PANG CHANG V WESTFIELD INS CO
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PANG CHANG,
UNPUBLISHED
October 25, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 234507
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-023912-CK
WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Smolenski and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to
defendant. We affirm.
This appeal arises from plaintiff's claim for uninsured motorist coverage under an
insurance policy issued by defendant. Plaintiff filed her claim following a head-on collision with
another driver, Kelly Ann Elizabeth Casey, in the City of Detroit. According to plaintiff,
Casey’s vehicle crossed the center line near Collingham Road, and her vehicle struck plaintiff’s
Toyota Camry.1
After plaintiff filed her complaint in this case, defendant filed a motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and argued that plaintiff’s injuries do not constitute a
serious impairment of body function under MCL 500.3135. Plaintiff filed an answer and argued
that her medical records establish that her injuries meet the threshold requirement in the statutes.
Following oral argument, the trial court granted defendant’s motion and ruled that, as a matter of
law, plaintiff did not suffer a serious impairment of body function. Plaintiff now appeals the trial
court’s ruling.
“This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary
disposition.” Trepanier v National Amusements, Inc, 250 Mich App 578, 582; 649 NW2d 754
(2002). As our Supreme Court explained in Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d
817 (1999):
1
According to plaintiff, in a prior action, the trial court entered a default judgment against Casey
in the amount of $150,000 after Casey failed to appear.
-1-
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the
complaint. In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under this
subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Where the proffered evidence fails to
establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10), (G)(4). Quinto v Cross &
Peters Co, 451 Mich 358; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
In Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Hill, 431 Mich 449, 453, 466; 430 NW2d 636 (1988), our Supreme
Court held that “the threshold requirements of MCL 500.3135(1) apply when an insured motorist
seeks benefits for noneconomic loss under the uninsured motorist provision of a no-fault policy.”
Under the no-fault act, a plaintiff may recover noneconomic losses if she has suffered “death,
serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” MCL 500.3135(1).
Under MCL 500.3135(2)(a), the issue whether the plaintiff has suffered serious impairment of
body function is a question of law for the trial court to decide if:
(i) There is no factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the
person's injuries.
(ii) There is a factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the
person's injuries, but the dispute is not material to the determination as to whether
the person has suffered a serious impairment of body function or permanent
serious disfigurement.
Further, under MCL 500.3135(7), “ ‘serious impairment of body function’ means an objectively
manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s general ability to
lead his or her normal life.”
The trial court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, plaintiff did not suffer a serious
impairment of body function. Plaintiff experienced aches and pains shortly after the car
accident. However, plaintiff’s x-rays revealed no injury and she had full range of motion. The
only objective finding by the emergency room doctor was mild posterior neck tenderness and he
told plaintiff to return to work with no restrictions. At her next hospital visit, plaintiff
complained of continued aches and pains but, contrary to her deposition testimony, records
indicate that her primary complaint was nausea from a muscle ache medication. Furthermore,
while Dr. Madhavi Kanneganti signed a disability certificate for plaintiff’s absence from work
between January 7 and January 15, 1999, plaintiff testified that Dr. Kanneganti urged her to
return to work and declined to continue her treatment because plaintiff refused to do so.
Thereafter, in April 1999, Dr. Asit Ray unequivocally stated that he could find no clinical
injury to support plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain. Indeed, Dr. Ray conducted various
tests and found no abnormalities and he concluded that plaintiff was able to return to work.
Though plaintiff testified that Dr. Ray continued to treat her until late 1999 or early 2000, his
letter clearly states that there was no basis for further treatment or therapy. Indeed, there is no
record evidence of any medical treatment until one year later.
In April 2000, Dr. Haranath Policherla found that plaintiff had limited range of motion in
-2-
her neck, though his testing revealed no neck injury. However, a lower lumbar EMG showed
left S-1 radiculopathy. Dr. Policherla prescribed massage therapy, which plaintiff continued
until July or August 2000. By all accounts, the massage therapy significantly relieved plaintiff’s
complaints of pain. Dr. Vaqar Siddiqui stated that plaintiff “reported significant improvement”
and reported no recent headaches or back pain and discontinued plaintiff’s therapy. Plaintiff also
testified that the massages improved her ability to work and take care of her children and, as of
January 15, 2001, she was performing her work and household chores.
One week after plaintiff’s deposition, plaintiff’s counsel sent her for an evaluation by Dr.
Stefan Glowacki, who indicated that plaintiff complained of neck pain, numbness and headaches
and had trouble with heavy household chores. Dr. Glowacki found that plaintiff’s range of neck
motion was limited, she had neck tenderness, and a muscle spasm. Dr. Glowacki diagnosed
plaintiff with post traumatic cephalgia and cervical spine spondylitis. Plaintiff also submitted to
an independent medical evaluation in February 2001, and the doctor found no clinical proof of
injury.
Plaintiff’s primary complaint throughout these proceedings was her neck pain which, she
maintained, radiated to her arms and legs. However, for a year and four months after the
accident, plaintiff had full range of motion in her neck and, though Dr. Policherla found that her
range of neck motion was limited, his tests revealed no neck injury and her discomfort was
relieved by massage therapy. Further, on the date of her deposition, plaintiff testified that she
was able to lead her normal life, both at work and at home. Dr. Glowacki was the only doctor to
conclude that plaintiff has some cervical spine inflammation, which apparently explained her
neck pain. However, this diagnosis, rendered two years after the accident, does not rise to a level
of a serious impairment of an important body function.
While Dr. Policherla’s finding of S-1 radiculopathy may qualify as an “objectively
manifested” medical problem, plaintiff did not complain about low back pain until April 2000
and any pain was relieved through massage therapy. Thus, nothing in the record establishes a
nexus between this apparently unrelated back problem and the car accident.2
For these reasons, the trial court correctly granted summary disposition to defendant
because plaintiff failed to establish that she suffered a serious impairment of body function under
MCL 500.3135.3
2
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by considering her injuries during a limited period of
time. At the motion hearing, the trial court asked plaintiff’s counsel whether doctors found an
objectively manifested injury between the time of the accident and before the April 2000 lumbar
EMG. The trial court judge also emphasized in her bench opinion that plaintiff received no
medical treatment between April 1999 and April 2000 and that plaintiff never complained about
low back pain until April 2000. This finding was clearly based on the evidence presented and it
was proper for the trial court to note the significant gap in plaintiff’s symptoms and treatment.
3
We reject plaintiff’s claim that defendant was precluded from challenging the threshold injury
issue under the doctrine of res judicata. As defendant correctly observes, plaintiff fails to cite
any case law to support this assertion, fails to set forth the requirements for applying res judicata
and fails to explain how it should apply to this case. “[T]he burden of proving the applicability
(continued…)
-3-
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Donald S. Owens
(…continued)
of the doctrine of res judicata is on the party asserting it.” Baraga County v State Tax Com’n,
466 Mich 264, 269; 645 NW2d 13 (2002). Moreover, it is well-established that, on appeal:
It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position
or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the
basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then
search for authority either to sustain or reject his position. The appellant himself
must first adequately prime the pump; only then does the appellate well begin to
flow. [Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).]
Accordingly, we consider this issue abandoned.
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
