JANE VAN STRATE V OWOSSO DISTRIBUTING CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JANE VAN STRATE,
UNPUBLISHED
November 1, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
OWOSSO DISTRIBUTING CORP., d/b/a THE
PINES COUNTRY HOUSE,
No. 233275
Shiawassee Circuit Court
LC No. 98-02367-NO
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Jansen and R. J. Danhof*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this slip-and-fall negligence action, defendant appeals as of right from a denial of
motions for a directed verdict and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted either his motion for a directed
verdict or his motion for JNOV because the evidence showed no causal link between plaintiff’s
fall and an unsafe condition on the premises. We review de novo a trial court’s denial of
motions for a directed verdict or JNOV. Abke v Vandenberg, 239 Mich App 359, 361; 608
NW2d 73 (2000). We view the evidence, as well as any legitimate inferences, in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and decide whether there existed a factual question about
which reasonable minds might have differed. Kubczak v Chemical Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich
653, 663; 575 NW2d 745 (1998) (directed verdict); Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198, 204; 580
NW2d 876 (1998) (JNOV).
The elements of negligence are (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2)
breach of that duty, (3) injury suffered by the plaintiff, and (4) causation of that injury by the
defendant’s breach. Phillips v Diehm, 213 Mich App 389, 397; 541 NW2d 566 (1995).
Negligence may be proven by legitimate inferences, provided the evidence is sufficient to
remove the inferences from the realm of conjecture. Berryman v Kmart Corp, 193 Mich App 88,
92; 483 NW2d 642 (1992). Conjecture is “simply an explanation consistent with known facts or
conditions, but not deducible from them as a reasonable inference.” Kaminski v Grand Trunk W
R Co, 347 Mich 417, 422; 79 NW2d 899 (1956) (internal quotation marks omitted). Legitimate
inferences that rise above conjecture, however, are logical sequences of cause and effect that
point to a theory of causation, regardless of the “existence of other plausible theories.” Id.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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The disputed elements in this case are breach and causation. Proof of causation entails
proof of two separate elements: (1) cause in fact, and (2) legal, or “proximate,” cause. Skinner v
Square D Co, 445 Mich App 153, 162-163; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). Cause in fact generally
requires showing that “but for” the defendant’s actions, the plaintiff’s injury would not have
occurred, whereas proximate cause normally involves examining the foreseeability of
consequences, and whether a defendant should be held legally responsible for those
consequences. Id. at 163. Cause in fact must be established by the plaintiff before proximate
cause becomes a relevant issue. Id. Notably, a plaintiff need not eliminate all logically
alternative causes. Id. at 160. Rather, it is enough for the plaintiff to “establish[] a logical
sequence of cause and effect, notwithstanding the existence of other plausible theories, although
other plausible theories may also have evidentiary support.” Id. at 160-161 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Defendant argues on appeal that the evidence showed no causal link between plaintiff’s
fall and an unsafe condition on the premises (spilled syrup). However, the evidence also showed
that mopping, done by defendant’s employee, could have created an unsafe condition in the area
plaintiff was walking, causing plaintiff to fall. Plaintiff thus presented evidence from which
reasonable jurors could infer a logical sequence of cause and effect between the spilled syrup and
plaintiff’s fall. Skinner, supra at 163; Kaminski, supra at 422.
Defendant also argues that the floor would have dried by the time plaintiff arrived, but
there was no evidence regarding how long it took for the floor to actually dry on the day of the
fall. Defendant further argues that plaintiff did not know if she slipped on water or the puddle of
syrup, but knowledge of the exact agent that constituted an unsafe condition is not an element of
negligence. Phillips, supra at 397. Reasonable minds could differ in their conclusions,
Berryman, supra at 91, and because the trial court was required to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to plaintiff as non-movant, it did not err in denying defendant’s motions for
directed verdict and JNOV. Kubczak, supra at 663; Forge, supra at 204.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Robert J. Danhof
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