PEOPLE OF MI V GEORGE TILLERY JR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 22, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 225055
Oakland Circuit Court
LC Nos. 98-162522-FC;
98-162524-FC;
98-162526-FC
GEORGE TILLERY, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Cavanagh and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC), MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(iii), and one count of second-degree CSC, MCL
750.520c(1)(b)(iii). He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twenty-five to fifty years for
each of the first-degree CSC convictions and ten to fifteen years for the second-degree CSC
conviction. He appeals by delayed leave granted. We affirm.
I.
Defendant contends that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, this Court
considers whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would
warrant a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Nowack, 462 Mich
392, 399; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). In order to convict defendant of first-degree CSC under MCL
750.520b(1)(b)(iii), the jury had to find that defendant was in a position of authority over the
complainant, and that he used that authority to coerce her submission to sexual penetration.
Conviction of second-degree CSC under MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(iii) requires the same findings,
except it applies to sexual contact as opposed to penetration.
A.
Defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he was in a
position of authority over complainant. We disagree. The “position of authority” element for
first- and second-degree CSC can be established with evidence that the defendant won the
complainant’s trust and her parent’s trust, and created the opportunity to exploit her while in a
vulnerable situation. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 370-373; 624 NW2d 227 (2001);
People v Reid, 233 Mich App 457, 470-473; 592 NW2d 767 (1999). In the instant case, the
-1-
evidence established that defendant had such a position of authority over the complainant. The
complainant’s mother came to regard defendant as a close family friend, a father figure to her
children, and a possible godparent for the complainant. The fact that he was never formally
named godfather is immaterial because no formal relationship is necessary to establish authority.
Reid, supra at 472. The complainant’s mother delegated some degree of parental authority to
defendant. She testified that she trusted him to supervise her children overnight on weekends,
and that he agreed to comply with her rules about what the children could and could not do. The
complainant testified that she spent the weekend at defendant’s house with the understanding
that he was in charge, and that she was obligated to listen to him. This evidence established that
the complainant’s mother had entrusted the complainant to defendant’s care. See id. Thus, a
reasonable trier of fact could find from this testimony that defendant was in a position of
authority over the complainant.
The evidence also established that defendant used that position of authority to coerce the
complainant to submit. The assaults only occurred in the middle of the night during the weekend
visits when the complainant was entrusted to defendant’s care and supervision. The complainant
was in an extremely isolated and vulnerable position during these weekend visits. As a thirteenyear-old overnight visitor, she could not simply leave the house. The only other adult present
was defendant’s girlfriend. The complainant was asleep in the living room of defendant’s house,
where he had ready access to her. Defendant thus used his authority to place the complainant in
an extremely vulnerable situation, and then sexually assaulted her while she was in that situation
of extreme vulnerability. See id. (coercion found where the complainant was alone with
defendant and isolated from others while subject to the general control of defendant).
Accordingly, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact
could find from this evidence that defendant used his authority to coerce the complainant’s
submission to sexual intercourse and contact.
B.
Defendant further argues that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt because there was no corroborative eyewitness to the alleged assaults, the
physical evidence was weak and inconclusive, and the complainant’s testimony was inconsistent
and not credible. However, a jury may convict a defendant solely on the basis of the
complainant’s eyewitness testimony, without corroborative physical evidence. People v Newby,
66 Mich App 400, 405; 239 NW2d 387 (1976). Defendant’s claim that the complainant was not
credible does not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence. “It is the province of the jury to
determine questions of fact and assess the credibility of witnesses.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich
625, 637; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). Here, the jury found that the complainant was credible despite
minor inconsistencies in the testimony and despite her belated revelation that more than one
assault occurred. We will not disturb the jury’s determination regarding credibility.
We also find no merit to defendant’s claims that the prosecution shifted the burden of
proof to him, or that it failed to negate a reasonable theory of innocence. Defendant’s claims of
insufficient evidence must therefore fail.
II.
-2-
Defendant next argues that his dual convictions of first- and second-degree CSC violate
the constitutional protections against double jeopardy. Because defendant did not raise this issue
before the trial court, it is not preserved. Consequently, reversal is warranted only upon a
showing of plain error affecting defendant’s rights, which generally requires a showing of
prejudice. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Here, there was no double jeopardy violation. Where the defendant commits two distinct
acts during the same episode of criminal behavior, the Double Jeopardy Clauses do not prohibit
multiple punishments for the separate acts. People v Lugo, 214 Mich App 699, 708-709; 542
NW2d 921 (1995) (dual convictions of felonious assault and assault with intent to do great
bodily harm were permissible, although they both arose from the same altercation between the
defendant and a police officer). In Lugo, this Court explained that there was no double jeopardy
violation because each conviction was predicated on a separate and distinct act occurring during
the altercation: the defendant first assaulted the officer with a broom, and then with a gun. Id. at
709. Similarly, in People v Rogers, 142 Mich App 88; 368 NW2d 900 (1985), this Court upheld
the defendant’s convictions of three counts of first-degree CSC because each was based on a
distinct act of penetration that the defendant either committed or aided and abetted. Id. at 89, 92.
Here, the complainant testified that defendant committed two separate acts while sexually
assaulting her: he fondled her breasts and he vaginally penetrated her. This evidence supported
separate convictions for first- and second-degree CSC. Accordingly, there was no double
jeopardy violation.
III.
Defendant contends that the trial court lacked the authority to try LC No. 98-162526-FC,
but he did not object in the trial court. This issue is therefore not preserved for appellate review.
This Court reviews such issues for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines,
supra. Here, although the chief judge was delayed in signing the final reassignment order, the
cases had already been consolidated and the reassignment was in progress at the time of trial.
Defendant has not shown that his substantial rights were affected by the delay in signing the
reassignment order. Accordingly, appellate relief is not warranted.
IV.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the complainant’s testimony
that defendant told her, during the assault, that she was “not the only one.” A trial court's
decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Manser,
250 Mich App 21, 31; 645 NW2d 65 (2002). “An abuse of discretion is found only if an
unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there
was no excuse for the ruling made.” People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 113; 631 NW2d 67
(2001).
Defendant claims that the statement was inadmissible because it was not relevant to any
issue in the case and was unduly inflammatory. Relevant evidence is evidence “having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401;
Aldrich, supra at 114. Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible, unless otherwise provided
-3-
by law, and evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Id.; MRE 402. Still, relevant
evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” MRE 403.
In this case, the statement was properly admitted because it was part of the res gestae of
the offense. People v Sheehy, 31 Mich App 628, 629-630; 188 NW2d 231 (1971), quoting
People v Savage (1923), 225 Mich 84, 86[; 195 NW 669]. Second, the statement was relevant
and probative to show how defendant approached the complainant, and how he conducted
himself while he coerced her to submit to his sexual advances. The statement was not unduly
inflammatory. The complainant testified about this statement in conjunction with her testimony
that defendant sexually assaulted her. Having heard that defendant sexually assaulted the
complainant, the jury was not likely to be significantly more outraged by defendant’s alleged
statement. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statement.
V.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the position of
authority element of CSC. The trial court instructed the jury that it must find that
at the time of the alleged act the defendant was in a position of authority over
Natasha Shaw, that is, he was in a position of caretaker, and used this authority to
coerce Natasha Shaw to submit to the sexual acts alleged.
The phrase “in a position of caretaker” is not part of the standard criminal jury instruction, CJI2d
20.4. Defendant claims that this addition by the trial court “misdirected” the jury and prejudiced
him.
This Court reviews jury instructions as a whole to determine if the trial court made an
error requiring reversal. People v Katt, 248 Mich App 282, 310; 639 NW2d 815 (2001), lv gtd
466 Mich 889 (2002). Even if they are not perfect, jury instructions are not erroneous if they
fairly presented the issues for trial and sufficiently protected the defendant's rights. Id. Here,
however, defendant did not object to the trial court’s instructions as given. Therefore, we review
this issue for plain error. Carines, supra.
Although we agree that inclusion of the phrase “in a position of caretaker” did not mirror
the standard jury instructions, it fairly presented the issues on the position of authority element
under the facts and circumstances of this case and sufficiently protected defendant’s rights. As
such, the instructions as given did not affect defendant’s substantial rights or prejudice him.
VI.
Last, defendant claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Because
there was no Ginther1 hearing, our review of this issue is limited to mistakes apparent on the
existing record. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 507; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). To establish
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-4-
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was
objectively unreasonable in light of prevailing professional norms and (2) that, but for counsel’s
error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590,
599-600, 623 NW2d 884 (2001); People v Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 531; 640 NW2d 314
(2001).
Defendant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Although he claims that defense counsel failed to investigate a “substantial defense,” he does not
explain what substantial defense counsel could have developed with more in-depth investigation.
Therefore, defendant has failed to show that his counsel’s performance was objectively
unreasonable, or that a different outcome would have resulted.
Defendant’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial
counsel failed to call certain witnesses is also without merit. “Decisions regarding what
evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial
strategy,” which this Court will not second-guess with the benefit of hindsight. People v Rockey,
237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). Failure to call witnesses constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel only if it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense. People v Daniel,
207 Mich App 47, 58; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). First, at trial, defendant stated on the record that
he freely and voluntarily decided to waive his right to testify and to call his wife to testify. The
decision was thus his own, not his attorney’s. With regard to defendant’s other prospective
witnesses, the record does not support defendant’s speculation that they would have given
favorable or admissible testimony. Therefore, defendant was not deprived of a substantial
defense. Accordingly, defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.