PEOPLE OF MI V CACIMIRO CABRERA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 2, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 227871
Branch Circuit Court
LC No. 99-126951-FC
CACIMIRO CABRERA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Markey and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from his convictions by a jury of two counts of first-degree
premeditated murder, MCL 750.316 (1 )(a), and one count of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent
terms of life in prison without parole for the murder convictions and to a consecutive two-year
term for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
At trial, witnesses testified that defendant argued with the victims, left the scene, and then
returned and shot them. Later in the morning of the murders, the Illinois State Police
apprehended defendant, wearing only one sandal, near Chicago for suspected drunk driving.
Testimony established that the other sandal was found beneath one of the victims. An Illinois
jailer testified that defendant told her that he had argued with two people, obtained a rifle from
his car without intending to harm anyone, but then became angry and shot the two men, losing a
shoe while leaving.
Marco Alejandro Hernandez, a Michigan police officer who spoke Spanish, as did
defendant, testified that, after waiving his Fifth Amendment rights, defendant confessed to
shooting both victims but claimed that he thought one victim was armed with a knife and that the
other was armed with a rifle. Hernandez testified that when the police told defendant that none
of the other witnesses had stated that the victims were armed with weapons, defendant
acquiesced to the witnesses’ version of events. Only part of this statement was tape-recorded
because the police claimed that the tape recorder initially did not work and that part of the taped
interview was destroyed during playback.
Johnny Lopez, another Spanish-speaking officer, testified that after defendant was
brought back to Michigan he again waived his rights and spoke to Lopez. Lopez testified that
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defendant initially recanted his Illinois confession. However, Lopez stated that when Lopez told
defendant his fingerprints were on the murder weapon,1 defendant confessed that he had shot the
victims to kill them and that the victims were not armed. Lopez testified that he had trouble
operating the tape recorder and that the statement was only partially recorded, but that part was
transcribed and read to the jury.
Defendant testified and denied committing the crimes. He further testified that one of the
victims had told him two days before the murders that someone who looked like defendant was
going to try to kill him (the victim).
Defendant first claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
move to suppress defendant’s Michigan statement to Officer Lopez. Defendant claims that the
statement should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Miranda2
rights.
Under the two-pronged test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant
must show that counsel's performance was deficient according to prevailing professional norms
and that the deficiency was so prejudicial that defendant was deprived of a fair trial. People v
Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). On this latter point, defendant must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional error or errors, the trial
outcome would have been different. Id. at 302-303. Moreover, because defendant failed to
move in the trial court for an evidentiary hearing regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, our
review is limited to mistakes apparent from the record. People v Sabin (On Second Remand),
242 Mich App 656, 659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).
The only testimony regarding whether defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived them before making the statement in question
came from Lopez, who testified that he advised defendant of his rights in Spanish and that
defendant understood his rights and agreed to speak to him.
The advice of rights and defendant’s waiver, in English, were also included in the
transcript prepared from the audiotaped part of the statement. While defendant ambiguously
referred to an attorney during the advice of rights, an ambiguous statement regarding counsel
does not require the police to stop their interrogation of a defendant. People v Granderson, 212
Mich App 673, 677-678; 538 NW2d 471 (1995). The transcript further indicates that after being
advised of his rights, defendant twice indicated that he was willing to speak to the officer. In
addition, Lopez twice specifically asked defendant if he wished to speak to him without a lawyer
and defendant, in essence, replied that he did and that he would tell “the lawyer” later what he
would tell officer Lopez. The transcript also indicates that defendant, who had already waived
his Miranda rights and given a statement in Illinois, understood his rights. Thus, there is nothing
in the record that provides an objective basis to conclude that counsel erred by failing to move to
1
The murder weapon, an M-1 .30-caliber carbine, was recovered by the police at the residence of
a friend of defendant, but the police had not identified fingerprints from it.
2
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602, 1612; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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suppress defendant’s statement to Lopez because of a defective waiver of Miranda rights.
“[C]ounsel is not required to advocate a meritless position.” People v Snider, 239 Mich App
393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Moreover, it is defendant’s burden to overcome the strong presumption that his trial
counsel was pursuing sound trial strategy. Toma, supra, 302-303. Here, good reasons exist to
believe that counsel was pursuing sound trial strategy by not objecting to the admission of
defendant’s statement to Lopez. The part of the statement that was recorded and transcribed
generally mirrored defendant’s trial testimony. For example, defendant recanted his Illinois
statements that he had shot the victims, asserted that he had said things in Illinois that he should
not have said, and advanced his trial defense of mistaken identity. While Lopez testified that
defendant again confessed after being told that the police had found his fingerprints on the
murder weapon, those admissions were not recorded and thus not laid before the jurors on paper.
By not objecting to the admission of defendant’s statement, defense counsel was able to
reinforce defendant’s trial testimony and at the same time cast doubt on the veracity of the police,
who twice had difficulty recording defendant’s statements. Also, by not objecting defense
counsel was able to plant the seed of defendant’s mistaken identity defense three times in the
minds of the jurors: in the statement defendant gave in Illinois, in the statement defendant gave to
Lopez, and during defendant’s trial testimony. In short, defendant on appeal has failed to meet
his heavy burden of overcoming the presumption that counsel was effectively pursuing sound
trial strategy. Id.
Moreover, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s alleged error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 302-303.
Apart from defendant’s statement to Lopez, the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming.
Eyewitnesses identified defendant as the shooter of the two victims. Testimony established a
motive for the crime in that defendant had argued with the victims earlier in the evening before
they were shot. Defendant made admissions to an Illinois jailer that he had become angry and
returned with a rifle, ultimately shooting the victims. Physical evidence linked defendant to the
crime: in particular, the mate to the one sandal defendant was wearing when arrested was found
under the body of one of the victims. Finally, defendant confessed to another police officer,
Hernandez, when confronted with witnesses’ statements that the victims were not armed.
The record in this case simply does not show that counsel's performance was deficient or
that the alleged error affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, reversal based on ineffective
assistance of counsel is unwarranted.
Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by not sua sponte conducting a hearing on
the admissibility of the statement is equally without merit. Indeed, nothing in the record “clearly
and substantially” raises a question concerning whether defendant’s statement was obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights. Therefore, the trial court was not required to conduct such a
hearing. See People v Ray, 431 Mich 260, 271-272; 430 NW2d 626 (1988).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by admitting the audiotape and transcript
of defendant’s statement to Lopez because there was an insufficient foundation to guarantee the
accuracy of the tape and transcription. We disagree. Because defendant raised no objection to
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the evidence at trial, we review this issue for plain error. People v Coy, 243 Mich App 283, 287;
620 NW2d 888 (2000). To obtain relief, defendant must show (1) that an error occurred; (2) that
the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious; and (3) that the plain error affected substantial rights,
i.e., that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597
NW2d 130 (1999).
We discern no clear or obvious error here. Indeed, defendant on appeal points to no
inaccuracy in the tape or transcription. Further, the transcribed portion of the statement was
generally consistent with defendant’s trial testimony, as noted above. Defendant’s rights were
also protected by the trial court instructing the jury that it must find “defendant actually made the
statement as it was given to you” before the statement could be used as evidence. Moreover, and
significantly, Lopez testified to recording the statement at issue and agreed that it had not been
“altered or changed in any manner since it was originally created.” Lopez also testified that the
portion of the statement that was actually recorded was accurately transcribed. Therefore,
sufficient foundation was laid under MRE 901, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the audiotape and the transcript of it in evidence. See People v Berkey, 437 Mich 40,
51-52; 467 NW2d 6 (1991), and People v Hack, 219 Mich App 299, 308, 316; 556 NW2d 187
(1997). No error occurred, and reversal based on this issue is unwarranted.
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct requiring reversal by
making improper statements in closing arguments. However, defendant did not object to the
prosecutor’s allegedly improper conduct. “Appellate review of allegedly improper conduct by
the prosecutor is precluded where the defendant fails to timely and specifically object; this Court
will only review the defendant’s claim for plain error.” People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713,
720; 613 NW2d 310 (2000). Accordingly, to warrant relief defendant must yet again show (1)
that an error occurred; (2) that the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious; and (3) that the plain
error affected substantial rights, i.e., that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. Carines,
supra at 763.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly commented that all people in this
country, regardless of their color, sex, shape or language, are entitled to constitutional rights,
which the prosecutor claimed to have “meticulously tried to provide to this defendant,” even
providing an interpreter. This comment was followed by the prosecutor noting that the victims
have rights, too – a right to justice. Defendant claims these comments improperly injected race
into the trial and appealed to the jury to sympathize with the victims.
A prosecutor may not inject racial or ethnic remarks into a trial, nor appeal to the fears or
prejudices of the jury. People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 651; 601 NW2d 409 (1999).
Furthermore, the prosecutor may not appeal to the jury to sympathize with the victim or victims.
People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 591; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Likewise, a prosecutor may
not argue it is the civic duty of jurors to convict a defendant. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261,
282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). These, and similar arguments, are condemned because they
encourage jurors to decide cases on issues broader than a defendant’s guilt or innocence of the
charges. People v Crawford, 187 Mich App 344, 354; 467 NW2d 818 (1991).
In this trial, where the victims and almost all the witnesses, including police officers and
defendant, had Hispanic origins, we cannot agree that the prosecutor’s comments injected race
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into the proceedings. Rather, the prosecutor affirmed that constitutional rights extend to all
people in this country regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, and language. The prosecutor’s
comments did not call on the jury to employ prejudice or fear in reaching its verdict but rather
informed the jury that the use of an interpreter was a necessary part of according defendant his
constitutional rights. These remarks were not prejudicial to defendant. Nor was the brief
comment that the victims had a right to justice. Indeed, this comment was isolated and did not
constitute a blatant appeal to the jury’s sympathy. See Watson, supra at 591. Moreover, the trial
judge instructed the jury that it should not base its decision on sympathy or prejudice. See id. at
592. Under the circumstances, we discern no clear or obvious error with regard to the
prosecutor’s comments. Moreover, in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt,
we do not believe that the comments, even if they were erroneous, likely affected the outcome of
the case. Carines, supra at 763. Accordingly, reversal is unwarranted.
Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of trial errors requires reversal. In
order for reversal to be required on the basis of cumulative error, there must be errors of
consequence that are seriously prejudicial to the point that defendant was denied a fair trial.
People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 387-388; 624 NW2d 227 (2001); People v Mayhew, 236
Mich App 112, 128; 600 NW2d 370 (2000). No such errors or prejudice occurred here.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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