IN RE ASHLEY MARIE SMITH MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of A.M.S., Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
August 16, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 237267
Ingham Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-034690-NA
MARGO SMITH,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BRIAN SMITH,
Respondent.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Saad and Smolenski, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her
parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(c)(i), (c)(ii) and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (j) were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I);
In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 357-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Because parental rights may be
terminated if clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one statutory ground, we need
not decide whether termination was proper under § 19b(3)(c)(ii). MCL 712A.19b(3).
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) provides that parental rights may be terminated if
[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time
considering the child’s age.
Testimony indicated that, subsequent to the child’s return to respondent’s care in 1995,
respondent failed to comply with the court’s order regarding therapy and pediatrician visits.
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Respondent continually failed to participate in therapy until the summer of 1999 and never fully
complied with visitation. Also, according to her therapist, respondent was unable to provide a
stable home for the child and, because of her own emotional problems, was unable to provide the
critical emotional support and nurturing the child needed. Additionally, at the time of the
termination trial, respondent lived with a man who had a prior conviction for domestic violence
and she continued to put her own needs ahead of the child.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(j) provides that parental rights may be terminated if
[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s
parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the
parent.
Again, we note that respondent was living with a man who had a conviction for domestic
violence, after divorcing the child’s father who repeatedly abused respondent in front of their
children, despite being warned by a caseworker that doing so jeopardized her chances of having
the child returned to her care. Also, at least two therapists testified that because of her own
emotional problems, respondent was incapable of parenting the child, thinking of her own needs
before those of the child’s.
Finally, there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of respondent's parental
rights was not contrary to the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 354.
Three therapists testified to the child’s need for a stable and nurturing environment, something
respondent was incapable of providing. Also, there was an apparent lack of a substantial bond
between respondent and the child, and evidence that the child’s behavioral issues became more
pronounced after visits with respondent. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err in
terminating respondent's parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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