PEOPLE OF MI V LAMAR ROBINSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 18, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 237738
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-005187
LAMAR ROBINSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Murphy and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant pleaded guilty to carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, and possession
of less than twenty-five grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v). His guilty plea was
conditioned upon being allowed to raise on appeal issues related to the trial court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. Defendant was sentenced to one year in jail, followed by four years’
probation, for the carrying a concealed weapon conviction, and one year in jail, followed by five
years’ probation, for the possession of cocaine conviction. He appeals as on leave granted. We
affirm.
As defendant was driving home after picking up his car from the mechanic, he was
stopped by police and pulled over. The officers testified that defendant was pulled over for
speeding and for having an obscured license plate. However, the trial court found, after an
evidentiary hearing, that the officers’ testimony was questionable and that the stop was not
proper. Upon being pulled over, defendant could not produce a driver’s license for police. An
officer ordered defendant out of his car and patted him down for weapons. The police checked
defendant’s name, either by running his name in their computer or by calling the station, and
discovered that there was an outstanding warrant for defendant’s arrest. Defendant was arrested
and the police subsequently searched his car, where they discovered a handgun, cocaine, and
heroin.1
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence based on an illegal stop. As noted above, the
trial court found that the stop was illegal, but, relying on People v Lambert, 174 Mich App 610;
1
Defendant testified that the police searched his car before discovering the outstanding bench
warrant, but the trial court found that the search was conducted after the police discovered the
outstanding warrant.
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436 NW2d 699 (1989), denied defendant’s motion based on the attenuation exception to the
exclusionary rule. The trial court also denied defendant’s motion for relief from the order. This
Court denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal, People v Robinson, unpublished order
of the Court of Appeals, entered March 8, 2001 (Docket No. 228184), but the Supreme Court
remanded the case to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. People v Robinson, 465
Mich 901 (2001).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting his motion to suppress because the
initial traffic stop was illegal. The prosecution does not challenge the trial court’s finding that
the initial stop was improper. In reviewing a trial court’s decision in regard to a motion to
suppress, this Court reviews the trial court’s factual findings to determine if they are clearly
erroneous, but reviews conclusions of law de novo. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 406;
608 NW2d 502 (2000).
In People v Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626, 634, 636; 597 NW2d 53 (1999), our
Supreme Court stated:
The introduction into evidence of materials seized and observations made
during an unlawful search is prohibited by the exclusionary rule. Weeks v United
States, 232 US 383; 34 S Ct 341; 58 L Ed 652 (1914), overruled on other grounds
in Elkins v United States, 364 US 206; 80 S Ct 1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960);
Silverman v United States, 365 US 505; 81 S Ct 679; 5 L Ed 2d 734 (1961).
Additionally, the exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction into evidence of
materials and testimony that are the products or indirect results of an illegal
search, the so-called “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. Wong Sun v United
States, 371 US 471; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).
***
“The exclusionary rule forbids the use of direct and indirect evidence acquired
from governmental misconduct, such as evidence from an illegal police search.
Three exceptions to the exclusionary rule have emerged: the independent
source exception, the attenuation exception, and the inevitable discovery
exception.” People v LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496, 508-509; 556
NW2d 498 (1996) (citations omitted).
The issue in the instant case is whether the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule
applies to the evidence found in defendant’s car. We find that the trial court properly applied the
attenuation exception and properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. The Lambert panel
stated:
When a defendant claims that physical evidence should be suppressed as a
result of an unlawful seizure of his person, the appropriate inquiry is whether that
evidence was procured by an exploitation of the illegality or, instead, by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. See People v Jones,
66 Mich App 223, 230-231; 238 NW2d 813 (1975), modified on other grounds
397 Mich 871 (1976), citing Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 488; 83 S Ct
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407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963). This is not a “but for” test, but rather depends on
whether there has been an exploitation of the primary illegality. Jones, supra, p
231. As explained in People v Roderick Walker, 27 Mich App 609, 617; 183
NW2d 871 (1970):
“Various approaches have been taken by the courts in deciding whether in
particular cases the people have taken advantage of or exploited the primary
illegality. One test, suggested by some commentators and applied by some
courts, and which makes sense to us, is whether it was reasonably foreseeable by
the police when they acted that by engaging in the illegal behavior they might
obtain evidence of the kind they obtained.” [Lambert, supra at 616-617.]
In Lambert, this Court, finding that the evidence found in the defendant’s car after he was
illegally stopped was admissible, stated:
Here, the unlawful stop produced defendant and his vehicle. However, the
physical evidence obtained resulted from the fact that one of the deputies
immediately recognized defendant as being the subject of outstanding bench
warrants. Defendant’s lawful arrest and all the evidence obtained resulted from
that identification. Under the circumstances of this case, it was not reasonably
foreseeable for the deputies to believe that they would be able to recognize the
driver of the vehicle as being the subject of outstanding bench warrants at the time
they made the stop. There was no exploitation of the primary illegality and,
hence, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine was inapplicable. We conclude
from the authorities cited above that where the police have unlawfully stopped or
detained a citizen and then discover that the person detained is the proper subject
of a lawful arrest on grounds other than the original illegal stop, the police may
make the arrest and any evidence obtained as a result of the lawful arrest is
admissible. For this reason, we uphold the trial court’s ruling that the evidence
was admissible. [Id. at 617-618 (emphasis added).]
Defendant argues that this Court’s holding in Lambert has been limited by the Supreme
Court’s decision in People v LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496, 508-509; 556 NW2d 498
(1996). We disagree. The facts in LoCicero are distinguishable from the facts in Lambert. In
Lambert, the arrest of the defendant and subsequent search of his car was not an exploitation of
the initial illegal stop because the police could not reasonably have known that the defendant
would have outstanding warrants for his arrest before they stopped his car and recognized him.
Lambert, supra at 617-618. In LoCicero, however, the arrest of the defendants and the
subsequent search of their car was the result of active police exploitation of the initial illegal stop
because the police were specifically looking for drugs when they stopped the defendants.
LoCicero, supra at 510.
The LoCicero Court rejected this Court’s opinion that the search was permissible because
the police discovered an open container of intoxicants after stopping the defendants’ vehicle in
an effort to find drugs; therefore, the police had grounds for a proper arrest and the evidence
found pursuant to that lawful arrest was admissible. Id. at 508-510. At first glance, the
LoCicero decision would appear to control here, but the distinguishing feature of LoCicero is
that there, the police used evidence found pursuant to the illegal stop as a basis for the arrest and
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the subsequent search which lead to the discovery of drugs. This was clearly exploitation of the
illegality. In contrast, in the present case, the police did not use any physical evidence
discovered on stopping defendant’s vehicle to support the initial decision to arrest defendant and
search the vehicle, instead the arrest arose out of simply finding defendant in light of the
outstanding arrest warrant, which lead to the discovery of evidence, providing further support to
arrest plaintiff. As in Lambert, this was not exploitation of the illegality. The LoCicero Court
specifically distinguished Lambert on the basis that “[i]n Lambert, the police did not discover
evidence – they discovered the defendant.” LoCicero, supra at 509. Here, the police discovered
defendant, which lead to the arrest and a lawful search. The Supreme Court did not overrule or
limit Lambert.
Defendant argues that Lambert does not apply to this case because the facts are
distinguishable. Again, we disagree. In this case, there was no showing that the police sought to
exploit the primary illegality of their stop. The police testified that they stopped defendant
because he was speeding and because his license plate was obscured. However, the trial court
found that those reasons were questionable and that the stop was illegal. The illegal stop
produced defendant and his vehicle. However, as noted above, the evidence found in
defendant’s car resulted from the fact that the police discovered that there was an outstanding
warrant for defendant’s arrest. Defendant’s lawful arrest pursuant to that warrant and all the
evidence found in his car resulted from this warrant when they stopped him. There is no
evidence that the officers had any suspicions related to defendant having an outstanding bench
warrant. Regardless of the officers’ actual reason for stopping defendant in this case, it was not
reasonably foreseeable for them to believe that they would stop a person with an outstanding
bench warrant. See Lambert, supra at 617. It was only after defendant had been stopped that the
police discovered that he had an outstanding bench warrant.
We find that, as in Lambert, the officers’ arrest of defendant and subsequent search of
defendant’s car was not an exploitation of the illegal stop, but was accomplished by means of the
arrest warrant discovered after the illegal stop. The warrant had no relation to their reason for
stopping him. Therefore, the police made a lawful arrest and any evidence found as a result of
this arrest is admissible.
Defendant also argues that, even if the evidence is admissible under the United States
Constitution, the evidence should be suppressed under the Michigan Constitution. Defendant
argues that, in Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 443 Mich 744; 506 NW2d 209 (1993), the Michigan
Supreme Court stated that the Michigan Constitution provided greater protection than the United
States Constitution from warrantless seizures and searches. However, Sitz was a case dealing
with sobriety checkpoint stops. In Michigan Dep’t of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444; 110 S Ct
2481; 110 L Ed 2d 412 (1990), the United States Supreme Court had held that a sobriety
checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In Sitz,
supra, at 759, the Michigan Supreme Court distinguished the Michigan Constitution from the
United States Constitution. The Michigan Supreme Court stated, “the history of our
jurisprudence conclusively demonstrates that, in the context of automobile seizures, we have
extended more expansive protection to our citizens than that extended [by the United States
Constitution]. Id. at 776. The Michigan Supreme Court then held that sobriety checkpoints
violated the Michigan Constitution. Id. at 747, 778-779. Sitz applies to random checkpoint stops
and not to the instant case. Additionally, the Michigan cases applicable to the instant case, such
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as Lambert and LoCicero, give analyses under the correct constitutional standard. The trial court
did not err in applying Lambert and by finding that the evidence found as a result of the search of
defendant’s car after the outstanding warrant was discovered was admissible.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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