PEOPLE OF MI V ELBERT PETERSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 18, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 232022
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-004974
ELBERT PETERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Murphy and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct,
MCL 750.520c(1)(a). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of ten to twenty years’
imprisonment for the first-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions and four to fifteen years’
imprisonment for the second-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction. Defendant now appeals
as of right. We affirm.
I.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor engaged in several instances of misconduct, the
cumulative effect of which denied him a fair trial. We disagree but will discuss each of
defendant’s claimed acts of misconduct separately.
Defendant first claims that the prosecution committed misconduct with its statements that
defense counsel misled and lied to the jury by reading a quotation from the prosecutor’s opening
statement as though it said that the prosecutor was concerned that the complaining witness might
lie. “The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial.” People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 434; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
When reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we examine the pertinent portion of the
record and evaluate the prosecutor’s remarks in context to determine whether defendant was
denied a fair and impartial trial. Id. at 435.
In this case, we find that defense counsel engaged in a serious and evidently deliberate
misrepresentation by this misquotation. Indeed, this was only one of a number of instances of
misconduct in closing argument by defense counsel. As such, the prosecution’s response to the
misquotation of her opening statement was not prosecutorial misconduct, but only a proper
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attempt to clear the record on a matter crucial to the central issue in the case, the complaining
witness’ credibility. Similarly, the prosecution’s argument that defense counsel was misleading
the jury was also in response to defense counsel’s mischaracterization of testimony. Although
the prosecutor could have used a milder term to describe defense counsel’s conduct, we have
held that a prosecutor need not “confine argument to the ‘blandest of all possible terms.’”
People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 112; 631 NW2d 67 (2001) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, because the prosecutor’s remarks were not improper, defendant was not denied a
fair trial.
None of the remaining allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were preserved with an
objection at trial. People v Mitchell, 223 Mich App 395, 400; 566 NW2d 312 (1997). We
review such unpreserved issues for plain error affecting substantial rights, which generally
requires a showing of prejudice. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999). Furthermore, reversal is not required if the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s
comments could have been prevented by a timely curative instruction. People v Schutte, 240
Mich App 713, 721; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
With this standard of review in mind, defendant next asserts that the prosecutor
improperly vouched for the credibility of the complaining witness by making arguments
unsupported by the record. A prosecutor may not make a statement of fact to the jury that is not
supported by the evidence, but she is free to argue the evidence and any reasonable inferences
that may arise from it as they relate to her theory of the case. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261,
282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). In this case, defendant’s assertion is factually inaccurate. The
prosecutor did not vouch for the credibility of the complaining witness. Rather, the prosecutor
properly argued based on the evidence presented that the complaining witness was credible. Id.;
People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82, 104; 351 NW2d 255 (1984). Thus, we find no error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra.
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor mischaracterized the medical testimony by
grossly misrepresenting the examining physician’s testimony. We disagree. The prosecutor
carefully explained to the jury that the physician did in fact testify that whatever penetration
occurred was not necessarily of a sexual nature, much less committed by defendant, and that the
injuries could not be dated precisely. Although the physician’s testimony may have been
somewhat ambiguous, we conclude that the prosecutor’s characterization of it was not
inaccurate.
Regardless, any prejudice that may have resulted from the alleged
mischaracterization of the testimony could have been cured by a timely instruction. As such, we
find no error requiring reversal. Schutte, supra.1
Defendant next claims that that the prosecution committed misconduct during closing
argument when it improperly referred to defendant as having a “sick, perverted mind.” After a
1
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor’s statements in the opening statement as to what the
medical testimony would show was contrary to the physician’s testimony. This argument
ignores the fact that an opening statement is merely an overview of what the attorney believes
the evidence will show and is not evidence. Thus, we do not find prosecutorial misconduct when
an opening statement later proves to be less than one hundred percent accurate.
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thorough review of the pertinent portion of the record, we find that this remark was clearly in
response to defendant’s closing argument. We have held that “[o]therwise improper
prosecutorial remarks generally do not require reversal if they are responsive to issues raised by
defense counsel.” Id. Furthermore, we find that an instruction could have cured any prejudicial
effect. Id.
Last, defendant claims that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair
trial. Because errors of consequence that are seriously prejudicial to the point that defendant was
denied a fair trial have not been identified, there can be no cumulative effect of errors meriting
reversal. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 388; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
II.
In the alternative, defendant argues that trial counsel’s failure to object to any of these
alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. As
the above discussion indicates, we have held defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct claims to be
without merit. Trial counsel is not required to raise meritless objections, and failure to do so
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425;
608 NW2d 502 (2000).
III.
Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to disregard
complainant’s testimony regarding her having been the victim of sexual abuse by someone else
five or six years ago. However, because the court already ruled that no evidence on this earlier
incident could be admitted, and defendant affirmatively acquiesced in that ruling, his waiver has
extinguished any error on appeal. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-216; 612 NW2d 144
(2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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