PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTOPHER DARYL NELSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 23, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224901
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 99-093357-FC
CHRISTOPHER DARYL NELSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 224902
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 99-094046-FH
CHRISTOPHER DARYL NELSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Hoekstra and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, defendant appeals as of right from jury convictions for
armed robbery, MCL 750.529 (Docket No. 224901), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b (Docket No. 224902), for which he was sentenced to
consecutive prison terms of 51 to 120 months and two years, respectively. We affirm.
I
Defendant’s convictions arise from the armed robbery of a clerk employed at an adult
bookstore located in the city of Jackson. On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court
abused its discretion when it allowed a police detective to testify that he had seen defendant in
possession of a handgun on an occasion approximately two months before the detective
interviewed defendant in connection with the instant armed robbery. Because defendant initially
objected to the evidence only on the ground that the bad act was “too remote,” and his later
objections were stated off the record during a bench conference, this issue is not preserved for
our review. See People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 113; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Therefore,
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we review this claim for outcome-determinative plain error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
The trial court allowed the challenged testimony to rebut defendant’s statement to the
detective during an interview that he could not have committed the armed robbery because he
did not have a gun and has never had a gun. Because the jury was able to corroborate the
eyewitness identification of defendant as the robber by viewing the security videotape on which
the events of the robbery and the images of the perpetrator were recorded, we are not persuaded
that admission of the officer’s testimony on this ground, even if error, was of such magnitude as
to affect the outcome of the trial. See id. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to a new trial on
this basis.
II
Defendant next argues that he was deprived of his right to equal protection of the law as
well as his right to an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community
because there were only two African-Americans in his forty-person jury venire.1 Because
defendant objected to the composition of the jury array only after the jury had been impaneled
and sworn, the challenge was untimely advanced. People v Dixon, 217 Mich App 400, 404; 552
NW2d 663 (1996). Unpreserved claims of constitutional error are reviewed under the plain error
rule. Carines, supra.
Defendant seeks to establish a systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the jury
selection process based solely on the fact that the number of African-Americans in his jury
venire was disproportionate to the number of African-Americans in the general population of
Jackson County. However, even if African-Americans were under-represented on defendant’s
venire, a systematic exclusion is not shown by one or two incidents of a venire being
disproportionate. See People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 481; 552 NW2d
493 (1996). Accordingly, plain error has not been shown.
III
Defendant also argues that he was deprived of due process because counsel was not
present at the four precustodial photographic showups conducted by law enforcement authorities,
even though defendant had become the focus of the criminal investigation. Defendant again
failed to preserve this issue for appellate review by failing to timely object or move the trial court
to suppress the identifications. People v Lyles, 148 Mich App 583, 591; 385 NW2d 676 (1986).
Indeed, defendant raised the issue for the first time in a motion for new trial filed in the trial
court. Under these circumstances, we review defendant’s claim subject to the plain error rule.
Carines, supra. Again, we find no plain error.
1
Our review of the record reveals that both prospective African-American jurors were excused
for cause by the trial court. One of the prospective jurors was excused after she indicated that
her religion prohibited her from sitting in judgment of others. The other prospective juror was
excused after he expressed animosity for and bias against certain Jackson County prosecutors
and law enforcement officials.
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Generally, the right to counsel does not attach to precustodial photographic
identifications. See People v McCray, 245 Mich App 631, 639; 630 NW2d 633 (2001). A
defendant is, however, entitled to counsel at a precustodial photographic showup when the
circumstances underlying the investigation are “unusual.” People v Lee, 243 Mich App 163,
182; 622 NW2d 71 (2000). Unusual circumstances exist where a “‘witness has previously made
a positive identification and the clear intent of the lineup is to build a case against the
defendant.’” Id., quoting People v McKenzie, 205 Mich App 466, 472; 517 NW2d 791 (1994).
In this case, there were no unusual circumstances surrounding the store clerk’s
identification of defendant at one of two photographic showups in which the clerk participated.
A store security camera captured the events of the robbery, including images of the robber. The
police seized the videotape as evidence. The detective assigned to investigate the robbery
viewed the security video and recognized the individual shown committing the robbery, but was
unable to “put a name to the face.” He subsequently prepared two photographic lineups, one
containing a photograph of a possible suspect identified by another police officer and one
containing a photograph of defendant, which the detective discovered in the regular course of his
duties. The clerk identified no one in the first set of photographs, but later identified defendant
as the robber after viewing the second set. However, at the time of this identification, defendant
was not in custody and had not been contacted or questioned. Moreover, the record evidence
reveals that the purpose of the showup was to elicit a positive identification from the victim that
defendant was the individual who committed the armed robbery. Accordingly, we find no error
on this record with respect to the photographic showups involving the clerk.
Because the first photographic lineup was shown to the store manager before the store
clerk identified defendant and before defendant was contacted, questioned and arrested, we
similarly find no error in the absence of counsel during this showup. Moreover, because the
second photographic showup with the manager (at which he identified defendant) occurred
before defendant was arrested and was apparently conducted to confirm, in the face of
defendant’s repeated and steadfast denials that he committed the robbery, the identification of
defendant as the person who committed the robbery, we find no error in the conduct of this
second photographic showup despite the fact that the showup occurred eleven days after the store
clerk positively identified defendant, and after defendant had been contacted by the detective and
twice informally questioned at his residence.
IV
Defendant next argues that his convictions violate the prohibition against being twice
placed in jeopardy for the same offense. Defendant is mistaken. It is well-settled that concurrent
convictions for armed robbery and felony-firearm do not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Wayne Co Prosecutor v Recorder’s Court Judge, 406 Mich 374, 388; 280 NW2d 793
(1979).
V
Defendant also argues that he was denied due process when the trial court failed to
instruct the jury with regard to cross-racial identification, which occurs when an eyewitness is
asked to identify a person of a different race. See, e.g., State v Cromedy, 158 NJ 112; 727 A2d
457 (1999). Not only did defendant fail to request such an instruction or to object when one was
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not given, he affirmatively waived, and thereby extinguished, any errors when he specifically
indicated to the trial court that he had no objections to the instructions “as . . . just read.” People
v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000); People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297,
311; 642 NW2d 417 (2001).
VI
Finally, defendant argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel. Defendant identifies eight alleged instances of constitutionally deficient
representation in support of his claim, only two of which he raised in the trial court in
conjunction with a motion for new trial. However, because these two alleged instances raised
below were not raised in conjunction with an evidentiary hearing, our review of all eight
allegations of deficient representation is limited to the appellate record. People v Sabin (On
Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).
To be successful on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
establish that
(1) the performance of his counsel was below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and (2) a reasonable
probability exists that, in the absence of counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different. [Id. at 659.]
Additionally, defendant must overcome a strong presumption that the conduct complained of
reflects sound trial strategy. Id.
In challenging his counsel’s performance at trial, defendant first argues that counsel was
deficient in failing to request that a corporeal lineup be conducted and that the jury be read a
cautionary instruction regarding the reliability of identification testimony. See CJI2d 7.8. We
do not agree. There is nothing on this record to suggest that a corporeal lineup would have
produced a result different from the photographic showups actually conducted. Indeed, the store
clerk identified defendant at trial as the man who robbed him. Moreover, the jurors themselves
viewed the surveillance tape of the robbery and could thus judge for themselves the reliability of
the store clerk’s identification without the need for additional instruction. Accordingly, we do
not conclude that either of the deficiencies alleged by defendant affected the outcome of the trial.
We similarly reject defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to call two
additional alibi witnesses. Several such witnesses, including defendant’s mother, testified at trial
in support of defendant’s alibi defense. The jury obviously rejected that defense and there is
nothing on this record to suggest that additional witnesses would have altered the jury’s decision.
Defendant next argues that trial counsel provided deficient representation when he failed
to move for a mistrial after the trial court elicited from a police witness the job duties of a
community police officer. Again, we disagree. The officer testified that his duties included
attempting to get community members “to be more positive about the community, and to assist
us in ridding the crime, and increasing the quality of life for them.” This testimony is not
inherently prejudicial to defendant. Under such circumstances, a motion for mistrial would have
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been futile. Counsel is not required to advocate a meritless position. People v Snider, 239 Mich
App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Similarly, for the reasons set forth in our discussion of Issue I, a motion for mistrial made
after the admission of the officer’s testimony that he had seen defendant with a handgun several
months prior to the charged armed robbery would have been an exercise in futility, which
counsel was not required to undertake to be effective. Id.
Defendant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective when he made the following
statement early in his closing argument:
The first thing I want to address is the part about the crime. When you watch that
videotape – and you can ask to see it again – you won’t see any gun come out of
my client’s pocket . . . .
Counsel’s isolated and innocuous slip-of-the-tongue neither rendered his representation deficient
nor, given the evidence presented at trial, adversely affected the outcome of trial.
Defendant also argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he elicited
testimony from a police officer that defendant had a prior arrest for possession of a firearm after
that same officer testified that he had seen defendant with a handgun several months before the
instant robbery. However, the record indicates that defense counsel elicited the testimony as part
of a strategy to defuse jury speculation that the only way the officer observed defendant with a
handgun was through defendant’s involvement in other criminal activity, the nature of which
might be left to further jury speculation. By eliciting testimony that defendant had been arrested
for possessing a firearm, counsel surmised that he could defuse any prejudice arising from the
prior gun possession by further eliciting testimony that no conviction arose from the gun
possession. This Court will not second-guess trial counsel on matters of trial strategy. People v
Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
Lastly, defendant argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
when he elicited testimony from a police officer suggesting that defendant dealt crack cocaine.
We can neither ascertain nor posit a strategic reason for admitting such speculation.
Nevertheless, we cannot say that absent the admission of this testimony “the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different,” where the jury viewed the actual robbery as it was
recorded on a security video. Sabin, supra.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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