RICK HATTLEY V STANLEY TARGOSZ
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RICK HATTLEY,
UNPUBLISHED
August 2, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
STANLEY TARGOSZ, d/b/a COURT OF KINGS
APARTMENTS,
No. 232871
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-008610-NO
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Sawyer and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant
to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff was visiting his father, who resided in an apartment on defendant’s premises.
Plaintiff parked his car in the rear parking lot and attempted to walk to the front of the building
through an area between the building and a fence. A large amount of snow was on the ground at
the time, and snow from the parking lot had been plowed to the corner of the building. The snow
formed a large mound that blocked clear access to the area between the building and the fence.
Plaintiff, who was wearing tennis shoes, attempted to climb over the snow mound so that he
could walk between the building and the fence. He slipped on the snow and sustained injuries
when he hit his head on an electrical box attached to the building.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that defendant negligently failed to maintain the premises in
a reasonably safe condition, including the area between the building and the fence, which was
used as a common walkway, and to warn of the unsafe condition. Defendant moved for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that he had no duty to maintain the
area where plaintiff fell because the area was not designed for pedestrian traffic and had never
been maintained for that purpose. The trial court granted the motion, finding that because
plaintiff did not present evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether the area was a common
walkway, as a matter of law defendant did not owe plaintiff a duty to clear the area.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 605; 572 NW2d 679 (1997).
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To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant breached the duty; (3) that the
defendant’s breach of duty proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) that the plaintiff
suffered damages. Berryman v K-Mart Corp, 193 Mich App 88, 91-92; 483 NW2d 642 (1992).
A possessor of land has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect an invitee from an
unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land. A possessor of land may
be held liable for injuries resulting from negligent maintenance of the land. The duty to protect
an invitee does not extend to a condition from which an unreasonable risk of harm cannot be
anticipated, or from a condition that is so open and obvious that an invitee could be expected to
discover it for himself. Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 609; 537 NW2d 185 (1995).
Generally, whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court. However, where the
determination of duty depends on factual findings, those findings must be made by the jury.
Holland v Liedel, 197 Mich App 60, 65; 494 NW2d 772 (1992).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. He contends that the trial court impermissibly made a finding of fact on the issue of
whether the area between the building and the fence was a walkway in order to conclude that
defendant did not have a duty to maintain the area.
We disagree and affirm. The area between the building and the fence was not a paved
walkway, and was not designated as a walkway. On the day of the incident a large pile of snow
blocked access to the area between the building and the fence. Plaintiff asserted that the area
between the building and the fence was commonly used as a walkway; however, he presented
only his opinion to support this assertion. Speculation and conjecture are insufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact. Detroit v General Motors Corp, 233 Mich App 132, 139; 592
NW2d 732 (1998).
Moreover, plaintiff’s statements in his affidavit that he did not climb over a pile of snow
and that he was walking on a smooth path when he fell directly contradicted his deposition
testimony that he fell when he was climbing over a pile of snow. A party cannot create a factual
dispute by submitting an affidavit that directly contradicts his own sworn testimony. Dykes v
William Beaumont Hosp, 246 Mich App 471, 480; 633 NW2d 440 (2001).
Because it was undisputed that the area was not paved for use as a walkway, and given
that plaintiff failed to present evidence that created an issue of fact as to whether the area was
generally used as a walkway, the trial court did not err in finding that defendant did not have a
duty to clear the area of snow so that it was accessible to pedestrians. Holland, supra. A
possessor of land is not an absolute insurer of safety to an invitee. Anderson v Wiegand, 223
Mich App 549, 553-554; 567 NW2d 452 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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