RONALD T HOOPER V DONALD HOOPER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RONALD T. HOOPER,
UNPUBLISHED
December 13, 2002
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Thirdparty Defendant-Appellee,
and
SHERRY HOOPER,
Third-party Defendant,
v
No. 231544
Sanilac Circuit Court
LC No. 95-023891-CK
DONALD HOOPER,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/Thirdparty Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
PAMELA HOOPER,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/Thirdparty Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
HOOPER BROTHERS FARMS,
Defendant,
and
HOOPER DAIRY, INC.,
Defendant/Third-party Plaintiff.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Smolenski and Owens, JJ.
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PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal by right an entry of judgment for plaintiff and subsequent denial of
their motion for reconsideration or rehearing. We affirm.
Twin brothers Ronald T. Hooper and Donald Hooper1 became partners in 1984, later
forming Hooper Dairy, a Michigan corporation, and Hooper Brothers Farms, a co-partnership.
The brothers found themselves unable to agree on the management of their ventures, eventually
resulting in the instant case. The parties subsequently entered into a stipulated judgment,
whereby a receiver’s report would dispose of certain claims. The meaning of the following
passage of the stipulation forms the basis of the present appeal:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED That if either CounterPlaintiff, DONALD HOOPER, or Counter-Defendant, RONALD T. HOOPER,
feel aggrieved by the Receiver’s written recommendation to this Court, or any
portion thereof, then that party can petition this Court for relief within 21 days of
receipt of said written recommendation.
The record discloses that defendants received the receiver’s report on October 3, 2000,
mailed their objections on October 24, 2000, and that the trial court received the objections on
October 26, 2000. The trial court refused to consider the objections, ruling that the period
specified by the parties required that it should have received the objections no later than October
24, 2000.
Defendants first contend that the trial court erred by ruling that the stipulated judgment
constituted a settlement agreement under MCR 2.507(H). We disagree. Defendants’ argument
is contradicted by the lower court record, which indicates the judgment was a settlement
agreement that all parties agreed to, specifically using the term “settlement agreement” several
times. Moreover, the parties to the suit each affirmed in open court that they wanted the
agreement to be binding and settle all claims. The stipulated judgment clearly constituted a
settlement agreement within the meaning of MCR 2.507(H).
Settlement agreements become binding on parties where made in open court or evidenced
by writing. MCR 2.507(H); Reed v Citizens Ins Co of America, 198 Mich App 443, 448; 499
NW2d 22 (1993). Only where the agreement was not made in open court or reduced to writing
will it be unenforceable. Brunet v Decorative Engineering, Inc, 215 Mich App 430, 436; 546
NW2d 641 (1996). Because the agreement here was made in open court, reduced to writing, and
acknowledged by the parties to be a settlement agreement that would be the final resolution in
the suit, the trial court correctly found that it was a settlement agreement under MCR 2.507(H).
Because settlement agreements between parties to a lawsuit constitute contracts and are binding
on the parties to the agreement, Mikoncszyk v Detroit Newspapers, Inc, 238 Mich App 347, 349;
605 NW2d 360 (1999), the trial court correctly concluded that the settlement agreement between
the instant parties constituted a binding contract.
1
Sherry Hooper and Pamela Hooper are Ronald’s wife and Donald’s wife, respectively.
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Defendants next contend that the trial court erred by holding that the agreement was
subject to principles of contract interpretation and that under the plain meaning of the excerpted
passage, defendant filed his objections past the twenty-one-day deadline. Contrary to
defendants’ argument, courts must interpret settlement agreements according to the principles of
contract interpretation, with the goal of honoring the intent of the parties. Mikonczyk, supra at
349-350. Where a contract contains no ambiguity, a trial court must enforce it as written, Farm
Bureau Mut Ins Co of Michigan v Nikkel, 460 Mich 558, 566; 596 NW2d 915 (1999), deciding
the meaning of the contract as a matter of law, Orley Enterprises, Inc v Tri-Pointe, Inc, 206 Mich
App 614, 617; 522 NW2d 896 (1994). The fact that the parties dispute the meaning of the
contract does not render it ambiguous. Cole v Ladbroke Racing Michigan, Inc, 241 Mich App 1,
14; 614 NW2d 169 (2000). Courts confronting an unambiguous contract must ascertain the
parties’ intent from the plain and ordinary meaning of the contractual language. Id. at 13.
We find that the excerpted passage contains no ambiguities, and that the plain meaning
indicates that if either of the parties had objections to the receiver’s report, they had to file those
objections in the Sanilac Circuit Court no later than twenty-one days after they received the
report. The agreement required defendants to petition the lower court within the twenty-one day
window. The objections, therefore, were not properly raised until they were filed in that court.
MCR 2.107(G); General Motors Corp v Detroit, 141 Mich App 630, 634; 368 NW2d 739
(1985). Mailing the objections within twenty-one days was not sufficient. Id.2 Defendants do
not dispute that they received the receiver’s report on October 3, 2000, and that the trial court
received their objections after October 24, 2000. Therefore, the trial court properly refused to
consider defendants’ objections because the contract term was unambiguous, and the objections
were not filed within the express twenty-one-day period.
Defendants finally claim that the trial court should have investigated the receiver’s report
to verify its accuracy and fairness. We find no such duty. On the contrary, courts must enforce
settlement agreements as written. Nikkel, supra at 566; Mikonczyk, supra at 349-350. A
settlement agreement “‘cannot be set aside or vacated by the court without the consent of the
parties . . . [because] it is not the judgment of the court but the judgment of the parties.’”
[Tudryck v Mutch, 320 Mich 99, 105; 30 NW2d 518 (1948), quoting In re Estate of Meredith,
275 Mich 278, 289; 266 NW 351 (1936).]
The parties’ stipulated judgment constituted a binding settlement agreement requiring
objections to be filed within twenty-one days of receiving the receiver’s report. Nothing in the
stipulation required the trial court to inquire into the methods used by the receiver or to make a
determination of fairness or accuracy. Thus, defendants essentially asked the trial court to
modify the settlement agreement, thereby setting aside the unambiguous intent of the parties.
The trial court could not have done this without the consent of the parties, and plaintiff did not
consent to defendants’ proposed modification. Tudryck, supra at 105. Moreover, this Court
generally will not consider a party’s complaint that the trial court enforced an order to which
2
The statute at issue in General Motors, supra, was subsequently amended to allow a filing to be
effective upon certified mailing or actual delivery. 1985 PA 95, § 2. However, this only
affected filings with the Tax Tribunal, not circuit court. The filing at issue in this case is
governed by the court rule.
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both parties stipulated. Marsh v Dep’t Civil Service (After Remand), 173 Mich App 72, 77; 433
NW2d 820 (1988).
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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