PEOPLE OF MI V JOSEPH O LOGAN JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 3, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 230163
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-005408
JOSEPH O. LOGAN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Hood and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of fourth-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC IV), MCL 750.520e(1)(b) (sexual contact through force or coercion), after
he slapped his co-worker’s buttock and grabbed her breast. He was sentenced to six months’
incarceration and appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
The complainant and defendant were both managers at a McDonald’s restaurant. On
March 21, 2000 the complainant and defendant were working together. According to testimony
adduced at trial, defendant and another employee, Deverell Morgan, were standing in the grill
area. When the complainant walked through this area, defendant allegedly “smacked” her on the
buttock. Later that same evening, defendant once again touched the complainant’s buttock as he
passed by her advising, “have a good day.” At this time, the complainant did not report these
incidents to her immediate supervisor.
On April 4, 2000, the complainant and defendant once again worked the same shift.
According to the complainant, this time defendant summoned her to the front counter whereupon
he used distasteful terms to describe her breasts, placed his right arm over her shoulders and
proceeded to “grab” her left breast. After this incident, the complainant advised the store
manager of defendant’s conduct. According to plaintiff, she filed a police report the following
day. As a result of this incident, defendant was charged with two counts of criminal sexual
conduct, fourth-degree. Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty on both counts.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
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II. Sufficiency of Factual Findings
First, defendant argues that the trial court erred because it did not sufficiently articulate
its factual findings and conclusions of law supporting defendant’s conviction as required by
MCR 2.517(A)(1). We do not agree.
MCR 2.517(A)(1) requires a trial court sitting without a jury to make separate findings of
fact and conclusions of law before directing entry of the appropriate judgment. MCR 6.403;
People v Johnson (On Rehearing), 208 Mich App 137, 141; 526 NW2d 617 (1994). A trial court
need not make specific findings as regards each element of the crime to comply with the dictates
of MCR 2.517(A)(1). People v Legg, 197 Mich App 131, 134; 494 NW2d 797 (1992). The
purpose underlying this articulation rule is to facilitate appellate review. Johnson, supra at 141.
Consequently, remand for articulation is not necessary “where it is manifest that the court was
aware of the factual issues and resolved them and it would not facilitate appellate review to
require further explication of the path the court followed in reaching the result.” Id. at 141-142;
Legg, supra.
We review the trial court’s findings de novo to the extent necessary to discern whether
the trial court was aware of the factual issues and correctly applied the law. People v Vaughn,
186 Mich App 376, 384; 465 NW2d 365 (1991). Our review of the record reveals that the trial
court fully complied with the applicable standard.
The instant case presents a classic example of a credibility contest between testifying
witnesses which the trial court, as the finder of fact, resolved in the complainant’s favor. The
complainant testified that defendant slapped her buttock and grabbed her breast resulting in
“sexual contact” as required by the governing statute. Furthermore, slapping and grabbing
constitute sufficient “force” for purposes of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct because
slapping and grabbing both require an individual to exert strength or power upon the person of
another. See People v Premo, 213 Mich App 406, 409; 540 NW2d 715 (1995) (wherein the
court discussed the definition of the term “force” to conclude that the act of pinching is an act of
physical force for purposes of forth-degree criminal sexual conduct.)
The testimony adduced at trial adequately established that defendant engaged in sexual
contact with the complainant by the imposition of force or coercion as required to find defendant
guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth-degree. On the record here before us, it is clear
that the trial court was aware of the factual issues and correctly applied the law; further
explication “of the path the court followed in reaching the result” would not facilitate this
Court’s review. Johnson, supra at 141-142; see also Legg, supra at 134-135; People v Vaughn,
186 Mich App 376, 384; 465 NW2d 365 (1990). In light of the limited evidence and simple
legal and factual issues raised by the parties, we find that the trial court’s factual findings and
conclusions of law meet the requirements of MCR 2.517 (A)(1) and MCR 6.403.
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III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Next, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because
trial counsel failed to articulate a defense theory, waived both opening and closing arguments
and failed to thoroughly and vigorously cross-examine the complainant. Pursuant to People v
Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), claims for ineffective assistance of counsel
should be raised by a motion for a new trial or evidentiary hearing. Since defendant did not
procure a ruling by the trial court on this issue, defendant’s claim for the ineffective assistance of
counsel is forfeited save for a review of the existing record. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393,
423; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). To set forth a viable claim for the ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant must establish deficient performance by counsel and a reasonable probability that but
for that deficiency, the result would have been different. See People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594
NW2d 57 (1999) citing People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115; 545 NW2d 637 (1996); Snider, supra,
at 423-424.
A review of the record does not support defendant’s position. The trial was very short
and essentially a question of the complainant’s credibility. The trial court was clearly aware of
the issues. A party’s theory of the case necessarily derives from the specific evidence that trial
counsel decides to produce along with certain witnesses trial counsel decides to present. These
are matters of and concerning trial strategy. See People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601
NW2d 887 (1999). This Court will decline to substitute its judgment for that of counsel on
matters pertaining to trial strategy and with the benefit of hindsight, will similarly decline to
assess trial counsel’s competence. Rockey, supra at 76-77.
Defendant also cites trial counsel’s waiver of opening and closing argument as an
additional basis supporting his claim for the ineffective assistance of counsel. Again, we
disagree. The central issue at trial revolved around the complainant’s credibility. We find no
support in the record that the outcome of the trial would have been different had trial counsel
delivered an opening and a closing argument to the court. Moreover, the prosecutor waived
argument as well. We find that defense counsel’s decision to forego opening and closing
argument was a matter of sound trial strategy which we decline to review or otherwise disturb.
Finally, defendant argues that defense counsel failed to vigorously and thoroughly crossexamine the complainant regarding allegedly inconsistent statements made by the complainant
and contained in an investigator’s report complied in response to the incident. We do not agree.
A review of the record does not reveal that defense counsel failed to adequately cross-examine
the complainant. Moreover, the investigator’s report to which defendant refers is not part of the
record and the alleged “error” in failing to refer to the report is not apparent on the face of the
existing record. Consequently, this alleged error is beyond the scope of this Court’s review.
Accordingly, we find that defendant failed to overcome the presumption of effective
assistance of counsel and further establish that but for these alleged errors, the outcome of the
trial would have been different. People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 559;
620 NW2d 19 (2000); Rockey, supra at 76.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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