BARBARA JOHNSON-PRICE V ST JOHN HOSP & MED CENTER CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BARBARA JOHNSON-PRICE,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
ST. JOHN HOSPITAL & MEDICAL CENTER
CORP, and LORITA WYTKA,
No. 233522
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-648385-CL
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Jansen and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action alleging age and race discrimination violations of the Michigan Civil Rights
Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s orders granting
defendants summary disposition and denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
Plaintiff, a fifty-seven-year-old African-American woman, began employment with
defendant St. John Hospital & Medical Center Corporation in 1967. After plaintiff received a
low performance evaluation and failed to successfully complete two work improvement plans,
plaintiff’s supervisor, defendant Lorita Wytka, terminated plaintiff’s employment in 1996 and
replaced plaintiff with a younger, Caucasian woman. The instant suit followed.
Because the trial court looked beyond the pleadings in granting summary disposition, we
review the motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10). A motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a claim and is subject to review de novo. Spiek v Dep’t
of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). In reviewing a trial court’s grant
of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the affidavits, pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358,
362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is appropriately
granted if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id.
In order to survive defendants’ motion for summary disposition, plaintiff was required to
first establish a prima facie case of age or race discrimination under the approach set forth in
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McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 802-803; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973).
See generally Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 462-463; 628 NW2d 515 (2001).1 Under
the McDonnell Douglas analysis, as applied in Michigan, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by showing that (1) she was a member of the protected class, (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) she
suffered the adverse employment action under circumstances inferring discrimination. See Lytle
v Malady, 458 Mich 153, 172-173; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). If the plaintiff is able to establish a
prima facie case, discrimination is presumed. Id. at 173. The burden then shifts to the defendant
to produce a nondiscriminatory reason for the action. Id. If the defendant is able to do this, “the
presumption created by the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case drops away.” Hazle, supra at
465. The plaintiff then has the burden to show that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason is
merely a pretext. Lytle, supra at 174.
There was no dispute regarding the first, second, and fourth prongs of the McDonnell
Douglas test. Regarding the third prong, “a plaintiff is not required to provide evidence that
[she] is at least as qualified as the successful candidate in order to establish a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas.” Hazle, supra at 470. Therefore, considering all evidence in
plaintiff’s favor, and giving plaintiff the benefit of any reasonable doubt, the trial court was
correct in implicitly finding that plaintiff had satisfied the McDonnell Douglas test. As such, a
presumption of discrimination arose and defendants were charged with providing a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for firing plaintiff.
Defendants contended plaintiff was terminated because of documented poor work
performance, despite having been given eight months to improve. Thus, the burden rested on
plaintiff to produce evidence that this reason was a pretext. In other words, plaintiff was
required to show discrimination “with admissible evidence, either direct or circumstantial,
sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that discrimination was a motivating
factor for the adverse action taken by the employer toward . . . plaintiff.” Lytle, supra at 176. To
survive defendants’ motion for summary disposition, plaintiff needed to create a genuine issue of
material fact whether defendants’ nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her were their true
reasons, or whether plaintiff’s age or race were motivating factors. See Town v Michigan Bell
Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688, 697; 568 NW2d 64 (1997).
The minimal evidence that plaintiff produced regarding her age discrimination claim, i.e.,
that Wytka referred to plaintiff as the “department historian,” was insufficient. Wytka explained
that plaintiff had worked in the department for twenty-nine years, which was far longer than any
other staff members. Wytka’s characterization of plaintiff could be as easily construed in a
positive, rather than a negative fashion. Additionally, plaintiff failed to provide any connection
between the comment and her termination. Plaintiff’s poor evaluation and inability to perform
either work improvement plan sufficiently established that defendants’ purported reasons for
firing plaintiff were factually based. Defendants’ purported reasons for terminating plaintiff
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In response to defendants’ motion for summary disposition, plaintiff produced no direct
evidence of age discrimination. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is appropriate
in cases without direct evidence of discrimination. Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich
App 601, 609; 572 NW2d 679 (1997).
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were independently sufficient to justify the termination, and plaintiff did not create a genuine
issue of fact regarding whether age was a motivating factor.
Plaintiff’s most substantial piece of evidence regarding the racial discrimination claim
was that Wytka had once told plaintiff that some staff members were intimidated by her, and that
in doing so Wytka stated that she did not mean “the Nancys, the Emmas and Bonnies.”
Although the three referenced staff members are African-Americans, plaintiff provided no
evidence that this statement was made in reference to ethnicity. Plaintiff conceded that there
were at least five other African-American staff members in her department who were not
referenced, and she was unable to articulate any reason to conclude that the comment was based
on ethnicity, rather than personality. Plaintiff also argued that racial discrimination was implicit
in the work improvement plan, based on the deposition testimony of plaintiff’s expert. However,
she was unable to specifically cite any evidence supporting her contention. We find that
plaintiff’s evidence was not sufficient to create a genuine issue of a material fact rebutting
defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff. The trial court
correctly held that plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case of race discrimination.
In plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, and now on appeal, plaintiff contends that an
additional affidavit established a prima facie case for racial discrimination. This Court reviews a
trial court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Charbeneau v
Wayne Co General Hospital, 158 Mich App 730, 733; 405 NW2d 151 (1987). The disputed
affidavit was procured twelve days after the trial court’s order of summary disposition. The
affiant was named on plaintiff’s witness list more than a year before the trial court’s decision.
Plaintiff produced no evidence and made no argument that the affidavit was unavailable before
the summary disposition motion was decided. This Court will find no abuse of discretion in the
denial of a motion for reconsideration that rests on evidence that could have been presented the
first time the issue was argued. Churchman v Rickerson, 240 Mich App 223, 233; 611 NW2d
333 (2000).
We affirm.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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