DANIEL DENNIS V CITY OF EASTPOINTE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DANIEL DENNIS,
UNPUBLISHED
December 27, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 237521
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 00-005008-NI
CITY OF EASTPOINTE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Murphy and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCL 2.116(C)(7) in this slip and fall case involving snow-covered ice
laying atop a municipal sidewalk. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff’s claim was barred by
governmental immunity and in its decision that the highway exception, MCL 691.1402(1), is
inapplicable under the facts of the instant case. We disagree.
In Haliw v Sterling Heights, 464 Mich 297; 627 NW2d 581 (2001), our Supreme Court
reaffirmed the “well-settled” principle that governmental agencies, while engaging in
governmental functions, are immune from tort liability absent a specific exception. Id., 302.
The highway exception, MCL 691.1402(1), provides in pertinent part:
[E]ach governmental agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall
maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and
convenient for public travel. A person who sustains bodily injury or damage to
his or her property by reason of failure of a governmental agency to keep a
highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably
safe and fit for travel may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the
governmental agency.
For purposes of the statute, the term “highway” includes public sidewalks. MCL
691.1401(e). According to MCL 691.1402(1), the duty imposed upon a municipality is to
“maintain” sidewalks “in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel.”
Thus, a plaintiff cannot recover under this exception unless he can show that his injury was
-1-
caused by a combination of an actual defect in the sidewalk coupled with the accumulation of ice
and snow. Id., 310. Reaffirming the analysis in Hopson v Detroit, 235 Mich 248; 209 NW 161
(1926), the Haliw Court held:
Simply put, a plaintiff cannot recover in a claim against a governmental
agency where the sole proximate cause of the slip and fall is the natural
accumulation of ice or snow. This is true even where the ice or snow naturally
accumulates in a portion of the [sidewalk] that was otherwise not ‘reasonably safe
and convenient for public travel.’ Hopson, supra at 250. Rather, there must exist
the combination of the ice or snow and the defect that, in tandem, proximately
causes the slip and fall. [Haliw, supra at 311].
In addition, “[t]his other defect, however, is not a proximate cause within the meaning of this
rule, simply because it causes the accumulation of the ice or snow.” Hopson, supra at 252; see,
also, Haliw, supra at 308, n 9. Moreover, this analysis does not depend on the cause of the
depression that allows the accumulation of ice or snow. Haliw, supra at 307; Hopson, supra at
251. In short:
In the absence of a persistent defect in the highway (i.e., a sidewalk),
rendering it unsafe for public travel at all times, and which combines with the
natural accumulation of ice or snow to proximately cause injury, a plaintiff cannot
prevail against an otherwise immune municipality.
[Haliw, supra at
312](emphasis added).
In the instant case, the trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. The evidence plaintiff submitted did not establish that the sidewalk where plaintiff
fell was cracked or broken, nor did it indicate a height differential between the slabs where
plaintiff fell. A number of additional facts are undisputed, at least for the purposes of
defendant’s motion for summary disposition. They agree that defendant is the party responsible
for the condition of the sidewalk. In addition, plaintiff testified that he did not trip, stumble or
fall on the sidewalk and that the sidewalk appeared completely flat when he examined it. The
parties do not dispute that the ice was caused by the melting and refreezing of water from a
natural source rather than from another source. Rather, plaintiff argues, and defendant accepts,
that the accumulation was caused by a combination of sidewalk slope and an abutting grass berm
that was elevated above the level of the sidewalk. This condition allowed water to pond and
freeze.1
The facts contained in the record establish that, although the sidewalk permitted the
accumulation of ice, as a factual matter, “no other danger to the steps of the traveler than that
arising from the presence of the ice . . . .” existed. Id., 312, citing Hopson, supra at 252. Thus,
after considering the documentary evidence presented in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Cole
v Ladbroke Racing Michigan, Inc, 241 Mich App 1, 7; 614 NW2d 169 (2000), we hold that the
1
According to plaintiff, the sidewalk was originally sloped so as to accommodate a driveway to
an adjacent property. When the driveway was removed, the slope of the sidewalk was not
altered prior to the addition of the grass berm.
-2-
trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to defendant pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7).
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.