ALIGEMAL HYSNI MD V CORNWALL PLUMBING INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALIQEMAL HYSNI, M.D.,1 and BESSIE HYSNI,
UNPUBLISHED
February 3, 2004
Plaintiffs-Appellees/CrossAppellants,
v
No. 243564
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 00-026975-NO
CORNWALL PLUMBING, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant/
Counterdefendant,
and
SINGH DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD., and
SINGH MANAGEMENT CO.,
Defendants-Counterplaintiffs/Cross-
Appellee.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Schuette and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Cornwall Plumbing appeals by leave granted from the trial court’s order
denying Cornwall’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR
2.116(C)(10). Plaintiffs cross appeal from the order dismissing defendants Singh Development
Co., Ltd. and Singh Management Co. from the case.2 This case arose when plaintiff Aliqemal
Hysni3 (now deceased) received second- and third-degree burns on his back after getting into his
1
Plaintiff’s name also appears in the lower court and appellate records as “Aliqemal” and
“Aliquimal.” The correct spelling is Aliqemal.
2
The Singh defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR
2.116(C)(10), but concede on appeal that summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) would
have been inappropriate.
3
Plaintiff Bessie Hysni’s claims are derivative.
“plaintiff” will refer to Aliqemal Hysni only.
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Thus, for ease of reference, the singular
shower. The shower and shower elements were installed by Cornwall Plumbing, a subcontractor
for Singh Development and Singh Management Company. Singh Development built, developed,
and owned the apartment complex, and Singh Management managed, operated, and maintained
the complex. Plaintiffs alleged that the scald guard and “limit stop screw” with which the
shower was equipped had not been properly installed and that the hot water temperature gauge
was set to the highest level, causing the water’s temperature to unexpectedly surge to
approximately 150 degrees. We affirm the trial court’s decision in part and reverse and remand
in part for the reasons set forth below.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) de novo. On review, we “‘consider the available pleadings, affidavits, depositions,
and other documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine
whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Michigan Education
Employees Mutual Ins Co v Turow, 242 Mich App 112, 114; 617 NW2d 725 (2000), quoting
Unisys Corp v Comm’r of Ins, 236 Mich App 686, 689; 601 NW2d 155 (1999).
Likewise, we review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) de novo. Beaty v Hertzberg & Golden, PC, 456 Mich 247, 253; 571 NW2d
716 (1997). MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the “legal sufficiency of the complaint” and permits
dismissal of a claim where the opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be
granted. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Only the pleadings are examined; documentary evidence is not considered. Id. Where the claim
is “so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify
a right of recovery,” the motion should be granted. Id.
When defendant Cornwall Plumbing moved for summary disposition, claiming that the
nature of the scalding water was open and obvious, the trial court held that Cornwall had not
presented support for its proposition that the open and obvious defense was available to it as a
contractor in a general negligence case. The trial court was correct. Our current jurisprudence
holds that the open and obvious defense is available in premises liability cases and failure-towarn cases. See Lugo v Ameritech Corp, 464 Mich 512; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), Bertrand v Alan
Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 609; 537 NW2d 185 (1995), Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp,
440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992), Glittenberg v Doughboy Recreational Industries (On
Rehearing), 441 Mich 379, 398-399; 491 NW2d 208 (1992), and Owens v Allis-Chalmers Corp,
414 Mich 413, 425; 326 NW2d 372 (1982).
Cornwall claims that our decision in Millikin v Walton Manor Mobile Home Park, Inc,
234 Mich App 490; 595 NW2d 152 (1999), stands for the proposition that the open and obvious
doctrine is available under any theory of liability and points specifically to the following
statement in that opinion: “The logic of [the discussed] cases, as well as the language they
employed, demonstrates that the doctrine protects against liability whenever injury would have
been avoided had an ‘open and obvious’ danger been observed, regardless of the alleged theories
of liability.” Id. at 497. But Cornwall ignores the context of our ruling. The specific issue we
decided was whether the plaintiff could avoid the open and obvious defense by couching her
complaint in terms of general negligence rather than failure to warn, the latter area of which, of
course, permits an open and obvious defense. Our statement preceding the one on which
Cornwall relies was, “On the basis of Riddle[, supra] and Bertrand[, supra] [premises liability
cases] and their analysis of applicable precedents, we conclude that the open and obvious
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doctrine applies to this premises liability case, notwithstanding plaintiff’s avoidance of a ‘failure
to warn’ allegation in drafting her complaint.” Id. at 497. Thus, we do not read Millikin as
extending the open and obvious defense to theories outside the ones examined in that case –
premises liability and failure to warn. If we meant to extend the open and obvious defense to
any general negligence case, we would not have found it necessary to redefine the plaintiff’s
cause of action as one for which the open and obvious doctrine was available. Thus, we affirm
the trial court’s refusal to grant summary disposition to Cornwall.
In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial court erroneously dismissed the Singh
defendants on the basis that the scalding nature of the shower water was open and obvious.
Plaintiffs assert that the open and obvious doctrine was not available to the Singh defendants
because they had a statutory duty under MCL 554.139 to render fit premises and to keep the
premises in reasonably good repair. We agree.
New developments in that area of the law require us to reverse the trial court’s decision.
In Woodbury v Bruckner, 467 Mich 921, 921; 658 NW2d 482 (2002), a premises liability case in
which the plaintiff claimed a violation of MCL 554.139, and the defendant claimed the alleged
danger was open and obvious, the Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court to determine
“whether the defendants violated the ‘reasonable repair’ requirement of MCL 554.139(1)(b)” in
lieu of granting leave to appeal. In so doing, the Court held, “The open and obvious doctrine
cannot be used to avoid a specific statutory duty.” Id., citing Jones v Enertel, Inc, 467 Mich 266,
267; 650 NW2d 334 (2002). In turn, we remanded the case to the trial court to resolve the
factual dispute about the statute’s applicability. Id. Then in O’Donnell v Garasic, ___ Mich
App ____; ____NW2d ____(2003), this Court held that the “open and obvious doctrine is not
available to deny liability to an injured invitee or licensee on leased or licensed residential
premises when such premises presents [sic] a material breach of the specific statutory duty
imposed on owners of residential properties. . . . ” Id. at slip op 7.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Woodbury as well as this Court’s decision in O’Donnell
dictates here that the open and obvious defense is unavailable to the Singh defendants if they
violated the statutory duty as plaintiffs claim. Because the trial court did not examine whether
Singh violated the statute, deciding instead that the hot water was open and obvious, this case
demands further factual development. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order granting
summary disposition to the Singh defendants and remand this case for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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