PEOPLE OF MI V EUGENE PAUL SIWIK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 6, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 241582
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-010303
EUGENE PAUL SIWIK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Cavanagh and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of first-degree felony murder, MCL
750.316(1)(b). We affirm.
On June 25, 2000, Leposava Filipovska did not return home from work and her car was
found on the side of the road, still running. The car’s rear bumper was damaged, and white paint
appeared to have been transferred as the result of a low impact collision. Filipovska’s body was
found nearly two miles away in a field behind a gas station she was known to frequent. The
Wayne County deputy chief medical examiner performed an autopsy which revealed no external
evidence of injury, but an enlarged heart and fluid in her lungs indicating that she did not die
instantly. The medical examiner listed the death as “unknown” or “indeterminate” because it
was unclear how her body had been found so far away from her car. Filipovska was known to
have had recent chest pain and difficulty breathing.
Detectives conducting an investigation near the location where Filipovska’s body was
found encountered defendant in the parking lot of a nearby motel at which he apparently was
staying. They told defendant that they were investigating a “situation” across the street, and
defendant asked one of them “how did that lady die over there?” Detectives testified that they
did not tell defendant that a lady had died, and claimed not to have released any details to
defendant prior to questioning him. Defendant told the detective that one of his friends had been
at the gas station and had been told about it.
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The case remained unsolved until July 2001, when members of the Calhoun County
Sheriff’s Department contacted Canton police officers and indicated that two of their inmates,
where defendant was also incarcerated at the time, had information regarding the case. The two
inmates told the officers that defendant had told them that he and another man, possibly his
uncle, had seen an older woman with a lot of money in line at a fast food restaurant located
across from defendant’s house and decided to follow her in a stolen white car, bumped the rear
bumper of the woman’s car, and, when the parties pulled over and got out of their car, defendant
tried to grab her purse. The two inmates continued that defendant told them the woman tried to
stop defendant, at which time his companion, grabbed her by the hair and pushed her against the
car. She then grabbed at her chest and collapsed. Defendant and his companion then pushed the
woman into the stolen car, with defendant holding her down as she continued to gasp and choke.
Defendant then told the two inmates that the woman died as they were driving away; they then
left her body in a field behind a gas station and drove away. Defendant told the inmates that he
took between $700 and $1200 from the woman.
As a result of the statements from the two inmates, police questioned defendant, who said
he had made up a story about being involved in Filipovska’s death after reading about it because
he wanted to make the other inmates think he was a hardened killer to impress or intimidate
them. A detective told the medical examiner about these statements, and on the basis of the
information he received from the detective, the medical examiner revised his report to conclude
that Filipovska had died as the result of homicide—the stress from the robbery had triggered her
heart attack. Defendant was charged and convicted of the crime.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting his inculpatory statements
because the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of felony murder independent of his
statements. We disagree. Defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal by objecting at trial;
therefore, our review is for plain error that affected defendant’s substantial rights. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761-763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
The corpus delicti rule is satisfied and a defendant’s confession may be admitted into
evidence when the prosecutor presents direct or circumstantial evidence establishing a specific
injury that was caused by some criminal agency. People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 269-270; 536
NW2d 517 (1995). The corpus delicti of murder is death caused by criminal agency. People v
McMahan, 451 Mich 543, 548-549; 548 NW2d 199 (1996). Once this showing is made, by a
preponderance of the evidence, a defendant’s inculpatory statements may be used to establish
identity, intent, or aggravating circumstances. Konrad, supra; People v Burns, 250 Mich App
436, 438; 647 NW2d 515 (2002).
Here, we agree with the prosecution that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence
independent of defendant’s inculpatory statements to establish that Filipovska’s death was
caused by a criminal agency. The evidence presented at trial included that sixty-three year old
Filipovska, a known creature of habit, did not arrive home after her afternoon shift of work that
ended at about 2:30 a.m., but instead her car was found on the side of the road, running, with
obvious rear-end damage, and with her open purse and cashless wallet in the area of the front
seat. The evidence also included that Filipovska, who had recently been experiencing difficulty
breathing, was found dead in a field about 1.8 miles from her car, which was a couple of hundred
yards from the hotel that defendant was living in at the time. When defendant was questioned by
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police during their canvassing of the immediate area, before the death became public
information, defendant asked something to the effect of “How’d that lady die over there?”
The medical examiner testified that Filipovska died of a heart attack, but death was not
immediate, and he listed the manner of death as unknown or indeterminate because little or
nothing was known about how her body ended up some distance from her car and the
circumstances “did not fit the profile of a natural death.” This evidence and associated
inferences were sufficient to establish by a preponderance that Filipovska died during and as a
consequence of a robbery while she was on her way home from work and after she exited her
vehicle that had been rear-ended. See People v Brasic, 171 Mich App 222, 227; 429 NW2d 860
(1988). The corpus delicti rule, which is designed to avoid the use of a defendant’s confession to
a crime that never occurred, was satisfied and defendant’s inculpatory statements were properly
admitted. See Konrad, supra at 269. Therefore, defendant has failed to establish plain error
warranting reversal. Further, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel premised on
this issue is without merit. People v Sabin (On Sec Rem), 242 Mich App 656, 659; 620 NW2d
19 (2000).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the medical examiner to
testify that Filipovska’s death was a homicide because such testimony was beyond his expertise
and improperly bolstered the prosecution’s theory of the case. We disagree. Defendant failed to
preserve this issue for appeal by objecting at trial; therefore, our review is for plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra.
Expert testimony is admissible under MRE 702 if (1) the witness is qualified, (2) the
testimony is relevant in that it assists the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a
fact in issue, and (3) the testimony is derived from recognized scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge. People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691, 710-719; 456 NW2d 391 (1990). In
accord with the relevancy and reliability requirements, the expert’s testimony should be directly
related to and within the scope of the witness’ expertise and should not include comment or
opinion on the credibility of other witnesses. People v Buckey, 424 Mich 1, 16-17; 378 NW2d
432 (1985); Franzel v Kerr Mfg Co, 234 Mich App 600, 621; 600 NW2d 66 (1999).
Here, defendant claims that the medical examiner’s testimony was impermissible because
it included that the manner of death was a homicide; specifically, that Filipovska’s heart attack
was precipitated by “intense stress that being assaulted implies, the term scared to death is what
comes to mind.” Defendant relies on People v Smith, 425 Mich 98; 387 NW2d 814 (1986), in
support of his argument that the medical examiner’s testimony was improper. In Smith, our
Supreme Court reversed a criminal sexual conduct conviction where the prosecution’s medical
expert based his opinion that the victim had been sexually assaulted not on objective medical
findings within the realm of his expertise as a gynecologist, but, rather, on the victim’s emotional
state and information given him by the victim. Smith, supra at 112-113. The Smith Court relied
heavily upon its previous decision in People v McGillen #2, 392 Mich 278; 220 NW2d 689
(1974), in reaching this conclusion. In McGillen #2, the Court reversed a rape conviction after
concluding that the physician testifying for the prosecution was not testifying based on medical
evidence, but rather on what he had been told by the victim. McGillen #2, supra at 286.
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These cases are inapposite. Medical examiners are charged by law with the duty to
investigate the cause and manner of death in all cases of persons whose death was unexpected or
caused by violence. MCL 52.202; 52.205(3). Attendant with that responsibility is the duty to
actually formulate an opinion as to the cause and manner of death in light of known facts and
circumstances. See id. In this case, the medical examiner testified that he determined that
Filipovska had an enlarged heart due to sustained high blood pressure which placed her at high
risk for sudden death and, indeed, the cause of her death was a heart attack. He further testified
that, because he did not know how her body ended up some distance from her car, i.e., the
circumstances in which the death occurred, he could not determine the manner of her death but
did know “that this did not fit the particular profile of a natural death.” He clarified that to
determine “the manner of death,” a medical examiner needs some kind of factual account of the
circumstances surrounding the death. The medical examiner also indicated that after receiving
additional information from the police that Filipovska was the victim of a robbery, he was able to
determine that such facts were consistent with the scenario presented – that she had an enlarged
heart which had not caused severe, obvious consequences until the “right trigger” came along, an
extremely stressful event like an assault involving a struggle and being held down. He testified
that these kinds of stress-induced heart attacks were well-documented in forensic pathology
literature and that he saw at least a couple cases a year.
Contrary to the situation presented in Smith, supra, here, the physician was a medical
examiner and an expert in forensic pathology, as stipulated by the parties, which is the specific
branch of medicine that specializes in investigating and interpreting evidence dealing with
diseases and disorders of the body, especially those that cause death. See Black’s Law
Dictionary (7th ed). Accordingly, the scope of his expertise includes determining the cause and
manner of deaths. As he testified, the manner of death, i.e., whether it is natural, homicide,
suicide, accidental, or indeterminate is determined by the objective facts and circumstances
surrounding the death. A medical examiner, by law, must make a manner of death determination
in every case. MCL 52.202. Accordingly, such expert opinion testimony is “directly related to
and within the immediate scope of the witness’ expertise” and, thus, is permissible. See Franzel,
supra. Further, the issue whether the fatal heart attack was the result of natural causes or
homicide was not within the knowledge of the common juror, i.e., a specialized understanding of
the heart and its functioning as related its preexisting condition is necessary. However, as with
any other expert testimony, it may be challenged on cross-examination. Here, during crossexamination, defense counsel challenged the factual basis of the medical examiner’s opinion
specifically questioning whether some other hypothetical stressful event could have caused
Filipovska’s fatal heart attack. In response, the medical examiner testified that the stressful event
would have had to be of an extreme nature to trigger the heart attack, such as that associated with
an assault and struggle. It was clear that the medical examiner based his conclusions regarding
there being a homicide on the assumption that Filipovska was robbed as described to him by the
police officer. It was for the jury to determine the weight of the testimony. People v Wolfe, 440
Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992); People v Givans, 227
Mich App 113, 123-124; 575 NW2d 84 (1997). Accordingly, defendant’s counsel was not
ineffective for failing to object to the testimony and defendant has failed to establish plain error
warranting reversal with regard to the admission of the testimony.
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Defendant next argues that the trial court pierced the veil of judicial impartiality when it
interrupted defense counsel’s cross-examination of the medical examiner. We disagree.
Because defendant failed to preserve this issue by objecting at trial, our review is for plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. See Carines, supra.
A trial court is authorized to interrogate witnesses at trial. MRE 614(b). However, the
court’s discretion is not unlimited. People v Hartsuff, 213 Mich App 338, 349; 539 NW2d 781
(1995), quoting People v Collier, 168 Mich App 687, 698; 425 NW2d 118 (1988). The trial
court may question witnesses to clarify testimony or elicit additional relevant information, but
such questions may not be intimidating, argumentative, prejudicial, unfair, or partial. People v
Cheeks, 216 Mich App 470, 480; 549 NW2d 584 (1996). The test is whether the trial court’s
questions and comments may have unjustifiably aroused the jury’s suspicion regarding witness
credibility and whether partiality quite possibly could have influenced the jury against
defendant’s case. People v Conyers, 194 Mich App 395, 405; 487 NW2d 787 (1992).
Generally, critical, disapproving, and hostile remarks toward counsel, the parties, or their cases
do not support a challenge for partiality. Cain v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 497 n 30;
548 NW2d 210 (1996).
Here, the trial court ruled on objections, attempted to control the proceedings in an
orderly fashion, and responded to an incorrect characterization of the court’s comments by
defense counsel. The court was not discourteous to defense counsel, nor did it belittle counsel.
Despite ruling in favor of the prosecution’s objection to a line of questioning, the court allowed
defense counsel to ask the questions anyway. Because the trial court’s remarks did not pierce the
veil of judicial impartiality, plain error warranting reversal has not been demonstrated and
defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel for failing to object on this ground.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court committed instructional error and the
prosecution engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in making misstatements of the law related to
felony murder during opening and closing statements. Again, defendant failed to preserve this
issue for appeal by objecting at trial; therefore, we will review the issue for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. See Carines, supra.
In reviewing claims of error in jury instructions, we examine the instructions in their
entirety. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 124; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). “Jury instructions
must include all the elements of the charged offense and must not exclude material issues,
defenses, and theories if the evidence supports them.” People v Canales, 243 Mich App 571,
574; 624 NW2d 439 (2000). Even if the instructions are imperfect, there is no error if they fairly
presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected the defendant's rights. Aldrich, supra.
When reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we examine the pertinent portion of the
record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context to determine whether the defendant
received a fair and impartial trial. People v Reid, 233 Mich App 457, 466; 592 NW2d 767
(1999).
Here, defendant concedes in his brief that the trial court and the prosecution, in addition
to making inaccurate statements of the law, also made accurate statements of the law. Viewed as
a whole, we conclude that the jury instructions accurately conveyed the law of felony murder to
the jury. On the whole, we also conclude that the prosecution’s remarks on the law of felony
murder were accurate. Even if they were not, the trial court’s instructions included a cautionary
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instruction that the arguments and statements of counsel were not evidence, and the prosecutor
herself counseled that the trial court’s statements of the law, and not any statements she made,
constituted the law the jury was required to apply. Juries are presumed to follow the court’s
instructions, and “instructions are presumed to cure most errors.” People v Abraham, 256 Mich
App 265, 278-279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s and
the prosecution’s remarks regarding the law of felony murder did not constitute plain errors
requiring reversal. Further, defense counsel’s failure to object on this ground did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Helene N. White
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