MEEMIC INSUR CO V JEFFREY ANDERSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHIGAN EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYEES
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 27, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 242967
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 00-026590-NI
EXECUTIVE RISK INDEMNITY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Saad and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Michigan Educational Employees Mutual Insurance Company (MEEMIC)
appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant Executive Risk Indemnity,
Inc.’s motion for summary disposition on its action for declaratory judgment. We affirm.
Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action stems from an underlying case involving an action
by plaintiff to recoup money it paid on a homeowners insurance policy that was originally issued
through its wholly owned subsidiary, MEEMIC Insurance Services. In order to recoup the
money paid out on the homeowners policy, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that an
independent insurance agent acting for MEEMIC Insurance Services negligently executed the
application for homeowners insurance because the agent issued the policy despite the fact that
the home contained two wood-burning furnaces. Plaintiff brought this action against defendant
seeking a declaration that, based on the errors and omissions insurance policy (E & O policy)
defendant issued to MEEMIC Insurance Services, defendant must indemnify the independent
insurance agent for his alleged negligent acts or omissions, and then pay directly to plaintiff any
judgment in plaintiff’s favor against the insured.
In response, defendant moved for summary disposition. Defendant argued that plaintiff
did not have standing to seek a declaratory judgment and that plaintiff was not entitled to
coverage under the errors and omission policy because plaintiff was not the insured party under
the E & O policy. Essentially, defendant argued that plaintiff could not seek a declaration of
coverage under an insurance policy that plaintiff was not a party to. In turn, plaintiff argued that
it did have standing because plaintiff was an interested party entitled to have its rights
adjudicated and because it was a subrogee of the homeowner, who had standing because she
suffered an injury in fact. Plaintiff also argued summary disposition was inappropriate because
the E & O policy contained latent ambiguities and parol evidence was necessary to demonstrate
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the parties true intent. Plaintiff argued that certain bargained for modifications regarding the E &
O policy demonstrated the parties’ intent to allow plaintiff to directly assert claims against
defendant for any independent agent’s errors and omissions committed in the sale of MEEMIC
insurance. The trial court determined as a matter of law that the E & O policy was unambiguous
and that parol evidence related to the alleged bargained for modifications to the E & O policy
could not be considered. The court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition,
however, on the ground that plaintiff was not an insured under the E & O policy and, therefore,
could not seek a declaration of rights under that policy.
Defendant’s motion for summary disposition was brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8)
and (C)(10). On appeal, although plaintiff frames the issue as whether there are genuine issues
of material fact regarding their declaratory judgment claim, the actual issues decided by the trial
court and presented to this Court are purely questions of law: (1) whether plaintiff has standing
to seek a declaratory judgment action and (2) whether the errors and omissions insurance policy
at issue here is an unambiguous, fully integrated contract so as to bar the introduction of parol
evidence. Therefore, review under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is more appropriate.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant or denial of summary disposition brought
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129; 631 NW2d 308
(2001). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings
alone; the motion may not be supported with documentary evidence. Id. Such a motion is
granted when the plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Id. at 129130. The construction of an insurance policy and the determination of whether the policy
language is ambiguous are questions of law that are also reviewed de novo on appeal.
Henderson v State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 460 Mich 348, 353; 596 NW2d 190 (1999).
Therefore, we first consider whether an injured third party has standing to seek a
declaratory judgment against a liability insurer before the insured tortfeasor’s underlying liability
has been determined. “‘Standing is the legal term used to denote the existence of a party’s
interest in the outcome of the litigation; an interest that will assure sincere and vigorous
advocacy.’” Allstate Ins Co v Hayes, 442 Mich 56, 68; 499 NW2d 743 (1993) (internal citiations
omitted). The grant of a declaratory judgment is within the trial court’s discretion and can only
be granted where there is an actual controversy. MCR 2.605(1); Shavers v Attorney General,
402 Mich 554, 588; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). Without an actual controversy, the court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment. Genesis Ctr, PLC v Comm’r of
Financial & Ins Services, 246 Mich App 531, 544; 633 NW2d 834 (2001). An actual
controversy exists when a declaratory judgment is necessary to guide the plaintiff’s future
conduct in order to preserve his legal rights. Id.
Initially, we observe that the concept of an injured third party seeking a declaration of
rights of the insured tortfeasor against the insurer has received little attention by Michigan
courts. However, Michigan case law has recognized that when an insurer files a declaratory
judgment action to decide coverage as to its insured, the injured party is a proper party to that
declaratory judgment action. For instance, in Cloud v Vance, 97 Mich App 446, 448; 296 NW2d
68 (1980), the injured party sued the insured for damages arising from an automobile accident.
The insured refused to cooperate with the insurer, and the insurer obtained by default, a
declaratory judgment that no coverage was owed under the insurance policy. Id. The injured
party was never given notice of the declaratory judgment action and was not a party to the
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proceeding. Id. The plaintiff-injured party then obtained a default judgment against the insured
and sought collection from the insurer by writ of garnishment under the insured’s insurance
policy. Id. at 448-449. The insurer, relying on the prior declaratory judgment it obtained against
the insured, moved for summary disposition against plaintiff arguing that the declaratory
judgment against the insured barred the plaintiff from asserting that the insurer was liable. Id. at
449.
The Cloud Court stated that the issue before it was whether the plaintiff was entitled to
have notice of a hearing where an insurer attempted to declare the obligations owed to the
insured under the defendant insurer’s policy. Id. The Court first declared that plaintiff had a
“substantial interest” in the insurance policy between defendant insurer and the insured because
by obtaining a judgment against the insured, the plaintiff was entitled to pursue a writ of
garnishment against the insurer. Id. at 449-450, citing Meirthew v Last, 376 Mich 33, 40; 135
NW2d 353 (1965). The Cloud Court then held that plaintiff had a “legitimate interest in
litigating the coverage issue with the insurer” because the plaintiff had an independent interest in
the insurance policy from the time of the accident that was contingent upon his recovery against
the insured. Id. at 451-452; emphasis added. The Court reasoned that it was “merely affording
plaintiff a trial on the merits regarding whether or not defendant insurance company is obligated
under the terms of the insurance policy with respect to the judgment of this plaintiff against the
insured.” Id. at 452.
Similar to the instant case, in Hayes, supra, the defendant insurer argued that the injured
party did not have standing in its declaratory judgment action because the injured party was a
“stranger to the contract” between insurer and insured. Id. at 62. In its analysis, the Court first
observed that MCR 2.605, confirms a court’s power to “‘declare the rights and other legal
relations of an interested party seeking a declaratory judgment’ ‘[i]n a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction.’” Id. at 65. Under this court rule, the Hayes Court determined that an
actual controversy existed between defendant insurer and the injured party because the very
nature of declaratory relief is to declare interests not yet vested. Id. at 63. The interest that was
“not yet vested,” but nonetheless a possibility, was the injured party’s possible recovery against
the insured, and then a subsequent garnishment action against the insurer. Id. at 61.
We note that other jurisdictions have allowed an injured party to seek a declaratory
judgment against a liability insurer before the insured tortfeasor’s underlying liability has been
determined. 1 Holmes’ Appleman on Insurance Law and Practice (2d ed), § 142.1(C). For
instance, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Howard v Montgomery Mut Ins Co, 145 Md App
549, 565; 805 A2d 1167 (2002), held that an injured party has standing to bring a declaratory
judgment action against the tortfeasor’s insurer during the pendency of a related tort suit, before
judgment in that suit, so long as the coverage issues are “independent and separable” from the
underlying issues related to the tortfeasor’s liability. In Allstate Ins Co v Atwood, 319 Md 247;
572 A2d 154 (1990), the Maryland Supreme Court provided examples of those instances where
the declaratory judgment actions were sufficiently “independent and separable” from the claims
asserted in a pending suit by an injured third party.
Examples include contentions that the insured failed to comply with contractual
cooperation or notification provisions, or failed to pay premiums; interpretation of
coverage language in a policy; interpretation of language of endorsement
extending insurance coverage to insured; interpretation of policy exclusion
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denying coverage when insured airplane was not operated by two named pilots.
[Id. at 252; citations omitted.]
We find this concept of “independent and separable claims” a worthy consideration.
With the above law in mind, we find that there is no material difference between the
insurer asking the court for declaratory relief and the injured party asking the court for
declaratory relief. In either situation, the standing requirement for the injured party is still
satisfied because the interest in the litigation is present regardless of who institutes the action. In
an action such as this, there exists the possibility that plaintiff may be entitled to recover against
defendant insurer in a garnishment action. The “legal rights” to be preserved in this case are
whether defendant would provide coverage for its insured and thus whether plaintiff may seek
indemnity from the insurer. Therefore, we hold that a third party has standing to seek
declaratory relief as to its rights provided that the coverage issues are “independent and
separable” from the underlying issues related to the tortfeasor’s liability. And the trial court
erred in concluding otherwise.
In this case, we find that plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action against defendant is
sufficiently “independent and separable” from its underlying action against the insured.
Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action has no bearing on the underlying liability question of
whether the independent agent was negligent in the manner in which he issued a MEEMIC
homeowners policy. Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action relates only to whether the
independent agent was covered under the E & O policy. Consequently, we conclude that
plaintiff has standing to seek a declaration regarding whether an independent insurance agent is
an insured and whether defendant must indemnify the agent under the policy.
Because plaintiff does have standing to seek a declaratory judgment action against
defendant, we next consider whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that parol
evidence could not be considered to support plaintiff’s claim that certain bargained for
modifications exist which would allow it to pursue a claim against defendant under the E & O
policy. Plaintiff argues that parol evidence regarding those modifications should have been
considered by the trial court because not all of the agreed upon terms were incorporated in the
final draft of the policy. Plaintiff does not point to any specific ambiguity in the contract itself,
but instead argues that the policy is ambiguous because not all of the bargained for terms are
expressed in the written policy. Therefore, the question is whether the E & O policy was a final
and complete expression of the parties’ agreement.
An insurance policy is much the same as any other contract; it is an agreement between
the parties. In construing an insurance contract a court will determine what the agreement was
and effectuate the intent of the parties. Heath v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 255 Mich
App 217, 218; 659 NW2d 698 (2002). To this end, courts must determine the intent of the
parties from the words used in the document itself and courts may not “‘make a different contract
for the parties or [] look to extrinsic testimony to determine their intent when the words used by
them are clear and unambiguous and have a definite meaning.’” UAW-GM Human Resource Ctr
v KSL Recreation Corp, 228 Mich App 486, 491; 579 NW2d 411 (1998) (internal citations
omitted).
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As evidence that the parties intended the written instrument to constitute a final and
complete expression of the agreement concerning the matters covered, the court should consider
whether the writing contains a merger or integration clause that explicitly states the document
represents the full and accurate agreement of the parties. UAW-GM, supra at 493-494. When
the parties include an integration clause in their written contract, it is conclusive and parol
evidence is not admissible to show that the agreement is not integrated except in cases of fraud
that invalidate the integration clause or where an agreement is obviously incomplete “on its face”
and, therefore, parol evidence is necessary for the “filling of gaps.” Id. at 502, quoting 3 Corbin,
Contracts, § 578, p 411.
Here, under part IV, the disputed agreement contains the following clause:
(L)
Entire Agreement
The Insureds agree that this Policy, including any endorsements
and the application attached to and forming part of this Policy and any materials
submitted in connection with such application, which materials are on file with
the Underwriter and are part of this Policy as if physically attached, constitutes
the entire agreement existing between the Insureds and the Underwriter or any of
its agents relating to this insurance. [Emphasis in italics added.]
This clause evidences an intent by the parties that the agreement constitutes a complete
expression of their understanding. The effect of a valid integration clause is to prevent the
introduction of parol evidence of other, contemporaneous agreements by the parties that are not
contained in the contract. UAW-GM, supra at 495. Accordingly, parol evidence of negotiations
surrounding the execution of the document is not admissible unless, as noted above, there is
some evidence of fraud or it is apparent that the agreement was incomplete “on its face.” In this
case, there were no allegations of fraud and we find nothing in the language of the E & O policy
which demonstrates that the policy is “on its face” incomplete. Therefore, the trial court did not
err in ruling that parol evidence could not be considered. Plaintiff concedes that without the
inclusion of certain modifications to the contract represented by the parol evidence, it cannot
pursue its claim against defendant. Hence, the trial court properly granted summary disposition
in favor of defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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