CRAIG ANSON WINNIE V JULIE ANN WINNIE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CRAIG ANSON WINNIE,
UNPUBLISHED
November 22, 2002
Plaintiff/CounterdefendantAppellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 237719
Alger Circuit Court
LC No. 99-003370-DM
JULIE ANN WINNIE,
Defendant/CounterplaintiffAppellant/Cross-Appellee.
Before: Hood, P.J. and Bandstra and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce that awarded plaintiff legal and
physical custody of the parties’ two minor daughters. Plaintiff cross appeals, challenging in
several respects the circuit court’s division of marital assets. We affirm the trial court’s decision
in all respects.
To characterize this proceeding as contentious and acrimonious is an understatement. The
record consists of numerous pre-trial motions and hearings and nine days of testimony, much of
which addressed the custody issues. The trial court then rendered a thorough opinion, with which
we agree.
I
The parties’ fourteen-year marriage disintegrated in 1999, after defendant made
allegations that the parties’ older daughter Rachael, who was born in 1992, had been sexually
abused by her second grade teacher and other members of the local community in Grand Marais,
Michigan, who allegedly belonged to a satanic cult. In early 2000, defendant also accused
plaintiff of being involved in sexually abusing the parties’ children. Plaintiff disbelieved the
allegations of abuse regarding Rachael and attributed their origin to defendant. Plaintiff denied
ever abusing the children himself. During the seven-day custody phase of the trial, plaintiff
presented evidence that several state police and Family Independence Agency investigations had
uncovered no abuse of the children by anyone. Defendant presented evidence that included an
opinion by a psychologist specializing in ritual abuse that Rachael likely had been sexually
abused, and the testimony of a forensic psychologist who opined that defendant reasonably
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believed that the children had suffered abuse and that plaintiff posed a danger to the children’s
safety.
II
Defendant first challenges the circuit court’s determinations that the children had an
established custodial environment with plaintiff, and that an award of legal and physical custody
of the children to plaintiff served the children’s best interests.
In a child custody dispute, “all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed
on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or
committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.” MCL 722.28.
The court’s factual findings regarding the existence of an established custodial environment and
regarding each custody factor within MCL 722.23 should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly
preponderates in the opposite direction. Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 20; 614 NW2d 183
(2000). When reviewing a circuit court’s factual findings, this Court defers to the court’s
credibility determinations. Mogle v Scriver, 241 Mich App 192, 201; 614 NW2d 696 (2000).
A
Before making a determination regarding the children’s best interests, the circuit court
must ascertain whether an established custodial environment exists. MCL 722.27(1)(c); Mogle,
supra at 197. An established custodial environment exists
if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that
environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.
The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the
custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship shall also be
considered. [MCL 722.27(1)(c).]
An established custodial environment may arise pursuant to a temporary court order with respect
to custody, pursuant to a court order that subsequently was reversed, in violation of a court order,
or in the absence of a court order. Hayes v Hayes, 209 Mich App 385, 388-389; 532 NW2d 190
(1995).
Ample evidence supports the circuit court’s determination that the children had an
established custodial environment with plaintiff. By the time the circuit court issued its August
2001 opinion, the children had resided in the parties’ marital home in plaintiff’s primary custody
for approximately twenty-one months pursuant to court orders.1 Furthermore, the testimony of
plaintiff, defendant’s mother, Rachael’s teacher, the superintendent of Rachael’s school and a
Friend of the Court counselor, as well as the court-appointed psychologist’s evaluations of the
1
Since December 1999, the children had resided primarily in plaintiff’s custody pursuant to a
temporary custody order that placed the children with plaintiff on weekdays and authorized
defendant to have weekend visitations, and a May 5, 2000, order of the court restricting
defendant to 1-1/2 hours of weekly, supervised visitation with the children.
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children, indicated that (1) both children appeared happy and performed well at school since
arriving in plaintiff’s custody, (2) the children appeared more confident and outgoing since being
placed in plaintiff’s custody, (3) the children loved plaintiff and displayed no fear of him or other
signs of abuse, (3) plaintiff actively participated in the children’s education and took them to
Sunday school, and (4) plaintiff displayed concern for the children’s well being and otherwise
performed as a good and loving father. The children also had friends near the marital home,
where plaintiff intended to remain.
This evidence shows that the children had a relationship with plaintiff of significant
duration, which was “marked by qualities of security, stability and permanence.” Mogle, supra
at 197, quoting Baker v Baker, 411 Mich 567, 579-580; 309 NW2d 532 (1981). The evidence
did not clearly preponderate against the circuit court’s finding that an established custodial
environment existed with plaintiff. Phillips, supra. To the extent that defendant relies on her
expert witness’ characterization of plaintiff as a threat to the children, the circuit court expressly
noted that it simply did not find the expert’s testimony credible, and this Court will not second
guess the circuit court’s credibility determination. Mogle, supra at 201.
B
Defendant also challenges the circuit court’s various findings regarding the children’s
best interests, arguing that many of the court’s best interest findings incorporated the court’s
erroneous determination that defendant’s beliefs regarding the children’s abuse derived from
delusions or paranoia.
Because the children had an established custodial environment with plaintiff, to prevail
with respect to her claim for custody of the children defendant had to demonstrate clearly and
convincingly that a change in the children’s custody would serve the children’s best interests.
MCL 722.27(1)(c); Heltzel v Heltzel, 248 Mich App 1, 27 n 17; 638 NW2d 123 (2001). In
reaching its conclusion regarding the children’s best interests, a court must apply the statutory
factors listed in MCL 722.23.
We initially reject defendant’s suggestion that the circuit court erred in its factual finding
that defendant, “as a result of her own personality disorder of paranoia, has projected her
erroneous beliefs on her daughters.” The voluminous record contains abundant evidence
establishing that no abuse of the children occurred at the hands of plaintiff or others in Grand
Marais, including: (1) the testimony that the children did not appear afraid of plaintiff and did
not exhibit any signs of abuse; (2) the testimony of Rachael’s teacher and the school
superintendent that Rachael did not display a fear of the school where some of her abuse
allegedly took place; (3) the superintendent’s testimony that he closely monitored the activity
within the small school and would have known whether the alleged acts of abuse occurred; and
(4) the superintendent’s and another teacher’s testimony regarding the unlikelihood that a teacher
could successfully accomplish the acts of abuse alleged by defendant. Further evidence that no
abuse occurred included the testimony of three state police officers and an FIA worker detailing
their investigations into defendant’s allegations of the children’s abuse by plaintiff and others,
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none of which uncovered evidence corroborating defendant’s allegations and all of which
concluded that no abuse occurred.2
Plaintiff, defendant’s mother, the school superintendent, the investigating police officers
and the FIA worker all specifically testified that they believed that defendant had made up the
allegations of abuse and projected them onto the children. Plaintiff suggested that the allegations
of abuse of Rachael reported by defendant appeared similar to those detailed in a book authored
by defendant’s therapist. Plaintiff also recalled that defendant and her sister previously had
alleged their own sexual abuse by their father and brother, which plaintiff and defendant’s
mother denied had validity.
This evidence amply supports the circuit court’s determination that defendant “imposed
thoughts on the children about abuse that were not true.” To the extent that defendant again
heavily relies on the testimony of her proffered expert witnesses, the circuit court expressly
discounted and found incredible the testimony of these experts. The court cited the experts’ lack
of or minimal contact with the parties and the children, and one expert’s questionable credentials
and apparent bias against plaintiff. We reiterate that we will not revisit the circuit court’s
credibility determinations. Mogle, supra at 201.
Best interests of the children
With respect to MCL 722.23(a), “[t]he love, affection, and other emotional ties existing
between the parties involved and the child[ren],” the circuit court characterized this factor as
even because it had no doubt that the parties “love their children and the love is reciprocated.”
The record appears virtually undisputed that both parties loved the children and that the children
loved the parties.
Regarding MCL 722.23(b), “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give
the child[ren] love, affection, and guidance, and to continue the education and raising of the
child[ren] in . . . [their] religion or creed, if any,” the circuit court found that this factor favors
plaintiff because defendant’s adherence to beliefs that the children suffered abuse adversely
affected her capacity and disposition to offer the children guidance. Ample evidence discussed
above reflects that, while plaintiff provided the children an established custodial environment,
defendant repeatedly made unsupported allegations of abuse and attempted to persuade the
children of the veracity of the allegations.
With respect to MCL 722.23(c), “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties involved to
provide the child[ren] with food, clothing, medical care . . . and other material needs,” the circuit
court found that this factor favors plaintiff because defendant had not demonstrated her capacity
or disposition to provide the children appropriate medical care. The record indicates that on two
occasions while this case was pending defendant took the children to emergency rooms on the
basis of her allegations that plaintiff had sexually abused them, and that neither hospital visit
2
These investigations included multiple interviews with the children, the parties, the alleged
abusers and others, physical examinations of the children, plaintiff’s submission to a polygraph
examination, visitation of alleged crime scenes, and examinations into the presence or absence of
tattoos on alleged abusers.
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substantiated any abuse. The record also reflects that defendant took Rachael to a therapist
specializing in ritual abuse whom defendant hoped would verify the allegations of abuse.
Defendant also indicated repeatedly during the circuit court proceedings her desire that the
children undergo further examinations and therapy to ascertain what happened to them.
Accordingly, the record supports the circuit court’s determination that factor (c) favors plaintiff.
Regarding MCL 722.23(d), “[t]he length of time the children ha[ve] lived in a stable,
satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity,” the evidence discussed
above regarding the children’s established custodial environment with plaintiff amply supports
the circuit court’s determination that factor (d) favors plaintiff.
In regards to MCL 722.23(e), “[t]he permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home,” the evidence established that the children had resided in the parties’
marital home for most of their lives, including during the divorce proceedings when the children
resided in an established custodial environment with plaintiff, and that plaintiff intended to
continue living in the marital home. This evidence, and defendant’s failure to testify regarding a
plan for the children, supports the circuit court’s finding that factor (e) favors plaintiff.
With respect to MCL 722.23(f), “[t]he moral fitness of the parties involved,” the circuit
court found that this factor did not favor either party. Defendant repeatedly questioned her
expert therapist and plaintiff regarding plaintiff’s past acts of masturbating with the aid of
nylons, and suggested when questioning her expert therapist that plaintiff had forced defendant
to engage in nonconsensual, “sadomasochistic” activities. The circuit court found no credible
evidence that plaintiff had forced defendant to have sex or that plaintiff had displayed any sexual
behavior to the children, and our review of the record supports the court’s determinations.
Regarding MCL 722.23(g), “[t]he mental and physical health of the parties involved,” the
circuit court found that this factor favors plaintiff because defendant appeared to have and to act
on “delusional beliefs regarding ritual sexual abuse.” As we have discussed, the evidence amply
supports the circuit court’s finding that defendant repeatedly projected onto the children
allegations that they had suffered sexual abuse despite substantial evidence to the contrary. To
the extent that defendant suggests that the court should not have considered the independent
psychologists’ expert opinions and other testimony proffered by plaintiff, we repeat that we will
not second guess the court’s decision to weigh more heavily the evidence provided by plaintiff
than the contrary opinions set forth by defendant’s expert psychologist. Mogle, supra.
With respect to MCL 722.23(h), “[t]he home, school, and community record of the
child[ren],” the testimony regarding the children’s enjoyment of and good performance at school,
plaintiff’s active participation in the children’s schooling, and the children’s loving and positive
relationship with plaintiff supports the circuit court’s determination that this factor favors
plaintiff.
Regarding MCL 722.23(j),3 “[t]he willingness and ability of each of the parties to
facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child[ren]
3
The circuit court did not address “[t]he reasonable preference of the child[ren],” MCL
722.23(i), because the parties stipulated that the court should not interview the children.
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and the other parent,” the circuit court found that this factor favors plaintiff. Plaintiff testified
that he knew the children needed their mother and that he would facilitate the continuity of the
children’s relationship with defendant. The testimony of plaintiff and defendant’s mother
indicated that defendant previously had refused to permit Rachael contact with her grandparents
and uncle, all of whom defendant had accused of abuse. We also note the testimony reflecting
that defendant once kidnapped the children on the basis of an ultimately unfounded suspicion
that plaintiff had sexually abused them. All of this evidence supports the court’s finding that this
factor favors plaintiff.
With respect to MCL 722.23(k), “[d]omestic violence, regardless of whether the violence
was directed against or witnessed by the child[ren],” our review of the record supports the circuit
court’s finding that this factor does not favor either party in light of the scarcity of evidence
regarding the occurrence of domestic violence during the marriage.
Regarding MCL 722.23(l), “[a]ny other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a
particular child custody dispute,” the circuit court noted that it placed “considerable weight on
the [guardian ad litem’s] recommendation.” The guardian ad litem interviewed the parties and
the children, participated in the lengthy trial, and produced a very thorough summary of the
evidence presented, which supports the circuit court’s decision to award plaintiff legal and
physical custody of the children.
After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the evidence clearly preponderates
against any of the circuit court’s findings regarding the statutory best interest factors. Phillips,
supra at 20. Because the circuit court correctly found that most of the statutory factors favor
plaintiff, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff legal and
physical custody of the children. Fletcher v Fletcher, 229 Mich App 19, 24; 581 NW2d 11
(1998).
III
Defendant next argues that the circuit court judges who presided over the case deprived
her of due process by acting on biases in favor of plaintiff and against her throughout the
proceedings. Defendant’s due process claim raises a constitutional question that we review de
novo. Saginaw Co v John Sexton Corp of Michigan, 232 Mich App 202, 222; 591 NW2d 52
(1998).
We note that defendant has failed to properly present this issue for our review because
she presents no authority supporting the proposition that her various allegations of improper
conduct amounted to a due process violation. Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 Mich App 41,
57; 649 NW2d 783 (2002). Nonetheless, in the interest of enhancing defendant’s perception of
justice in this case, we will briefly address the due process argument. Frericks v Highland Twp,
228 Mich App 575, 586; 579 NW2d 441 (1998).
Most of defendant’s complaints have been reviewed and rereviewed by several judges
during four pretrial hearings held pursuant to defendant’s repeated motions to disqualify the
presiding judges and other judicial officers. Defendant characterized nearly every occurrence
even remotely adverse to her during the entire proceedings as an “abuse” by either one of the
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several different judges who presided over the trial or by other court personnel that had a part in
the case.4
Our review of the entire record and defendant’s heavily documented motions to
disqualify reflect several judges’ careful consideration of defendant’s repeated allegations of bias
and impropriety, yet no substantiation of defendant’s claims. After repeated examination of the
record in the context of defendant’s allegations of bias and improper conduct, the five different
judges who heard defendant’s motions all determined that no evidence of actual bias or prejudice
against defendant existed, and that defendant had not otherwise been deprived of due process.
Nonetheless, in an effort to alleviate defendant’s fears and perceptions of impropriety, two of the
presiding judges were removed from the case on the bases that defense counsel had strongly
criticized one of them, and that another judge had presided over a criminal matter involving
defendant. Crampton v Dep’t of State, 395 Mich 347, 351-353; 235 NW2d 352 (1975).
We reject defendant’s suggestion that the judge who presided over the trial “canceled 11/2 days of remaining trial time rather than allow [defendant’s] testimony.” Our review of the
record reveals that after the court allotted the parties 351 minutes of trial time going into the
sixth day of the custody phase of trial, defendant expended approximately 320 of her minutes
interrogating for very nearly an entire day her expert witness, who already had testified at some
length, and plaintiff. Defendant ignored the court’s cautions regarding her waning trial time.
Defendant’s knowing expenditure of her remaining trial time on witnesses other than herself
precludes her from arguing on appeal that any error in this regard occurred. Farm Credit
Services of Michigan’s Heartland, PCA v Weldon, 232 Mich App 662, 684; 591 NW2d 438
(1998).
We lastly reject defendant’s suggestion that the judge who ultimately presided over the
trial displayed undue “hardness” toward her and her case or engaged in an “obstruction of
disfavored proofs.” The record reflects that the trial judge, who more than once characterized
the instant case as “the longest divorce case in the history of Marquette County,” occasionally
chastised both plaintiff’s and defendant’s counsel for their repetitious arguments and objections,
from time to time criticized defense counsel’s confusing and improper questions, once
sanctioned or threatened to sanction defense counsel with contempt for tossing a pen in the air
after the court had warned him not to do so, and otherwise made certain that the parties
understood that he was “in control of this proceeding.” However, the trial judge also permitted
defendant generous time for examining and cross-examining witnesses and granted defense
counsel leeway in admitting many items of evidence. Because none of the judge’s actions in
controlling the conduct of the trial especially affected defendant, precluded defense counsel’s
vigorous advocacy on behalf of defendant, or otherwise prevented defendant from presenting her
case, we conclude that no due process violation occurred. In re Juvenile Commitment Costs, 240
Mich App 420, 440; 613 NW2d 348 (2000).
4
Defendant’s arguments included that the various presiding trial judges and other authorities had
assisted plaintiff in winning his case, that the judges had engaged in improper ex parte
communications, that plaintiff had bribed nonjudicial officials involved in the case, that judges
had unfavorable dispositions toward defense counsel, and that the judges had deprived defendant
of her right of access to the courts by refusing to give her requested hearings and by making up
their minds regarding the merits of defendant’s positions before any hearings occurred.
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IV
Plaintiff contends on cross appeal that in calculating the marital property distribution the
circuit court erred in failing to award plaintiff credits for (1) $7,114.49 that defendant expended
from a joint stock account to pay for litigation expenses, and (2) insurance proceeds arising from
the destruction of a barn on a parcel of marital real property that the court awarded to defendant.
Plaintiff has provided this Court no argument with supporting authority regarding his claims of
entitlement to credits with respect to these amounts. Plaintiff may not rely on this Court to
discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate his arguments
Columbia Assoc’s, LP v Dep’t of Treasury, 250 Mich App 656, 678; 649 NW2d 760 (2002).5
V
Plaintiff also argues on cross appeal that the circuit court improperly calculated a
property distribution credit for monthly payments of $2,000 that he made to defendant during the
pendency of the proceedings. If the circuit court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous, this
Court should affirm the circuit court’s discretionary dispositional ruling unless it possesses the
firm conviction that the circuit court’s property division was inequitable. Welling v Welling, 233
Mich App 708, 709-710; 592 NW2d 822 (1999).
In December 1999, a stipulated order was entered that provided for plaintiff’s monthly
payment of $2,000 to defendant for the shorter of five months or the duration of the proceedings,
and further explicitly provided that these amounts were “a preliminary property distribution and
not support” for which “[p]laintiff will receive credit . . . off the top of the property settlement.”
In May 2000, the circuit court entered a subsequent order that provided for continuation of the
$2,000 monthly payments to defendant “as a disbursement from the marital estate” “until further
order of this Court,” but the order made no mention that plaintiff would receive credits for these
further payments.
We find no fault in the circuit court’s decision to award plaintiff a credit of $10,000 for
his monthly payments pursuant to the December 1999 order, and not to award plaintiff a $26,000
credit for the thirteen monthly payments that he made pursuant to the May 2000 order. The
circuit court properly enforced the parties’ agreement that plaintiff would receive credit pursuant
to the December 1999 order. Bers v Bers, 161 Mich App 457, 463; 411 NW2d 732 (1987). In
light of the fact that the May 2000 order did not expressly contemplate plaintiff’s entitlement to
credit and that the record supports the circuit court’s observation that plaintiff had maintained
5
We further observe that the circuit court’s property distribution appears wholly equitable.
Welling v Welling, 233 Mich App 708, 709-710; 592 NW2d 822 (1999). Plaintiff’s own exhibits
and testimony established that he spent between $15,000 and $25,000 on attorney fees utilizing
money that the parties had earned during the marriage. Furthermore, the insurance proceeds
existed to compensate the diminishment in value of real property that the circuit court, without
objection, awarded to defendant.
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exclusive control over nearly the entire marital estate throughout the extended divorce
proceedings, we cannot characterize the court’s decision not to award plaintiff a further credit of
$26,000 as unfair or inequitable. Welling, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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