PEOPLE OF MI V DWAYNE C ADAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 18, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 226560
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-004568
DWAYNE C. ADAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Gage and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of felonious assault, MCL 750.82, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The trial court
sentenced defendant to three months’ to four years’ imprisonment for the felonious assault
conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant
appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant and a codefendant, his brother, stood trial together on charges of felonious
assault against the brother’s former girlfriend, Kimberly Brown, and her current boyfriend,
Danny Simmons. Brown, Simmons and Simmons’ nephew all testified that defendant pointed a
rifle at them, and that defendant’s brother attempted to stab Brown and Simmons. The jury
found defendant guilty of felonious assault against Simmons and felony-firearm. With respect to
defendant’s brother, the jury could not reach a verdict regarding the felonious assault count
against Simmons, and found him not guilty of assaulting Brown.
I
Defendant first contends that Brown’s missing written statement to the police precluded
his counsel from effectively cross examining her, and thus violated his rights to confrontation
and cross examination. A defendant is entitled to have produced at trial all evidence bearing on
guilt or innocence that is within the prosecutor’s control. Where evidence is not produced, the
proper considerations are whether (1) suppression was deliberate, (2) the evidence was
requested, and (3) in retrospect, the defense could have significantly used the evidence. People v
Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 514; 503 NW2d 457 (1993). Absent the intentional suppression of
evidence or a showing of bad faith, a loss of evidence that occurs before a defense request for its
production does not require reversal. People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 364-365; 494
NW2d 873 (1992).
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In this case, the record indicates that the entire police file had been lost. Neither defense
counsel alleged at trial that any bad faith on the part of the police or prosecutor had been
involved in the file’s disappearance, and both defense counsel declined the trial court’s offer to
further question the investigating police officer regarding the missing file. Although defendant
suggests that a remand is necessary because the record was unclear as to what was lost or
missing, nothing would be gained by a remand where the record is clear that the file was lost.
Moreover, as acknowledged by defendant, reversal is not required absent a showing of bad faith
or deliberate destruction of the statement. In this case, absolutely no evidence showed that the
file was destroyed purposely or in bad faith.
We additionally observe that there is also no evidence that the defense could have made
significant use of the missing statement. While defendant argues that Brown’s statement may
have contained information that would have demonstrated her lack of credibility, i.e., if the
statement, contrary to Brown’s trial testimony, omitted a reference to defendant’s possession of a
gun, this argument is wholly speculative. Furthermore, “[t]he right of confrontation insures that
the witness testifies under oath at trial, is available for cross-examination, and allows the jury to
observe the demeanor of the witness.” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 584; 629 NW2d
411 (2001). Defendant had the opportunity to extensively cross examine Brown, test her
credibility, and have the jury observe her demeanor.
Even assuming that defendant’s right to confront Brown was compromised by the
missing statement, any error qualifies as harmless. “Constitutional error is not a basis for
reversal if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Watson, supra at 585.
A limitation on cross-examination that prevents a defendant from placing
before the jury facts from which bias, prejudice, or lack of credibility of a
prosecution witness might be inferred constitutes denial of the constitutional right
of confrontation. However, violations of the right to adequate cross-examination
are subject to a harmless-error analysis. Whether such an error is harmless in a
particular case depends on a host of factors, including the importance of the
witness’ testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or
absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness,
the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of
the prosecution’s case. [People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 644-645; 588 NW2d
480 (1998).]
See also Watson, supra.
Brown was cross examined extensively by counsel for defendant and his brother’s
attorney. The cross examinations raised issues of Brown’s credibility and impeached her using
her preliminary examination testimony. Despite assaults on her credibility, the testimony and
evidence at trial corroborated Brown’s claim that defendant had a gun during the incident.
Brown’s initial statements to the responding police officer, after flagging him down at a gas
station, indicated the involvement of a gun.1 At trial, Brown, Simmons and his nephew all
1
At the preliminary examination, Simmons testified that defendant came at him with a gun. At
the preliminary examination, Brown was asked questions related to defendant’s brother’s assault
(continued…)
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testified that defendant had a gun. This evidence reflects that the prosecutor’s case was based on
the testimony of several witnesses to the assault, not on Brown’s testimony and credibility alone.
Because Brown’s testimony was cumulative to that of Simmons and his nephew, we find that the
lack of her statement to further test her credibility was harmless.2
II
Defendant next argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the trial
court read to the jury an instruction with respect to the missing witness statement. Our review of
this issue is limited to errors apparent on the record because no Ginther3 hearing was held.
People v Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414; 566 NW2d 649 (1997). To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that his defense counsel’s performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v Stanaway, 446
Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). The defendant must overcome the presumption that
the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich
App 14, 17; 466 NW2d 315 (1991).
After the fact of the missing statement was brought to light, defendant’s brother’s counsel
submitted a proposed jury instruction that would have advised the jury that Brown’s written
statement was lost and that the jury could infer that the statement would have been unfavorable
to the prosecution. After the prosecutor objected to the instruction, the trial court invited all of
the attorneys to submit memoranda addressing an instruction on the missing statement. The
following day, however, the prosecutor, counsel for defendant, and defendant’s brother’s counsel
agreed that no disputes existed regarding the jury instructions and that the court should give the
instructions agreed on by the attorneys. No instruction with respect to the missing statement was
included.
We find that counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue an instruction with respect
to the missing witness statement. No instruction was warranted given the absence of evidence of
any bad faith by the police or prosecutor. Davis, supra at 514-515. Because no indication
existed that any bad faith conduct had led to the missing file, counsel’s decision not to pursue an
instruction was not objectively unreasonable. Moreover, defendant cannot demonstrate that but
for the failure to pursue the instruction, the outcome of the trial would have been different. As
previously discussed, Brown’s testimony was not the only evidence that defendant possessed a
gun during the incident. To acquit defendant, the jury would have had to disbelieve Simmons
and his nephew in addition to Brown. We cannot conclude that an instruction related to Brown’s
statement would have affected the outcome of defendant’s trial. Stanaway, supra.
(…continued)
on her with the knife, but was not asked any questions about defendant or his actions during the
incident.
2
We reiterate that the argument that the written statement may have weakened Brown’s
credibility is entirely speculative.
3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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III
Defendant further asserts that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to
object to the admission of a Korg brand bag recovered by the police from defendant’s brother’s
house, and because counsel did not move to strike inadmissible hearsay testimony regarding the
Korg bag.
We reject defendant’s suggestion that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the admission of the Korg bag because the record demonstrates that his brother’s counsel
objected to the bag’s admission. Where a ruling obviously affects both codefendants in a case,
an objection by only one defense counsel may preserve the issue for his codefendants. People v
Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 41 n 4; 597 NW2d 176 (1999). Furthermore, in light of defendant’s
brother’s objection and the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of the bag, defendant’s
counsel was not required to make a frivolous additional objection to the admissibility of the bag.
People v Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich App 411, 425; 564 NW2d 149 (1997).
The alleged hearsay testimony regarding the bag was elicited while defendant’s counsel
cross examined Brown. Defendant’s counsel inquired whether the police had retrieved a gun
from defendant’s brother’s house. Brown answered that she did not recall the police finding a
gun, but that they found a gun clip and a “bag that the gun should have probably went [sic] in.”
When defense counsel then attempted to discredit Brown by emphasizing, “So, you don’t even
know if it was a bag” for the gun, Brown responded that her son had told her “that that’s the bag
that daddy keeps the gun in.” This testimony undeniably constituted hearsay. MRE 801(c).
However, counsel’s decision not to move to strike the unresponsive hearsay statement does not
constitute ineffective assistance. Counsel apparently made a strategic decision to forego an
objection because moving to strike the inadmissible testimony would have highlighted it, when
the statement otherwise was brief and not repeated. More importantly, defendant cannot
demonstrate that but for his counsel’s conduct in failing to move to strike the statement, the
outcome of the trial would have been different. Whether the Korg bag could have been used for
a gun or a music keyboard was examined at length during the responding police officer’s
testimony. The officer opined that he was sure the bag was used for gun storage. Because the
jury had ample evidence that the Korg bag was a gun bag, we conclude that the hearsay response
of Brown did not affect the outcome of the trial.
IV
Defendant next contends that his counsel ineffectively failed to object when the
responding officer testified concerning the statements Brown and Simmons made to him after
they flagged down his police car. This argument has no merit. Defendant’s brother objected to
the statements as hearsay and the trial court ruled them admissible. Any further objection by
defendant would have been frivolous. Torres, supra. Accordingly, counsel’s conduct was not
objectively unreasonable.
Furthermore, defendant suffered no prejudice from the lack of an objection because the
trial court properly admitted the statements at issue as excited utterances.
MRE 803(2) permits the admission of statements “relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of the
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excitement caused by the event or condition.” A statement is admissible under
this exception if (1) there was a startling event and (2) the resulting statement was
made while the declarant was under the excitement caused by that event. While
the time that passes between the event and the statement is important in
determining whether the declarant was still under the stress of the excitement
when the statement was made, the focus of the exception is on the declarant’s
“lack of capacity to fabricate, not the lack of time to fabricate.” [People v Layher,
238 Mich App 573, 582-583; 607 NW2d 91 (1999), aff’d 464 Mich 756; 631
NW2d 281 (2001).]
The testimony supported that a startling event had occurred and that Brown and Simmons
remained under the stress and excitement of the incident at the time they made the challenged
statements to the officer. Shortly after the incident, Brown and Simmons flagged down the first
police car they saw near a gas station. The officer testified that when Brown and Simmons
flagged him down, they appeared excited and hyper. The officer immediately followed them to
defendant’s brother’s house, and defendant’s brother testified that the police arrived at his house
within five to ten minutes of the incident. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence as an excited utterance. Layher,
supra at 582.
V
Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly failed to include within its felonious
assault instructions to the jury the definition of a firearm within CJI2d 17.11. This issue is not
preserved because defendant neither requested CJI2d 17.11 nor objected to its absence. People v
Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 657; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). We review this
issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App
101, 124-125; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). We review jury instructions in their entirety to determine if
error requiring reversal occurred. Even if the instructions were imperfect, reversal is not
required as long as they fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected the
defendant’s rights. Id. at 124.
We initially note that defendant technically has abandoned this issue by failing to explain
his position or citing any authority to support his argument that the trial court should have
instructed the jury according to CJI2d 17.11. Kelly, supra at 640-641. Moreover, we find no
plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. The trial court properly instructed the jury on
the charge of felonious assault pursuant to CJI2d 17.09. The court’s failure to define “firearm”
within the felonious assault charge was not improper because the definition of firearm was
unnecessary. The jury was instructed that the weapon at issue was a rifle. Defendant defended
the charge by arguing that he never possessed a rifle and that Brown and Simmons fabricated
their stories. Defendant did not set forth as a defense that any weapon he may have possessed
was not a “firearm.” We further note that the trial court defined firearm within the context of the
felony-firearm charge. Because the instructions as a whole fairly presented the issues and
protected defendant’s rights, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to define firearm within the
context of the felonious assault charge did not affect the outcome of the case.
VI
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Defendant next claims that the trial court failed to properly define firearm when
instructing the jury on the felony-firearm charge. We review this issue, which also is
unpreserved, for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Aldrich, supra.
The trial court instructed the jury that “[a] firearm includes any weapon from which a
dangerous object can be short [sic] or propelled by use of explosives, gas or air.” Defendant
argues that the trial court should have included the following italicized portion of the definition
of “firearm” provided within MCL 8.3t:
The word “firearm”, except as otherwise specifically defined in the
statutes, shall be construed to include any weapon from which a dangerous
projectile may be propelled by using explosives, gas or air as a means of
propulsion, except any smooth bore rifle or handgun designed and manufactured
exclusively for propelling BB’s not exceeding .177 calibre by means of spring, gas
or air. [Emphasis added.]
At trial, however, no evidence showed that defendant possessed a BB gun, and he did not defend
the charge by arguing that he possessed a weapon that did not qualify as a firearm. Therefore,
the trial court’s failure to include the italicized language did not affect the outcome of the case.
People v Yarbrough, 107 Mich App 332, 336-339; 309 NW2d 602 (1981). We conclude that the
instructions on the felony-firearm charge, which contained all the requisite elements of the
offense, and the court’s definition of firearm were adequate under the circumstances.
VII
Defendant lastly argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by prompting the
responding police officer to express his opinion on Simmons’ credibility. Because defendant did
not object at trial to the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct, we review this unpreserved allegation
for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Watson, supra at 586.
The prosecutor asked the officer what conclusion he reached after he had obtained a
description of the knife from Simmons and subsequently discovered a knife near defendant’s
brother’s house. The officer testified to his conclusion that the recovered knife “was the knife
that was indeed pulled out. Basically that the information that I gathered was true.” Defendant
complains that the question and answer constituted improper vouching for Simmons’ credibility.
Brown, Simmons and his nephew all testified before the officer testified. Both defendant
and his brother intimated and suggested through their questioning of Brown, Simmons and his
nephew that they had fabricated their stories. The prosecutor’s direct examination of the officer
rehabilitated Simmons’ credibility by offering that the information he gave with respect to the
knife had proved to be true when the evidence was recovered. The prosecutor did not engage in
improper vouching, which occurs when the prosecutor expresses his opinion about a witness’
truthfulness or suggests that the government has some special knowledge that a witness will
testify truthfully. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 276; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). The officer did
not express his opinion that Simmons was truthful or that defendant was guilty, but merely
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commented that after investigating he believed that he had received credible information.4
Furthermore, the prosecutor did not argue for a conviction on the basis of the officer’s opinions.
People v Moreno, 112 Mich App 631, 634-636; 317 NW2d 201 (1981). Accordingly, we find no
plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
4
We note that the prosecutor’s challenged question regarding the knife related to the charges
against his brother, not defendant himself.
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