LISA PENNA V MGM GRAND DETROIT LLC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LISA PENNA,
UNPUBLISHED
December 3, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
MGM GRAND DETROIT, L.L.C.,
MICHAIL KRAVARITIS, GREGORY
VANSTONE, and LISA JOHNSON-HANNAH,
No. 233499
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-929162-CK
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and White and B. B. MacKenzie*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, an African-American, filed suit against defendants alleging that she was
wrongfully terminated from her position as assistant manager of the Brown Derby Restaurant at
the MGM Grand Detroit. Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary
disposition to defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that defendants breached her employment contract by terminating
her without giving the requisite sixty days’ notice. We disagree.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for
a claim. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999); Oade v Jackson
National Life Ins Co of Michigan, 465 Mich 244, 251; 632 NW2d 126 (2001). When deciding
such a motion, a court must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other
evidence submitted by the parties in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Where no genuine issue of material fact
exists, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. See MCR 2.116(C)(10),
(G)(4). This Court reviews de novo a ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Smith, supra.
The construction of unambiguous contractual language is a question of law, whereas the
construction of ambiguous contractual language is a question of fact. Saint Paul Fire & Marine
Ins Co, 228 Mich App 101, 107; 577 NW2d 188 (1998). If a contract, although inartfully
worded, admits of only one interpretation, it is not ambiguous. Meagher v Wayne State
University, 222 Mich App 700, 722; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). Contractual language is construed
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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according to its plain and ordinary meaning, and the court should avoid technical or strained
constructions. Saint Paul Fire, supra at 107.
Here, the parties’ letter of employment provided as follows:
7. Termination Right: Either party shall have the right to terminate this
agreement and your employment hereunder, without cause, on 60 days notice,
without further obligations to the other.
The employee handbook provided: “In cases of serious misconduct, . . . [employees] may be
subject to immediate separation with ‘just cause.’” Taken together, the terms of plaintiff’s
employment clearly and unambiguously provided for sixty days’ notice when either party sought
to terminate the agreement without cause, but allowed for immediate termination—i.e., without
notice—when an employee is terminated for “serious misconduct,” described as “just cause.”
Therefore, if defendants terminated plaintiff’s employment for cause, they did not breach the
sixty-day notice provision.
The employee handbook addressed certain behavior for which an employee could be
subject to immediate termination.1 Unacceptable conduct included the use of language that
could be offensive to others, sexual harassment, and “discourteous conduct of a flagrant nature.”
Among the reasons given by defendants for plaintiff’s discharge were complaints that she made
inappropriate comments regarding race, male genitalia, and religion. Although the precise nature
of the investigation undertaken by defendants before discharging plaintiff is unclear, no evidence
was presented to refute that plaintiff made the comments or that such comments constituted
grounds for immediate termination. Thus, because plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the making of these comments and whether they constituted “just cause”
for immediate termination, the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendants on
plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.
Plaintiff next argues that summary disposition was improperly granted on her race
discrimination claim. We disagree.
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged race discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act,
MCL 37.2102 et seq. The statutory provision in question, MCL 37.2202(1)(a), provides that an
employer cannot “[f]ail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of
employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital
status.” A prima facie case of disparate treatment can be established by direct or indirect
evidence. Because plaintiff here did not present any direct evidence of discrimination by
defendants, she must establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment using the burden-shifting
framework in McDonnell Douglas, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). A prima
facie case is established by evidence that (1) the plaintiff was a member of the protected class;
(2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she
was discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, i.e.,
1
Neither party provided the handbook in its entirety; therefore, it is unknown whether the
handbook contained any contractual disclaimer.
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other similarly situated persons outside the protected class were treated differently. Hazle v Ford
Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 463; 628 NW2d 515 (2001). See also Town v Michigan Bell
Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688, 695; 568 NW2d 64 (1997) (Brickley, J.). Once a plaintiff has
sufficiently established a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, the burden of production
shifts to the defendant to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason for the plaintiff’s
termination. Hazle, supra at 464-465. Once the defendant produces such evidence, the
presumption of discrimination “drops away,” and the burden reverts back to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant’s reasons were mere pretext for discrimination. Id. at 465. Thus,
to survive summary disposition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence, when construed
in her favor, is “’sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that discrimination was
a motivating factor for the adverse action taken by the employer toward the plaintiff.’” Id.,
quoting Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 176; 579 NW2d 906 (1998) (Weaver, J.).
Here, plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly granted summary disposition to
defendants because she had failed to demonstrate that her employment situation was identical in
all respects to other non-minority employees. We find no error in the trial court’s analysis. To
be similarly situated, all relevant aspects of the employment situation between two persons must
be nearly identical. Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co, 235 Mich App 347, 370; 597
NW2d 250 (1999). See also Pierce v Commonwealth Life Ins Co, 40 F3d 796, 802 (CA 6,
1994). As the trial court aptly noted, although plaintiff presented evidence of misconduct and
absenteeism by other employees who were not members of the protected class and who were not
discharged, plaintiff failed to demonstrate either that the positions and duties of these employees
were nearly identical to hers, or that the alleged misconduct or absenteeism of these employees
was of a similarly egregious nature to hers. Thus, we conclude that plaintiff failed to present a
prima facie case of race discrimination.
Moreover, even assuming that plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, she has failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
whether defendants’ nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination were pretextual. Defendants
met their burden to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for plaintiff’s termination,
e.g., complaints that plaintiff made inappropriate and offensive comments to other cast members,
and absenteeism. In the absence of any indication that plaintiff’s race played any role
whatsoever in defendants’ decision to discharge her, we conclude that the trial court properly
granted summary disposition to defendants.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
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