IN RE BRETT & SAMANTHA WRIGHT MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of J.B. and K.B., Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 26, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 233014
Allegan Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-023301-NA
LENA BOWRING,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DANIEL BOWRING,
Respondent.
In the Matter of B.W., JR., and S.W., Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 233015
Allegan Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-024285-NA
LENA BOWRING,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BRETT WRIGHT, SR.,
Respondent.
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Before: Gage, P.J., and Griffin and G. S. Buth*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court
order terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). We
affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory ground for termination was
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337;
45 NW2d 161 (1989). The trial court correctly concluded, based on testimony from the
children’s therapists and documents contained in the lower court record, that the care the
children received from respondent-appellant in the past was not emotionally or physically
adequate to enable them to grow up as healthy children.
Respondent-appellant made some progress in improving her parenting abilities through
parenting classes and counseling and did not appear to need further technical instruction on
raising and disciplining the children. However, respondent-appellant did not progress in
establishing an independent, stable lifestyle. She had a twelve-year history, since age sixteen, of
making poor choices. She chose abusive men to live with, consistently broke the law which
caused her to lose her driver’s license at least twice and serve jail time for a felony conviction,
and ignored her obligation to pay for rent, restitution, and traffic fines. Just during the course of
these proceedings, respondent-appellant was evicted from two rental apartments and burned out
of a trailer, lost all of her possessions twice, was incarcerated three times (a fourth incarceration
occurred at the conclusion of the termination hearing), and seriously injured in a car accident.
While not all of her incarcerations were for additional criminal activity, some were for failure to
pay child support and restitution, most of respondent-appellant’s difficulties were brought about
by her own poor judgment.
In the year-and-a-half prior to the termination hearing, respondent-appellant had four
different jobs, was homeless for a time, resided with her sister, and also resided in the trailer that
burned, in an apartment from which she was evicted, in a cabin, and lastly with Junior. She
asserted that she had found stability with Junior but had only resided with him for five to six
months at the time of the termination hearing. Junior was not yet divorced.
Respondent-appellant brought to light facts about her physical and sexual abuse as a child
just two months prior to the termination hearing. Although she felt she had dealt with that issue,
her counselor believed she needed therapy for it because it would affect the way she raised her
children.
The conclusion of the numerous members of the Family Assessment Clinic team, several
FIA caseworkers and the children’s therapists was that, although respondent-appellant was of
normal intelligence, likeable, and had no substance abuse issues, she was not able to provide the
minimally sufficient care for the children at the time of the termination hearing or in the near
future. The possibility that she would be able to do so was described as “slim” and at a
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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“substantial risk” of reoccurring parenting problems, and returning the children to her was
described as using the children as guinea pigs. Two years after losing custody of her children,
respondent-appellant had still not exhibited the stability, competence, and good judgment
required for raising four children with psychological needs. The children would be less
emotionally damaged if allowed to maintain some contact with respondent-appellant, but
termination was considered best even if no contact was possible.
After weighing the testimony of the many witnesses and the testimony revealing twelve
years of respondent-appellant’s poor judgment against respondent-appellant’s argument that she
had had a stable life for the past five to six months, the trial court correctly concluded that there
was no reasonable likelihood that respondent-appellant would be able to provide proper care and
custody of the children within a reasonable time. The trial court did not err in determining that
clear and convincing evidence supported termination of respondent-appellant's parental rights
pursuant to §19b(3)(g).
Finally, the trial court did not err in finding that termination was in the children’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent-appellant’s parental rights to the
children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ George S. Buth
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