PEOPLE OF MI V CEDRIC JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 10, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 239886
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-013859
CEDRIC JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Fitzgerald and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with possession of less than twenty-five grams of heroin, MCL
333.7403(2)(a)(v). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of the heroin found in his
pocket when he was searched in a private home (not his own) while the police were executing a
search warrant for the premises. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that there
was a lack of probable cause for the search of defendant’s pocket, and therefore, suppressed the
evidence. Because the prosecutor had no other evidence with which to proceed, the case was
dismissed. The prosecutor appeals as of right, and we now affirm.
I. Facts And Procedural History
The evidence brought forward during the evidentiary hearing and the facts found by the
circuit court are straightforward and undisputed. Defendant presented no evidence during the
hearing while the prosecutor presented as witnesses Detroit police officers Ceiere Campbell and
Ahmed Haidar. The only exhibit admitted into evidence was the November 14, 2001 search
warrant and affidavit.
According to Officer Campbell, on November 12, 2001, the police conducted a
controlled purchase of narcotics from 8855 Heyden in Detroit. The informant who made the
purchase provided Campbell with a description of the person who sold him the drugs. The next
day, Officer Campbell monitored the house and saw a person matching the description given by
the informant, who opened the front door for a number of people during the surveillance period.
Officer Campbell’s description of these events was set forth in the search warrant affidavit as
follows:
On November 12, 2001 affiant met with SOI #2012. The SOI was searched for
drugs and money with negative results, was issued a sum of Secret Service Funds
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with which to make the purchase. The affiant observed the SOI go directly to the
target locations front door, enter, stay briefly, then return directly to the affiant
and turned over a quantity of suspected cocaine, and indicated that it was
purchased from the above described seller at the above described place using the
funds provided. The SOI was again searched for drugs and money with none
found.
The affiant conveyed the suspected cocaine to the Narcotics Section where a
preliminary analysis proved positive. The cocaine was then placed into LSF
#497947.
On November 13, 2001 affiant conducted surveillance of the target location. The
affiant observed at least five unknown persons arrive both on foot and in vehicles
within a thirty-minute period. The affiant would observe the individuals travel to
the front porch, enter, stay briefly, then leave. The affiant believes this
information coupled with the above facts is consistent with ongoing narcotic
activity.
Based on the testimony contained in the search warrant affidavit, a search warrant was
signed on November 14, 2001 authorizing the search of 8855 Heyden, and in particular the
following items:
Also to be searched is the seller, described as a b/m/ approximately 40-45 years
old, 6’0, 170lbs, medium build w/dark complexion and short black hair, referred
to hereafter as seller, and to seize, tabulate and make return according to the law
the following property and things; all controlled substances, all moneys, books
and records used in connection with illegal narcotic trafficking, all equipment and
supplies used in the manufacture, delivery, use or sale of controlled substances,
all firearms used in connection with the above described activities, all evidence of
ownership, occupancy, possession or control of the premises.
Both officers Campbell and Haidar participated in one form or another with the
subsequent execution of the search warrant. Officer Haidar’s assignment was to provide security
toward the rear of the dwelling while the raid was initiated. Once the premises had been secured,
Officer Haidar entered the dwelling. Officer Haidar found four adults who were already located
in the living room, while Officer Campbell testified to also seeing “some children” in the house.
Officer Haidar testified that he decided to conduct pat down searches for weapons on the adults
for safety purposes and for the purpose of locating evidence of contraband.1 With respect to
defendant, Officer Haidar conducted a pat down search and, while doing so, grabbed defendant’s
right front pocket and rubbed it together, which produced the sound of a plastic baggie rubbing
together. As he removed the baggie from defendant’s pocket, another item fell out. The other
1
The testimony established that the pat down search conducted by Officer Haidar took place
after the officers had already conducted a sweep of the house to locate other potential
inhabitants.
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item was another baggie containing loose marijuana. Officer Haidar’s testimony as to this event
was as follows:
(By Mr. Bresnehan)
Q. When you were conducting your search on the outside part of the clothing,
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You indicated that. You indicated you felt something, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And based on your experience as a police officer you felt it was packaging.
What made you conclude that?
A. When I removed it from his pocket.
Q. Okay, what made you initially suspect it could have been contraband or any
type of evidence?
A. Because it was a sandwich baggie, and from my past experience ninety
percent of the time narcotics would be stored in a sandwich baggie.
Q. Okay, was there something about the material that made you believe it was a
baggie when you felt it?
A. It was the plastic. When I rubbed it together I felt, I could hear the plastic
rubbing.
Q. Okay, and at this time you felt that you –it was a baggie and you took it out of
the defendant’s pocket, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did you then do with it?
A. I took the baggie out of his pocket and another item fell out of his pocket,
along with the baggie that I obtained in my hand had loose marijuana in it.
Q. Okay, and that fell out as you were pulling out the first baggie?
A. Yes.
The undisputed evidence also established that there were no other narcotics found during
the search of the home and neither defendant nor any of the other persons present in the home
ever made any motion, gesture, or any other type of act that caused Officer Haidar to believe that
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defendant was dangerous or associated with any criminal activity in the house. Defendant was
subsequently arrested.
After a suppression hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion, holding that
although the officer had the authority to conduct a pat down search of defendant, the officer’s pat
down of defendant did not provide him with probable cause to believe defendant had contraband
in his pocket. See Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). The
prosecutor now concedes on appeal that the evidence was not properly seized under the plain feel
exception to the warrant requirement, and thus does not challenge the trial court’s decision in
that regard.
II. Analysis
The prosecutor, however, now defends the search of defendant on the ground that this
Court should adopt a bright line rule under which the scope of the search warrant for narcotics in
a private residence would allow the search of anyone found on the premises.2 Because this
argument was not properly presented to nor decided by the trial court, the issue is not preserved.
See People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). This Court’s review of an
unpreserved issue is limited to determining whether the prosecutor demonstrated a plain error
affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
This Court reviews constitutional questions de novo. People v Pitts, 222 Mich App 260, 263;
564 NW2d 93 (1997).
A. People v Hawkins; People v Burbank
In support of his assertion that the scope of a search warrant for narcotics in a private
residence should automatically justify the search of all persons found on the premises, without
regard to probable cause or reasonableness requirements, the prosecutor argues that the United
States Supreme Court decision in Wyoming v Houghton, 526 US 295; 119 S Ct 1297; 143 L Ed
2d 408 (1999), changed the landscape of search and seizure law. The prosecutor asserts that
Houghton extended the scope of a search warrant to the pockets of persons found on the
premises because, as the prosecutor contends, when drugs are concerned, persons’ pockets
constitute “any place where the items sought might reasonably be expected to be found.” The
prosecutor argues that, in light of Houghton, this Court should reexamine its decisions in People
v Hawkins, 163 Mich App 196; 413 NW2d 704 (1987), and People v Burbank, 137 Mich App
266; 358 NW2d 348 (1984).
Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; People v
Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 417; 605 NW2d 667 (2000). Absent a compelling reason to impose
2
During closing arguments in the trial court, the prosecutor did make minimal reference to the
argument that searching the individuals found in the house was permissible pursuant to the
search warrant. However, the trial court did not decide that issue, most likely because the main
thrust of the prosecutor’s argument was that the plain feel exception authorized the search and
seizure. The lower court record does not contain a written response to defendant’s motion, so we
are unable to discern what, if anything, the prosecutor argued in writing to the trial court.
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a different interpretation, the Michigan Constitution is construed to provide the same protection
as that secured by the Fourth Amendment. People v Levine, 461 Mich 172, 178; 600 NW2d 622
(1999). Generally, a search or seizure conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless there
exists both probable cause and a circumstance establishing an exception to the warrant
requirement. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 294; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). Probable
cause to search exists when facts and circumstances warrant a reasonably prudent person to
believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the evidence sought will be found in
a stated place. People v Beuschlein, 245 Mich App 744, 749; 630 NW2d 921 (2001). Whether
probable cause exists depends on the information known to the officers at the time of the search.
Id. at 750.
In Burbank, supra, the defendant was found, along with several other adults and children,
in a home that was being searched. All were placed with their hands up against a wall. One of
the officers on the scene observed “bulges” in the defendant’s brassiere. Although the defendant
was not one of the persons listed in the search warrant to be searched, the officer took the
defendant into another room to be searched. Three vials of amphetamine were found. The trial
court suppressed the evidence, and this Court affirmed, holding that the officer did not have
probable cause to search the defendant when the defendant was not a resident of the house, and
the police officer did not have any facts upon which to assert probable cause to search her
brassiere. Burbank, supra at 269-270. The Court rejected the prosecutor’s argument that the
defendant was properly searched because the defendant was found in a home in which narcotics
were found on other persons. Id. at 270.
The basis for the Burbank Court’s holding was Ybarra v Illinois, 444 US 85; 100 S Ct
338; 62 L Ed 2d 238 (1979). In Ybarra, a search warrant was issued authorizing the search of
the Aurora Tap Tavern and its bartender for any evidence pertaining to the possession of a
controlled substance. Ybarra, supra at 88. That same day police officers executed the search
warrant. One officer conducted pat down searches of the nine to thirteen customers present,
including the defendant, as a “cursory search for weapons.” Id. When patting down the
defendant, the officer felt a cigarette pack that he thought contained “objects.” Id. After patting
down the remaining customers, the officer returned to the defendant, removed the cigarette pack,
and found in it six tin foil packets of heroin. Id. at 89.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the trial court. The
Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches was violated. Id. at 96.
The Court’s holding was based on two principles. First, the Court held that probable
cause is not provided by the singular fact that the person is located in a dwelling in which there is
judicially determined probable cause to believe that illegal activity is taking place:
It is true that the police possessed a warrant based on probable cause to search the
tavern in which Ybarra happened to be at the time the warrant was executed. But,
a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity
does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Sibron
v New York, 392 US 40, 62-63, 88 S Ct 1889, 1902, 20 L Ed 2d 917. Where the
standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by
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probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement
cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally
there exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises
where the person may happen to be. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
protect the “legitimate expectations of privacy” of persons, not places. [Id. at 91
(footnote omitted; emphasis added).]
The Ybarra Court also held that the search of the defendant could not be justified under Terry
because the Terry exception “does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief
or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on the
premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place.” Id. at 94.
Returning to our State court decisions, several years following Burbank, we decided
Hawkins, supra. In that case the defendant was given a pat down search when he was found in a
house during the execution of a search warrant. Upon performing a Terry pat down search, the
police found two vials of Percodon on the defendant. The defendant was arrested, but the case
was ultimately dismissed when the trial court suppressed evidence of the Percodon. Hawkins,
supra at 197. This Court affirmed the trial court, holding that under Ybarra and Burbank, the
officers could not search the defendant on the sole basis that he was in a house that was the
subject of a valid warrant:
We disagree with the prosecutor’s argument that the search of defendant’s person
was authorized by the warrant. In Ybarra v Illinois, 444 US 85, 91; 100 S Ct 338;
62 L Ed 2d 238 (1979), the Supreme Court noted that persons have a
constitutional right guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
reasonable expectation of personal privacy. When a search warrant is executed
and persons not named in the warrant are searched on the basis that their presence
on the premises made them “containers of the evidence,” that constitutional right
is eroded. Ybarra, supra; People v Arteberry, 154 Mich App 1, 4; 397 NW2d 198
(1986), lv gtd 428 Mich 857 (1987); People v Burbank, 137 Mich App 266; 358
NW2d 348 (1984), lv den 419 Mich 917 (1984), cert den 469 US 1190, 105 S Ct
962; 83 L Ed 2d 967 (1985).
In the instant case, defendant did not live in the house that the police were
searching, nor did the police have probable cause to search defendant. Because it
was not apparent that defendant possessed illegal contraband, the police could not
arrest defendant or extend the warrant to search him. People v Secrest, 413 Mich
521, 528; 321 NW2d 368 (1982); Burbank, supra. [Id. at 197-198.]
B. Wyoming v Houghton
Houghton is a case that dealt with the automobile exception to a warrantless search of the
contents of an automobile. The issue in that case was whether “police officers violate the Fourth
Amendment when they search a passenger’s personal belongings inside an automobile that they
have probable cause to believe contains contraband.” Houghton, supra at 297 (emphasis added).
That case did not involve the search of the purse’s owner or the search of a person’s pockets.
The difference between searching a person, as opposed to a container, is significant. Indeed, the
Houghton Court repeatedly emphasized the constitutional distinction between the two searches.
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In holding that all containers found within an automobile are the proper subject of a
search when there is probable cause to believe that the automobile itself contains contraband, the
Houghton Court emphasized that it’s holding was entirely consistent with Ybarra and the earlier
decision of United States v Di Re, 332 US 581; 68 S Ct 222; 92 L Ed 2d 210 (1948). The Court,
speaking through Justice Scalia, noted that Ybarra and Di Re “turned on the unique, significantly
heightened protection afforded against searches of one’s person,” Houghton, supra at 303, and,
citing Terry, supra at 24-25, the Court explained why the search of a person, as opposed to an
object, is granted this “heightened protection:” “‘Even a limited search of the outer clothing . . .
constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely
be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.’” Houghton, supra. Thus,
because “[s]uch traumatic consequences are not to be expected when police examine an item of
personal property found in a car,” the Court held that the Wyoming Supreme Court had erred in
relying upon Di Re and Ybarra because those cases involved searches of persons, rather than
containers as in Houghton. Id. at 303 and n 1. See also id. at 308 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Hence, in reviewing Houghton, it is abundantly clear that the Court specifically distinguished
between the law governing searches of persons as dealt with in Di Re and Ybarra, and the search
of objects belonging to persons as addressed in Houghton.
In light of the foregoing principles, it is apparent that the holdings of this Court in
Burbank and Hawkins remain good law after Houghton. As discussed, Houghton did not deal
with the search of a person, but dealt with the substantially different issue of searching an object
of personal property not found on the person, but in a car. Hence, the prosecutor has failed to
convince us that Houghton has at all changed the legal landscape with respect to the search of
persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.3
We also emphasize what this case is not about. Neither the facts in this case nor the
arguments presented raise the line of cases which distinguish Ybarra on the basis that the
occupant searched was determined not to be a “mere visitor” in a private home that was the
subject of a search warrant. Those cases, which emanate from both the state and federal courts,
have held on a variety of grounds that occupants who are found, for example, in a house
containing narcotics in the open for all to view, are not in a position similar to a random
customer in a public tavern. See, e.g., United States v Gray, 814 F2d 49, 51-52 (CA l, 1987)
(upholding a search of the defendant’s jacket, which he was not wearing, even though he was a
visitor not named in the search warrant because it was 3:30 a.m. and a drug deal had just “gone
down”); United States v Holder, 990 F2d 1327, 1329 (CA DC, 1993) (the defendant’s proximity
to large amounts of narcotics on open display gave probable cause to search the defendant);
United States v Savides, 664 F Supp 1544, 1550-1552 (ND Ill, 1987) (the defendant’s presence
in the home with large quantities of narcotics and weapons in plain view granted police probable
cause to search the defendant, even though he was a visitor in a private home); State v Andrews,
3
We point out that other than Houghton, the prosecution has not provided this Court with any
authority in support of its position. We would expect that in asking this Court to reverse two of
our precedents, the prosecution could offer at least one case that holds that all occupants in a
private dwelling are subject to a search based on the existence of a warrant to search the
premises for narcotics and devices used with same.
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201 Wis 2d 383; 549 NW2d 210 (1996) (distinguishing between searches of a person and the
search of a visitor’s “belongings”); State v Leiper, 145 NH 233; 761 A2d 458 (2000).4
The dissenting opinion overstates our holding in this case. We, in no fashion, hold that
there is an “absolute bar” to the search of persons located on private premises subject to a search
warrant. Rather, we simply hold that (1) absent probable cause to search individuals not named
in the search warrant and who do not own or reside in the premises, they cannot be searched
without offending the Fourth Amendment (assuming, also, of course, that no other exception to a
warrantless search exists), and (2) Houghton does not stand for the proposition that all persons
found within a dwelling can be searched as potential containers of evidence (again, absent
probable cause to do so). These are hardly remarkable conclusions given that the Houghton
Court specifically distinguished Ybarra and Di Re from the case before it, and the failure of the
prosecution to cite a single case which is contrary to our holding today. Finally, although we too
find Justice Rehnquist’s dissent reasonable and well-founded, “[a] dissenting opinion obviously
does not constitute binding precedent.” US v Jackson, 240 F3d 1245, 1249 (CA 10, 2001). Our
obligation is to follow the Supreme Court’s binding opinions interpreting the Fourth
Amendment, and as a lower court, we cannot alter these precedent. That task is to be taken, if at
all, by the Supreme Court. Rodriquez De Quijas v Shearson/American Express Inc, 490 US 477,
484; 109 S Ct 1917, 1921; 104 L Ed 2d 526 (1989).
Accordingly, because the prosecution concedes the propriety of the trial court’s ruling as
to the invalidity of the search under Terry, and no other probable cause has been suggested to
exist that would have warranted the search of defendant, we affirm the trial court’s order.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
4
For a discussion of these cases and the differing principles espoused with respect to the search
of a visitor’s personal belongings when located in a private home subject to a search warrant, see
Propriety of Search of Nonoccupant Visitor’s Belongings Pursuant To Warrant Issued For
Another’s Premises, 51 ALR 5th 375 (1997) and People, Places and Fourth Amendment
Protection: The Application of Ybarra v Illinois To Searches of People Present During The
Execution Of Search Warrants On Private Premises, 25 Loy U Chi LJ 243 (1994).
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