PEOPLE OF MI V MARK ANTHONY VENTERS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 12, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 232890
St. Joseph Circuit Court
LC No. 99-009738-FH
MARK ANTHONY VENTERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and R. J. Danhof*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction, following a jury trial, on one count of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC 2), MCL 750.520c(1)(a)(sexual contact with a
person under the age of thirteen). Defendant was sentenced to a term of nineteen months to
fifteen years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
Defendant was prosecuted for having sexual contact with the twelve-year-old female
victim in April of 1999. The victim was the daughter of defendant’s girlfriend. At various times
and in various locations, defendant and his girlfriend lived together along with the victim and the
girlfriend’s other two children.1 This included a time span in 1999 spent in the home of the
victim’s aunt2 and at the Wood Motel. The jury heard testimony from the victim, the victim’s
mother (defendant’s girlfriend), the victim’s aunt, and defendant.
The victim testified that she lived with her siblings, her mother, and defendant at her
aunt’s house for several months in 1999. She asserted that there were four separate incidents in
which defendant acted inappropriately. The first incident, which formed the basis of the CSC 2
charge and conviction, occurred at the aunt’s house while the victim was sitting on a loveseat
and playing with dolls with a young relative. The victim claimed that defendant came up behind
her and with one hand grabbed her breast. Not until she told defendant to stop three or four
*
Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
1
These were not defendant’s children, and defendant testified that he has no children of his own.
2
This was the sister of the victim’s mother.
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times and threatened to call police did defendant remove his hand. The victim testified that she
did not know the whereabouts of her mother and her aunt at the time of the assault. She stated
that the assault took place after she returned home from a birthday party at another relative’s
house. The victim indicated that she told her aunt, on the day of the incident, that something bad
happened. She told her mother that defendant was doing stuff he should not be doing, and she
told her grandmother that bad stuff was happening. However, the victim could not recall when
she spoke to her mother and grandmother, and she could not recall the date of the assault.
The second incident occurred at the aunt’s house while the victim was sitting on a couch
watching television. Defendant approached her and requested that she perform fellatio on him.
The victim refused and defendant left. She could not identify the date on which this incident
occurred.
The third incident also occurred at the aunt’s house while the victim was sitting on the
porch speaking on a cordless phone. Defendant asked her if she remembered him touching her
breast and requesting fellatio and whether it made her feel good. The victim responded that she
remembered the incidents but told defendant that it did not make her feel good. Defendant then
left and went into the house. The victim did not know the whereabouts of her mother or her aunt
at the time of defendant’s comments. On cross-examination, the victim could not recall the time
frame between the third incident and the prior two incidents.
The fourth incident3 occurred at the Wood Motel while the victim was sitting on a bed
watching television. According to the victim, defendant, who was standing, leaned over and
kissed her on the cheek, which made her very uncomfortable. The victim did not tell anyone
about the kiss, nor was she sure when it took place.
The victim testified that she told school officials of defendant’s inappropriate behavior
after officials pressed her about the reasons she was missing so much school. This led to an
investigation by the Family Independence Agency (FIA) and the police and eventually led to
defendant’s arrest. The record indicates that the matter came to the school’s attention on May 5,
1999.
On cross-examination, the victim testified that the incident involving defendant grabbing
her breast (further referenced as the “assault”) did not occur at the time of a birthday party. She
further testified that she did not recall testifying at the preliminary examination to the effect that
the assault occurred on April 30, 1999, that she did not tell her mother about the assault, that she
told her aunt about the assault on April 30, 1999, and that her aunt was at the movies at the time
of the assault. The victim did not recall telling FIA personnel that the assault took place on April
30, 1999. The victim then testified that she told her mother and grandmother about the assault
before telling school personnel. Regarding the kissing incident at the motel, the victim testified
that she did not recall testifying at the preliminary examination that her mother had left the motel
3
We note that it is difficult to decipher from the record the chronological order in which the four
incidents unfolded. It is clear that incident three occurred after the first two incidents because of
the reference to those prior events. However, it is unclear whether the fourth incident actually
followed the first three or preceded them, or if the sexual contact incident occurred before or
after defendant requested oral sex.
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for donuts and milk, that she, the victim, was wearing a cheerleading shirt, and that the kiss
occurred right before Christmas eve.
The victim’s mother testified that she, defendant, the victim, and her other children had
lived together with her sister for a period of time and had lived together for some time at the
Wood Motel. However, she could not recall when they lived in those places, not even the
particular years. She did not recall the victim ever saying that anything was going on with
defendant. The mother claimed that she first found out about defendant’s inappropriate behavior
after the school became involved.
The victim’s aunt testified that she, her sister, and her sister’s children, including the
victim, lived in the aunt’s home from January to November 1999, and that defendant lived with
the group from January to March 1999. The aunt further testified that defendant refused to leave
her home after she confronted him about the victim’s claims of abuse.
Defendant denied ever grabbing the victim’s breast, and he denied ever making any
sexually suggestive comment to the victim about performing fellatio. He also denied the
incident in which the victim claimed that defendant asked her if she enjoyed being touched on
the breast and being asked to perform fellatio. Additionally, defendant denied kissing the victim
on the cheek in the Wood Motel.
Defendant did state that on one occasion, at the aunt’s house, he approached the victim
from the rear and innocently put his arm around her, telling the victim that he loved her. He also
acknowledged that he had once innocently kissed the victim on the cheek, and that he had at one
time asked the victim whether she masturbated.
Regarding the time frame of events and defendant’s living arrangements, defendant
testified that in the first couple months of 1999, he lived at the Wood Motel, the Salvation Army
shelter, and at another friend’s apartment; he claims that he did not reside with his girlfriend or
the victim during this period of time. According to defendant, he resided with the victim and his
girlfriend at the aunt’s house from approximately March through June 1999.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant first argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to adequately
impeach the victim with prior inconsistent statements made by the victim to the police and
statements made by the victim at the preliminary examination. Defendant also argues that the
prosecutor should have revealed these inconsistent statements to the jury. We reject defendant’s
arguments.
In People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001), our Supreme Court,
addressing the basic principles involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, stated:
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To justify reversal under either the federal or state constitutions, a
convicted defendant must satisfy the two-part test articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed
2d 674 (1984). See People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797
(1994). “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not performing as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”
Strickland, supra at 687. In so doing, the defendant must overcome a strong
presumption that counsel’s performance constituted sound trial strategy. Id. at
690. “Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.” Id. at 687. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show the
existence of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Because the
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both deficient performance and
prejudice, the defendant necessarily bears the burden of establishing the factual
predicate for his claim. See People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).
Our review is limited to the record because no Ginther4 hearing occurred. People v
Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414; 566 NW2d 649 (1997).
Defendant acknowledges that trial counsel did impeach the victim with some of her
preliminary examination testimony, but it was insufficient. Specifically, defendant argues that
trial counsel should have impeached the victim regarding preliminary examination testimony in
which the victim testified, as to the time of the assault, that defendant did not touch her breast
very long, that her mother and aunt were at the movies, that she phoned her grandfather right
after the assault to find out when they would return from the movies, and that her cousin was
outside fighting and the police came over because of the fight.
Defendant argues that trial counsel should also have impeached the victim regarding
statements in a police report made by the victim to police on May 5, 1999, in which she stated
that defendant grabbed her breasts outside of her aunt’s house while her mother was inside
preparing dinner, that she did not tell her mother because she knew what her mother would say,
and that defendant requested oral sex at the Wood Motel, not at her aunt’s house.
The prosecutor’s position is that trial counsel declined to excessively impeach the victim
as a matter of sound trial strategy. We agree.
We first note that defendant takes portions of the report out of context and that the report,
although containing discrepancies in relation to the victim’s trial testimony, is, in our opinion,
much more damaging to defendant than the victim’s trial testimony. The discrepancies could
reasonably have been explained by the prosecutor to the jury as the result of a scared young child
being victimized by defendant. On the second day of trial, on the record and outside the
presence of the jury, defense counsel discussed the possibility of calling an FIA worker to the
4
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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stand to testify about revelations made by the victim that could be deemed inconsistent with the
victim’s trial testimony. However, counsel declined to do so, with defendant’s approval,
because the worker’s testimony would also have bolstered the victim’s testimony in many
aspects.
Although trial counsel may have pressed the victim further concerning contradictory
preliminary examination testimony, defendant has not overcome the presumption that it was a
matter of sound trial strategy not to do so, where counsel had already impeached the victim to
some degree, the victim was crying on the stand, and continued impeachment may have inflamed
the jury against defendant.
Moreover, with regard to prejudice, defendant has not shown the existence of a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been
different, where the victim was consistent with her story that defendant grabbed her breast. In
light of our findings, there is no legitimate basis for defendant’s claim that the prosecutor
committed misconduct by failing to reveal prior inconsistent statements of the victim to the jury.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction
because the victim’s testimony was inconsistent and not credible. We disagree.
When ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a
conviction, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515-516; 489 NW2d 748
(1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). This Court will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role
of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 514-515.
The elements of CSC 2 are that the defendant engaged in sexual contact with another
person and that person was under the age of thirteen. MCL 750.520c(1)(a); People v Mary
Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 253; 562 NW2d 447 (1997). Sexual contact “includes the intentional
touching of the victim’s . . . intimate parts or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the
immediate area of the victim’s . . . intimate parts, if that that intentional touching can reasonably
be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification [or] done for a sexual
purpose . . . .” MCL 750.520a(l).
There was sufficient evidence that defendant committed CSC 2, where the victim
testified consistently that defendant grabbed her breast, and where there was no dispute that the
victim was under the age of thirteen at the time of the assault. The victim’s testimony was not
required to be corroborated in order for the jury to convict defendant. MCL 750.520h.
Additionally, there was evidence, defendant’s statements concerning oral sex, showing that his
actions were committed for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. Moreover, defendant’s
argument focuses on the victim’s credibility, which is properly left to the jury to determine, not
this Court.
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C. Prior Acts
Defendant finally argues that his due process rights were violated when the trial court
allowed the prosecutor to present similar acts evidence, i.e., the three incidents not involving
sexual contact. We disagree.
The admission of similar acts evidence pursuant to MRE 404(b) is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 378; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).5 The Knapp
panel stated:
Pursuant to MRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes or wrongs "is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith." However, other acts evidence may be admissible "for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme,
plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident when the same is material." MRE 404(b). Other acts evidence must be
offered for a proper purpose under the rule, the evidence must be relevant, and its
probative value must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
[Knapp, supra at 378-379, citing People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508
NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994).]
It is insufficient for the proponent of the evidence to merely recite one of the purposes
articulated in MRE 404(b). People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 387; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). The
proponent must also explain how the evidence relates to the recited purposes. Id.
Relevance is a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at
issue that must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences that make a material
fact at issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
. . . The logical relationship between the proffered evidence and the ultimate fact
sought to be proven must be closely scrutinized. [Id. at 387-388 (citation
omitted).]
Here, we first note that two of the incidents involved comments concerning oral sex and
not “acts.” Former statements do not constitute prior acts for purposes of MRE 404(b). People v
Goddard, 429 Mich 505, 514-515; 418 NW2d 881 (1988). Regardless, those statements were
relevant as to intent and motive, which are proper purposes under MRE 404(b), where the
prosecutor was required to establish that defendant’s actions were for the purpose of sexual
arousal and gratification. MCL 750.520c(1) and 750.520a(l). We do not find that the probative
value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. MRE 403. Concerning the kissing
incident, defendant himself testified that he had once kissed the victim on the cheek. Any error
would be harmless. MCL 769.26; People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
5
Defendant preserved the issue through a pretrial motion.
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Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Robert J. Danhof
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