert property and the defendants either knew, or had reason to suspect that
other people knew of the victim’s location. However, even if those individuals suspected that he
was at the house on Calvert, they were not aware that he was being confined there. People v
Warren, 228 Mich App 336, 343-345; 578 NW2d 692 (1998), rev’d in part on other grounds 462
Mich 415 (2000); People v Johnson, 171 Mich App 801; 430 NW2d 828 (1988). Contrary to
Hall’s argument, the fact that others knew to look for the victim at that location is not
dispositive. Here, Hall admitted that he and Monford used tape to restrain the victim. Hall’s
statement and another witness’ testimony established that Hall pushed and threatened to shoot
the witness in order to keep him away from where the victim was being held captive. Viewed in
a light most favorable to the prosecution, the totality of circumstances showed that Hall deprived
the victim of the assistance of others by virtue of his inability to communicate his predicament to
others, which is “the essence of ‘secret confinement.’” Jaffray, supra, 309.
Holmes additionally argues that the evidence of intent was insufficient to support his
conviction of felony murder. Felony murder requires proof of intent to kill, to do great bodily
harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or
great bodily harm was the probable result. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 401; 614 NW2d 78
(2000). As previously discussed in the context of Holmes’ challenge to the trial court’s denial of
his motion for directed verdict as to the first-degree premeditated murder charge, there was
sufficient evidence to establish that Holmes intended to kill the victim. Moreover, Holmes’
admission that he participated in the beating of the victim after he had been shot clearly
established Holmes’ intent to do great bodily harm or to create a very high risk of death or great
bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result.
III. ADMISSION OF HALL’S STATEMENT
Hall next argues that the trial court erred by admitting his statement into evidence
because he testified that the police failed to honor his request for counsel. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
In general, a challenge to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence of a
confession on the ground that it was obtained in violation of a defendant’s right to counsel is
reviewed de novo, yet this Court will not disturb the court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. People v Kowalski, 230 Mich App 464, 472-484; 584 NW2d 613 (1998).
B. Analysis
Here, several police officers testified that Hall never requested counsel. The trial court
stated that it believed the police officers rather than Hall. Having reviewed the testimony at the
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evidentiary hearing, we are not persuaded that the trial court’s assessment of credibility was
clearly erroneous.
Hall also argues that the trial court violated his right to confront his accusers by limiting
his cross-examination of a witness as follows:
Q. [W]ere you using drugs back at that time?
A. No.
THE COURT: You don’t have to answer that.
THE WITNESS: Okay. Thanks, your Honor.
[Defendant Hall’s counsel]: That’s all.
The right to cross-examine witnesses is a primary interest secured by the Confrontation
Clause. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; People v Adamski, 198 Mich App 133, 138;
497 NW2d 546 (1993). But the right does not include a right to cross-examine on irrelevant
issues. Id. Trial judges may reasonably limit cross-examination to accommodate concerns about
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, among others. Id. “Cross-examination may be
denied with respect to collateral matters bearing only on general credibility, as well as on
irrelevant issues.” People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 564; 496 NW2d 336 (1992) (citations
omitted). However, “[a] limitation on cross-examination that prevents a defendant from placing
before the jury facts from which bias, prejudice or lack of credibility of a prosecution witness
may be inferred constitutes a denial of the constitutional right of confrontation.” People v Kelly,
231 Mich App 627, 644; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
In the present case, the record does not establish that the trial court violated Hall’s right
of confrontation. Hall’s counsel’s question was not whether the witness was under the influence
of drugs at the time of the events that were the subject of his testimony. Rather, the question was
more general, “were you using drugs back at that time?” To the extent that Hall’s counsel was
attempting to discredit the witness by showing that he was a drug user, the evidence was
collateral and immaterial, and the court properly restricted the inquiry. To the extent that Hall’s
counsel was attempting to show that the witness’ observations might have been affected because
he was under the influence of drugs, that evidence would have been relevant to the witness’
credibility. However, if this was the subject counsel wanted to pursue, counsel was required to
make an offer of proof. MRE 103(a)(2); People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 352; 365 NW2d 120
(1984). “Absent some evidentiary support, the error, if any, in excluding the evidence was
harmless.” People v Witherspoon (After Remand), 257 Mich App 329, 331; 670 NW2d 434
(2003) (citation omitted). Moreover, the witness’ testimony was an insignificant part of the
prosecution’s case, and was cumulative and corroborated by other witnesses, which further
supports our conclusion that any error here was harmless. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627,
644-645; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
IV. JURY RE-INSTRUCTION
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Monford argues that the trial court erred when, in response to the jury’s request for reinstruction concerning the elements of the crimes, the court omitted instructions concerning
aiding and abetting. We disagree.
Monford waived any error in this regard by expressly agreeing that the court had satisfied
the jury’s request with regard to re-reading the elements of the charges. People v Carter, 462
Mich 206; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). The record does not support Monford’s claim that he
objected to the omission of the aiding and abetting instructions after the jury retired. Although
he claims that the transcript is inaccurate, he has not overcome the presumption of its accuracy.
See People v Abdella, 200 Mich App 473, 476; 505 NW2d 18 (1993). To the extent that
Monford claims that the trial court prevented counsel from objecting by interrupting counsel, we
note that the court subsequently gave counsel the opportunity to explain his objection when the
court asked him, “Do you want it [the objection] to be vehement, continuing and strenuous?”
Therefore, the record does not show that counsel attempted to preserve this issue after having
waived it.
Monford also argues that the trial court erred by instructing that duress is not a defense to
murder when he did not rely on duress as a defense and there was no evidence to support it.
Monford claims that the instruction placed him in the difficult position of having to explain that
Monford was not relying on duress.
This issue is not included in the statement of questions presented and is not preserved for
appellate review. MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v Yarbrough, 183 Mich App 163, 165; 454 NW2d
419 (1990). Moreover, the alleged error was waived by counsel’s expression of satisfaction with
the charge as given. People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 311; 642 NW2d 417 (2002).
Furthermore, the instruction was appropriate in light of Monford’s theory of the case, which
emphasized his fear of Hall and Holmes, and his statements that Hall and Holmes made him tie
the victim up, that he could not get away from them, and that Hall threatened him.
V. CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
Monford also argues that the trial court improperly denied his challenges for cause as to
seven venire persons who indicated they could not be impartial because of their moral or
religious views. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews a trial court’s rulings on challenges for cause for an abuse of
discretion. People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 521; 616 NW2d 710 (2000).
B. Analysis
This Court uses a four-part test to determine if a party is entitled to relief based on a trial
court’s denial of a challenge for cause:
There must be a clear and independent showing on the record that (1) the
court improperly denied a challenge for cause, (2) the aggrieved party exhausted
all peremptory challenges, (3) the party demonstrated the desire to excuse another
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subsequently summoned juror, and (4) the juror whom the party wished to later
excuse was objectionable. [People v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 248-249; 537
NW2d 233 (1995), citing People v Legrone, 205 Mich App 77, 81; 517 NW2d
270 (1994).]
Monford has not demonstrated that the third factor was satisfied. He did not indicate at the time
of voir dire that he wanted to excuse another juror. His assertions that Juror “N” was
objectionable, first made in the context of his motion for new trial, were inadequate to satisfy the
test. Therefore, he is not entitled to relief on this basis.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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