SALAH KULATO V RONNIE MANSOUR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SALAH KULATO,
UNPUBLISHED
May 31, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
RONNIE MANSOUR and ACN TELEVISION
CORPORATION,
No. 227143
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-019900-NZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and O’Connell and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Salah Kulato appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendants
Ronnie Mansour and ACN Television Corporation’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
According to Kulato’s complaint, which he filed on December 29, 1999, he and Mansour
formed ACN “on or about July 1998,” with each man holding fifty percent of the shares in the
corporation. Kulato alleged that Mansour, his cousin, engaged in unspecified “wrongful
conduct,” forcing Kulato to leave the corporation without being paid the wages and dividends
owed to him. In Kulato’s view, the corporation was “hopelessly deadlocked.” Consequently, he
asked the trial court to order an accounting, appoint a receiver, dissolve the corporation, award
damages for breach of fiduciary duty and misuse of corporate assets, and to award injunctive
relief.
Responding to the complaint with a motion for summary disposition on February 7, 2000,
defendants presented a very different picture of ACN’s business affairs that did not include
Kulato as a shareholder to any extent. For instance, ACN’s May 12, 1998, articles of
incorporation listed Mansour as the sole incorporator, and ACN’s lease had only Mansour’s
signature, listing him as president. Mansour’s affidavit averred that Kulato had been only a parttime salesperson working on commission for the corporation, earning about $500 a month, as
briefly noted in a letter dated July 1, 1998. Copies of checks issued to and cashed by Kulato
revealed that they had been for “commissions.”
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In response to the motion for summary disposition, Kulato submitted his own affidavit in
which he claimed to own a fifty-percent interest in the television corporation and that he had an
agreement with Mansour regarding their respective duties and salary. Kulato argued that
defendants’ motion was an attempt to block discovery and that defendants “never answered the
Complaint with any affirmative defenses,” to which defendants countered that Kulato had never
sent them any discovery requests. Kulato acknowledged that he had nothing in writing to show
that he was a shareholder because “this is a family matter” and the division of labor between the
two cousins entailed Mansour filling out the paperwork he was using to prove his complete
ownership of the corporation. Nevertheless, Kulato asserted that he could produce “about ten
witnesses” to say he was a shareholder, naming twelve individuals. He did not provide affidavits
from any of these potential witnesses. He did not explain why he could not produce their
affidavits, if they were unavailable, or whether he wanted additional time to secure their sworn
statements.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition on April 3, 2000,
reasoning that Kulato’s failure to provide any documentary evidence demonstrating his
ownership interest in ACN in the face of defendant’s evidence showing that he was only a sales
representative left no question of fact regarding the corporation’s ownership. Without this
ownership interest, the trial court held, Kulato had no right to sue under the Business
Corporation Act1 for the relief he had requested. Ten days later, on April 13, 2000, Kulato
moved for reconsideration, arguing that summary disposition was premature because there had
been no discovery. In support for his claim that he had an ownership interest in the corporation,
Kulato submitted an affidavit from a person ACN formerly employed in which the affiant
declared that Mansour told her that plaintiff “was his partner in ACN Television Corporation and
owned 50% of the corporation.” The trial court denied Kulato’s motion for reconsideration,
explaining that he had not brought anything new to its attention.
Kulato now argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary
disposition before allowing him an opportunity to engage in discovery.
II. Standard Of Review
Case law requires that we review de novo orders granting or denying summary
disposition.2
III. Legal Standard
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual
support for a claim.3 When deciding a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), “the trial court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
other documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine
1
See MCL 450.1101 et seq.
2
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
3
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
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whether a genuine issue of any material fact exists to warrant a trial.4 The nonmoving party
cannot simply rest on allegations or denials, but must present evidence showing that a material
issue of fact is in dispute requiring resolution at trial.5 In the end analysis, summary disposition
is appropriate if the documentary evidence establishes “that there is no genuine issue in respect
to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”6
IV. Opportunity For Discovery
In Village of Dimondale v Grable7 this Court explained that,
“[a]s a general rule, summary disposition is premature if granted before discovery
on a disputed issue is complete.” “However, summary disposition may be proper
before discovery is complete where further discovery does not stand a fair chance
of uncovering factual support for the position of the party opposing the motion.”[8]
Kulato has never alleged that defendants are in possession of evidence, documentary or
otherwise, that would support his claims. He acknowledged that there is no documentary
evidence proving or suggesting that he has an ownership interest in ACN, while defendants
presented the trial court with documentary evidence contradicting Kulato’s claims. Though
Kulato alleged in his affidavit that other individuals would be able to verify his claim that
Mansour admitted that they were equal partners in the corporation, he did not provide any
evidence from these individuals in time for the trial court to consider it while ruling on the
motion for summary disposition.9 Moreover, MCR 2.116(H) provides a process by which a
party can demonstrate to the trial court that other critical affidavits are unavailable, making
summary disposition premature or inappropriate. Despite alleging that “at least ten” individuals
would support his claims when drafting his own affidavit, Kulato did not provide the information
MCR 2.116(H) requires. Thus, Kulato neither demonstrated that he needed additional time to
discover evidence his party opponents might have been holding or to secure affidavits from
favorable witnesses at the time the trial court ruled on the dispositive motion. From the evidence
available and arguments made, there was no reason for the trial court to believe that the record
would be any more favorable to Kulato if it denied or delayed ruling on the motion for summary
disposition.
4
Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999); see also MCR
2.116(G)(5).
5
Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455, n 2; 597 NW2d 28 (1999), citing MCR
2.116(G)(4).
6
Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
7
Village of Dimondale v Grable, 240 Mich App 553; 618 NW2d 23 (2000).
8
Id. at 566 (citations omitted).
9
Though Kulato submitted an additional affidavit following the trial court’s ruling on the motion
for summary disposition, the affidavit was not part of the record the trial court had considered
when deciding the motion. Notably, Kulato does not challenge the trial court’s ruling on the
motion for rehearing.
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Kulato also argues that the trial court erred by granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition because whether he was a shareholder was a factual matter that rested on the
credibility of witnesses. Questions revolving around witness credibility, as well as motive or
intent, ordinarily should be submitted to a factfinder.10 The nature of Kulato’s claims leaves the
real possibility that, had this case gone to trial, the jury would have weighed his credibility and
the credibility of his supporting witnesses against defendants’ contrary claims and evidence to
reach a verdict. However, in order to survive a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) so that he could ask the jury to believe him over his cousin, Kulato had to provide
some evidence that went beyond his allegations in the complaint.11 His affidavit added nothing
to the statements in the complaint and, thus, was insufficient in light of defendants’ ample
evidence.12 Consequently, the trial court did not err in granting the motion for summary
disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
10
See Vanguard Ins v Bolt, 204 Mich App 271, 276; 514 NW2d 525 (1994).
11
See MCR 2.116(G)(4).
12
See Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 432; 526 NW2d 879 (1994).
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