PEOPLE OF MI V VERNON LEROY BOLLING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 9, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 227623
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 94-132608-FH
VERNON LEROY BOLLING,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Talbot and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver less
than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). He was sentenced to fourteen months to
twenty years’ imprisonment. He appeals by right. We affirm.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Marty Bugbee to provide
opinion testimony regarding telephone messages for defendant that were found at codefendant
Greg Crouch’s residence. Detective Bugbee testified that the fact that messages were found at
the residence led him to conclude that defendant was residing with Crouch. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. People v Christel, 449 Mich 578, 587; 537
NW2d 194 (1995). Even if Detective Bugbee’s testimony were not admissible under MRE 702,
it was admissible under MRE 701. In general, police officers may provide lay opinions about
matters that are not overly dependent on scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge. People
v Oliver, 170 Mich App 38, 49-50; 427 NW2d 898 (1988), modified on other grounds 433 Mich
862 (1989). Here, Detective Bugbee’s testimony regarding an inference that could be drawn
from the fact that there were telephone messages for defendant found at Crouch’s house was not
dependent on technical or specialized knowledge. However, the officer's observations helped
provide the jurors with a “clear understanding” of his testimony and helped the jury determine “a
fact in issue” regarding whether defendant possessed the cocaine found on the premises. MRE
701. Therefore, Detective Bugbee’s testimony was admissible as opinion testimony by a lay
witness under MRE 701.
Even if Detective Bugbee’s testimony were inadmissible, however, the error would have
been harmless in light of the other substantial evidence indicating that defendant was residing at
Crouch’s house, including defendant’s own admission to police that he was living at the Crouch
residence, at least part-time. Moreover, following defense counsel’s objection to Detective
Bugbee’s testimony, the jury was instructed to give the testimony whatever weight they believed
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it merited. Under these circumstances, any error in the admission of Detective Bugbee’s
testimony was harmless.
Defendant also claims that Officer Michael Farley provided improper “drug profile”
testimony. Officer Farley’s opinion testimony that the cocaine found in defendant’s jacket
pocket was packaged for delivery, not personal use, was not improper drug profile evidence.
Moreover, his testimony that the scale found in defendant’s bedroom was a “quality scale” and
“very accurate,” and that it was likely used to weigh cocaine “in small, gram and a half portions
and [place it] into the packaging material . . . for distribution,” was not drug profile evidence.
This testimony did not relate to characteristics of a typical person engaged in specific illegal
activity. People v Murray, 234 Mich App 46, 52; 593 NW2d 690 (1999). The testimony was
elicited from Officer Farley, an expert in drug trafficking, to aid the jury in understanding
evidence relating to how drugs are packaged for delivery or sale. Whether the cocaine was for
personal use or intended for delivery was a pivotal issue in this case. Moreover, how illegal
drugs are packaged for distribution is not within the knowledge of a layperson. The purpose of
Officer Farley’s testimony was to aid the jury in resolving the delivery issue. A prosecutor may
use expert testimony from a police officer to aid the jury in understanding evidence in controlled
substances cases. People v Ray, 191 Mich App 706, 707; 479 NW2d 1 (1991); see, also,
Murray, supra at 53.
To the extent that testimony relating to pagers and large amounts of cash was improper
drug profile evidence, Murray, supra at 52-53, reversal is unwarranted. Defense counsel did not
object to the introduction of this evidence at trial. Unpreserved claims of error are reviewed
under the “plain error rule.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-767, 774; 597 NW2d 130
(1999). In order to avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, a defendant must show that: (1) an
error occurred; (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious; and (3) the plain error affected
substantial rights. Id. at 763. Establishing that the plain error affected substantial rights requires
a showing of prejudice such that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.
Id. Even conceding that the admission of the drug profile evidence constituted plain error,
defendant cannot establish that he was prejudiced to the extent that the error affected the
outcome of the proceeding. Although the circumstantial evidence tending to prove that
defendant possessed and intended to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine may not have been
overwhelming, we do not believe that Officer Farley’s testimony that “pagers are commonly
used for individuals to be summoned for a delivery” and that “large sums of money” and “cash
on hand” were associated with drug transactions, affected the outcome of the trial. The evidence
indicated that defendant resided, at least part-time, with Crouch and that there was a “cocaine
processing lab” on the premises. Although denying that he possessed any of the cocaine,
defendant admitted that he knew that Crouch sold cocaine. Cocaine and an expensive scale
(which was covered with cocaine residue) were found in defendant’s bedroom. The cocaine,
packaged for delivery, was found in defendant’s jacket pocket. Defendant’s thumbprint was
found on one of the packages containing cocaine. Under these circumstances, any error in the
admission of Officer Farley’s testimony was harmless. Moreover, it does not appear that
defendant is actually innocent of the charged offense, or that any error seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of the instant judicial proceedings. Therefore, reversal is
not required on the basis of this unpreserved issue. Carines, supra at 763-764.
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Next, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
with regard to CJI2d 8.5, the jury instruction relating to “mere presence.” CJI2d 8.5 is included
in the cluster of Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions that include the instruction on aiding and
abetting. CJI2d 8.1. See also CJI2d 8.4. The clear and unambiguous language of CJI2d 8.5
indicates that the instruction applies when the prosecutor’s theory is aiding and abetting, i.e., that
the defendant intentionally assisted someone else in committing a crime. Here, the prosecutor’s
theory was not aiding and abetting; therefore, defendant was not entitled to the “mere presence”
jury instruction.
Furthermore, the instructions given in this case fairly presented the issues to be tried and
sufficiently protected defendant’s rights. People v Canales, 243 Mich App 571, 574; 624 NW2d
439 (2000). With regard to defendant’s theory that although he knew there was cocaine in
Crouch’s house, the cocaine belonged to Crouch and he was merely staying at Crouch’s house,
the jury was instructed that “It’s not enough if the Defendant merely knew about the cocaine.
The Defendant possessed the cocaine only if he had control of it or the right to control it either
alone or with someone else. That’s the definition of possession.” This instruction, combined
with defense counsel remarks during closing argument that “knowing that there’s cocaine in a
house is not in and of itself a crime” and that it is not against the law to be present in a place
where cocaine is found, sufficiently apprised the jury of defendant’s theory and the applicable
law relating to possession of cocaine. Defendant was not denied his right to a properly instructed
jury.
Next, defendant claims that remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument
regarding codefendant Greg Crouch denied him a fair trial. We disagree. Considered in context,
the prosecutor’s remarks were made in response to comments defense counsel made during
closing argument, so they were not improper. People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1, 16 (Ryan, J.); 260
NW2d 58 (1977); People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 608; 560 NW2d 354 (1996).
Lastly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to allow defendant to testify
that he had no prior criminal history. Defendant has suggested no other purpose for this
testimony other than to bolster his credibility. This Court has previously held that evidence of
the lack of a criminal record is not admissible to prove honesty or bolster the credibility of a
witness. People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 46; 597 NW2d 176 (1999); People v Phillips, 170
Mich App 675, 680-681; 428 NW2d 739 (1988). Thus, the trial judge properly excluded
defendant’s testimony regarding his lack of criminal history. Defendant’s reliance on People v
Huff, 101 Mich App 232; 300 NW2d 525 (1980), rev’d on other grds 411 Mich 974 (1981), is
misplaced. The instant case is distinguishable from Huff. Here, the prosecutor did not attempt to
impeach defendant by telling the jury of the existence of unnamed prior felony convictions. In
this case, it was defendant who wanted to provide testimony that he had no prior criminal
history. Under these circumstances, the lack of a criminal record is not admissible to prove
honesty or bolster the credibility of a witness. Griffin, supra at 46; Phillips, supra at 680-681.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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