PEOPLE OF MI V MARIO E INGRAM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 223970
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000865
STACEY C. INGRAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 224907
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000865
MARIO E. INGRAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Cavanagh and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Stacey and Mario Ingram were tried jointly before separate juries, having
been originally charged with alternative theories of first-degree premeditated and felonymurder.1 Stacey Ingram was convicted of first-degree felony-murder, MCL 750.316, and Mario
Ingram was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317. Stacey Ingram was sentenced to
life imprisonment for the felony-murder conviction, and Mario Ingram was sentenced to forty to
sixty years’ imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction. Both defendants appeal as
of right. We affirm.
Defendant Stacey Ingram argues that her statement to the police could not be used to
establish the underlying felony and, therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support her
1
The felony-murder charge against Mario Ingram was dismissed before trial.
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first-degree felony-murder conviction, as well as insufficient evidence to justify binding her over
for trial. We disagree.
The sufficiency of the evidence is to be evaluated by reviewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that
every element of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Nunez, 242 Mich
App 610, 615; 619 NW2d 550 (2000). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences from
the evidence are sufficient to establish the elements of a crime. People v Schultz, 246 Mich App
693, 702; 635 NW2d 491 (1991). Resolving credibility disputes is within the exclusive province
of the trier of fact. People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 404; 648 NW2d 648 (2002).
Contrary to what Stacey Ingram argues, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied in a felonymurder case by showing that “a death has occurred and that the death resulted from a criminal
agency.” People v Hughey, 186 Mich App 585, 589; 464 NW2d 914 (1990). Independent proof
of the underlying felony is not required. Id. at 586-590.
In the present case, the medical examiner’s testimony was sufficient to prove that the
victim’s death was the result of a criminal agency (ligature strangulation). Thus, the corpus
delicti for felony-murder was established. In her statement to the police, Stacey Ingram stated
that she knew that Mario Ingram was going to ask the victim for money, and changed seats with
him before the fatal assault. When Mario Ingram began strangling the victim, Stacey Ingram
assisted him by putting the car in park and relocking the car door after the victim managed to
unlock it. After the victim was dead, Stacey Ingram took money out of her wallet and shared it
with Mario Ingram, helped Mario Ingram place tape on the victim’s mouth and nostrils, helped
Mario dispose of the victim’s body and abandon the victim’s child, kept the victim’s car and
wallet, and obtained cash for herself and Mario Ingram using the victim’s ATM card. Viewed in
a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rationale trier of
fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Stacey Ingram assisted Mario Ingram with knowledge
that Mario intended to kill the victim during the course of a larceny. People v Kelly, 423 Mich
261, 278-279; 378 NW2d 365 (1985).
Furthermore, because sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support Stacey
Ingram’s convictions, any error in the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary examination
was harmless. People v Moorer, 246 Mich App 680, 682; 635 NW2d 47 (2001).
Stacey Ingram also argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed
verdict on the charge of first-degree premeditated murder. We disagree.
In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for directed verdict, we must similarly
view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational
factfinder could find that the essential elements of the charged crime were proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 52-53; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). Although
the jury did not convict Stacey Ingram of first-degree premeditated murder, we are satisfied from
the circumstances described above, the length of time necessary to cause death from ligature
strangulation, as well as Stacey Ingram’s behavior before, during, and after the killing, that the
evidence was sufficient to present the question of premeditation and deliberation to the jury. See
People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 733; 597 NW2d 73 (1999); People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297,
301; 642 NW2d 417 (2002); People v Jones (On Rehearing), 201 Mich App 449, 451; 506
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NW2d 542 (1993). Therefore, the trial court did not err in submitting the first-degree
premeditated murder charge to the jury.
Next, Stacey Ingram argues that the trial court erred in allowing police officers to testify
that she lied to them about the victim’s car before she was advised of her Miranda2 rights. We
disagree. We agree with the trial court that defense counsel opened the door to the challenged
line of questioning by asking a police officer why Stacey Ingram was sent to detention. Counsel
had pursued this line of questioning at a prior suppression hearing and, therefore, knew or should
have known how the officer would respond. Reversal may not be premised on an “error to
which the aggrieved party contributed by plan or negligence.” Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich
App 513, 537; 564 NW2d 532 (1997).
We further note that the officers testified that, before her arrest, Stacey Ingram had lied
when she told them that she didn’t know who the car belonged to and denied having been in
possession of it. Her former boyfriend had similarly testified that, as he was being arrested,
Stacey Ingram “started lying that the car was [his].” Thus, the officers’ testimony was
cumulative to this other testimony. Accordingly, even if the officers’ testimony could be
considered improper, we would conclude that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392, 406; 521 NW2d 538 (1994).
Next, Stacey Ingram argues that the trial court erred in allowing evidence that the
victim’s daughter was abandoned on a stranger’s doorstep after the crime. We disagree. A trial
court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v
Smith, 456 Mich 543, 550; 581 NW2d 654 (1998). Here, Stacey Ingram’s treatment of the child
was post-homicidal conduct, which was relevant to the issue of intent. See People v Bigelow,
225 Mich App 806, 808; 571 NW2d 520 (1997), vacated 225 Mich App 806 (1997), reinstated in
pertinent part 229 Mich App 218, 221 (1998).
Stacey Ingram also argues that the trial court erred by failing to give an attempt
instruction in conjunction with its instruction on felony-murder, which identified the underlying
felony as attempted larceny. Because Stacey Ingram did not object to the instructions given or
request an attempt instruction at trial, this issue is not preserved. Accordingly, we review this
issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Here, whether or not Stacey Ingram’s conduct constituted an
attempted larceny was not a principal issue at trial. Indeed, it was apparent from the evidence
that a completed larceny was accomplished. Against this backdrop, any error did not affect
Stacey Ingram’s substantial rights. Therefore, this unpreserved issue does not warrant appellate
relief.
Next, Stacey Ingram argues that trial counsel was ineffective. Because Stacey Ingram
did not raise this issue in a motion for a Ginther3 hearing or new trial, our review is limited to
mistakes apparent from the record. People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649 NW2d 94
(2002).
2
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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First, counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress the marijuana seized
from Stacey Ingram at the time of her arrest. As discussed infra, Stacey Ingram was legally
arrested, and the marijuana was therefore properly seized pursuant to a search incident to that
lawful arrest. See People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 115-117; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). Because
a motion to suppress would have been futile, counsel was not ineffective for failing to so move.
People v Rodriguez, 212 Mich App 351, 356; 538 NW2d 42 (1995).
We also disagree with Stacey Ingram’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to
cross-examine her former boyfriend at the preliminary examination. Whether to cross-examine
the witness was a matter of trial strategy, entrusted to counsel’s professional judgment. People v
Rockey, 251 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). Here, Stacey Ingram does not indicate
what helpful information could have been elicited through cross-examination, nor has she shown
how cross-examination might have made a difference in the outcome. Indeed, considering that
the witness had accused Stacey Ingram of stealing the victim’s car, cross-examination might
have been more damaging than helpful. Stacey Ingram has failed to overcome the presumption
of sound trial strategy with regard to counsel’s decision not to cross-examine the witness.
Next, Stacey Ingram claims defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
suppress evidence that she had been shot and was a witness to another murder. We disagree.
Defense counsel opposed the prosecutor’s motion in limine to introduce evidence that she had
given a statement in the previous case and the trial court ruled that this evidence was relevant,
both to rebut the argument that Stacey Ingram’s pregnancy made her weak and susceptible to
undue influence, and to show that she was familiar with police procedure. Under the
circumstances, the record does not demonstrate that counsel was ineffective for opposing the
prosecution motion in limine rather than moving to suppress the disputed evidence. People v
Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 312, 314; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
Next, Stacey Ingram argues that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on flight
in accordance with CJI2d 4.4. We disagree. Several witnesses testified that Stacey Ingram and
her sister were walking away from the scene after the police arrived and began arresting Stacey
Ingram’s former boyfriend and another male for possession of the victim’s stolen car, which they
had borrowed from Stacey Ingram. Whether they were walking rather than running is
immaterial for purposes of determining whether an instruction on flight was warranted. The
significance of the evidence was that they were observed leaving the scene. We find no error in
the court’s decision to instruct the jury on flight. See People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 80-81; 537
NW2d 909 (1995), mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995).
Stacey Ingram next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress her confession
as the fruit on an illegal arrest. “‘We review de novo a trial court’s ultimate decision on a motion
to suppress.’” People v McKinney, 251 Mich App 205, 207; 650 NW2d 353 (2002), quoting
People v Beuschlein, 245 Mich App 744, 748; 630 NW2d 921 (2001). However, we review the
trial court’s factual findings underlying its decision for clear error. Id. In this case, the police
were already aware that the victim had been killed and that her automobile had been stolen.
Further, immediately before Stacey Ingram was arrested, the police were informed that she had
been driving the victim’s car and had recently allowed two young men to use it, and that she was
also attempting to leave the scene. The information provided to the police constituted reasonably
trustworthy information giving rise to probable cause to believe that Stacey Ingram had
committed a felony, possession of a stolen car. See Champion, supra at 115. We find no error
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in the trial court’s determination that Stacey Ingram was legally arrested without a warrant. See
MCL 764.15. Because the arrest was not illegal, the trial court properly denied Stacey Ingram’s
motion to suppress her confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest.
Stacey Ingram next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain
morgue photographs. According to the record, the photos depicted petechia hemorrhage and
ligature marks. They were relevant for purposes of determining Stacey Ingram’s intent,
evaluating her statement, and corroborating the medical examiner’s testimony concerning the
manner of death. Mills, supra at 71. Also, the trial court determined that the photos were not
gruesome. Stacey Ingram has not shown that the probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at 76. Hence, we find no abuse
of discretion.
Next, Stacey Ingram argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing her police
statement to be read into evidence where the requirements of MRE 803(5) were not satisfied.
Regardless of whether the foundational requirements of MRE 803(5) were met, Stacey Ingram’s
statement was admissible as an admission of a party opponent under MRE 801(d)(2)(A). Thus,
reversal is not required because the trial court reached the right result. Ford Credit Canada
Leasing, Ltd v DePaul, 247 Mich App 723, 730; 637 NW2d 831 (2001).
Stacey Ingram next argues that, given the results of her polygraph examination, the trial
court erred in denying her motion for reconsideration of her motion to suppress. This Court
reviews a trial court’s decision in a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.
Churchman v Rickerson, 240 Mich App 223, 233; 611 NW2d 333 (2000).
Defense counsel offered the polygraph results as essentially newly discovered evidence
to support reconsideration of Stacey Ingram’s motion to suppress evidence heard and denied
more than two months earlier. Counsel conceded that the motion was being filed at the “last
minute.” The trial court denied the motion as one untimely made on the eve of trial. While the
reasons offered by counsel for the untimely filing may have been meritorious, we cannot say that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion as untimely.
Next, Stacey Ingram and Mario Ingram both argue that the prosecutor committed
misconduct depriving them of a fair trial when she “spoke” during opening statements in the
“voice” of the victim speaking from the grave, in the voices of each defendant and, before Mario
Ingram’s jury, in the voice of the physical evidence. We review claims of prosecutorial
misconduct to determine whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. People v Bahoda,
448 Mich 261, 266-267; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Clearly, a prosecutor may not appeal to the jurors’ sympathies. People v Watson, 245
Mich App 572, 591; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Similarly, “[a] prosecutor may not intentionally
inject inflammatory arguments with no apparent justification except to arouse prejudice.”
People v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 247; 537 NW2d 233 (1995). In arguing the evidence and its
reasonable inferences, however, a prosecutor is not required to speak in the blandest possible
terms. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 112; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Even if we were to
agree with defendants that the technique used by the prosecutor was inappropriate, we are
satisfied after considering the evidence presented against each defendant that there is no
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reasonable possibility that the alleged misconduct contributed to the conviction. Anderson,
supra at 406. Thus, any such errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Lastly, Mario Ingram argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the
prosecutor to present evidence that some unspecified person used the victim’s debit card after the
murder. We disagree.
Mario Ingram was charged with first-degree premeditated murder. To prove this charge,
the prosecution was required to prove that Mario Ingram intentionally killed the victim and that
the act of killing was premeditated and deliberate. Ortiz, supra at 301. “Premeditation may be
established through evidence of the following factors: (1) the prior relationship of the parties; (2)
the defendant’s actions before the killing; (3) the circumstances of the killing; and (4) the
defendant’s conduct after the homicide.” Bigelow, supra at 808. “Minimal circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to prove an actor’s state of mind.” Ortiz, supra at 301.
The prosecutor did not present any direct evidence to Mario Ingram’s jury that Mario was
involved in using the victim’s ATM card after the murder, nor concerning the identity of the
person who did. However, in light of the evidence of Mario Ingram’s complicity with another
person at the time the victim was killed, and the implausible denials and explanations contained
in his statement, we believe that evidence showing the unauthorized use of the victim’s ATM
card shortly after the killing was relevant to the issue of Mario Ingram’s intent. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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