PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES HOWARD WINCHESTER SR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 26, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 228314
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 99-002764-FC
JAMES HOWARD WINCHESTER, SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of four counts of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520b(1)(c), and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of
four to fifteen years for each conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues first that the trial court impermissibly broadened the scope of the
informations when it instructed the jury that it must find that the charged offenses were
committed between 1987 and 1996. Defendant failed to object to the jury instructions and,
therefore, review is forfeited absent manifest injustice. MCL 768.29; People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 764-765; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Here, the date range in the jury instructions
matched that stated on the informations. Further, the information, which included more specific
time frames for each of the counts, was read to the jury. Therefore, we find no manifest
injustice.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to quash
the informations. We review the denial of a motion to quash an information for abuse of
discretion. People v Naugle, 152 Mich App 227, 233; 393 NW2d 592 (1986). The purpose of a
criminal information is to apprise a defendant of the “offense with which he is charged.” People
v Rios, 386 Mich 172, 175; 191 NW2d 297 (1971). A criminal information must be as specific
as possible after a reasonably thorough investigation. Naugle, supra at 234; see MCR 6.112(D);
MCL 767.51. However, an imprecise time allegation is acceptable for sexual offenses involving
children in light of their difficulty in recalling precise dates. Naugle, supra at 234 n 1. Further,
time is not an element of a sexual assault offense. Id. at 235. The trial court’s finding that the
two to three year time frame in each information complied with the rule in Naugle is not grossly
violative of fact and logic, People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996), and
therefore we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to quash.
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Defendant next argues that the court erred by denying him permission to ask the victims
about the physical, emotional, and educational effects of his alleged assaults. We disagree.
Injury to the victims is not an element of any of the charges against defendant and, therefore, this
evidence was not relevant to any fact at issue. MRE 402. Hence, we find no abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673
(1998).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury
on the cognate lesser included offense of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC IV), MCL
750.520e. People v Corbiere, 220 Mich App 260, 264-265; 559 NW2d 666 (1996). We review
a request for instruction on a cognate included lesser misdemeanor offense for abuse of
discretion. People v Stephens, 416 Mich 252, 265; 330 NW2d 675 (1982).
Lesser included cognate offenses must be consistent with the evidence and the
defendant’s theory of the case. People v Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 253; 562 NW2d 447 (1997).
Here, the offense of CSC IV was consistent with the evidence. However, defendant’s theory of
the case was that the charges against him were “exaggerations and imaginations” and were too
old to be proven or disproven, not that he had satisfied one or more elements of CSC IV but not
CSC I and II. Therefore, CSC IV was not an appropriate cognate included lesser offense in this
case, and the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing defendant’s request.
Defendant next makes three arguments regarding evidentiary rulings of the trial court.
First, defendant argues the court prevented him from rehabilitating a witness by introduction of
her prior consistent testimony. Any error in failing to allow defendant to present the prior
testimony was harmless under the circumstance that the clear import of the witness’ testimony
was that she did not remember a time when defendant and the girls slept at her house at the same
time, although it was possible.
Second, defendant argues the court erred in preventing him from eliciting prior
inconsistent statements of the victims from two non-victim witnesses. In both cases, the court
ruled that defendant had to challenge the victims directly with their inconsistent statements
before admitting third-party proof of those statements. Although a witness need no longer be
confronted with a prior inconsistent statement before its introduction, MRE 613(b), that is still
the preferred method and the trial court had discretion to require it. People v Parker, 230 Mich
App 677, 683; 584 NW2d 753 (1998). We further note that as to one complainant any error
would be harmless because the jury acquitted as to that complainant, and as to the other
complainant defendant did not seek to recall the witness after the victim testified. Therefore, we
find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling.
Finally, defendant argues that admission of testimony by four witnesses regarding out of
court statements made by three victims constituted improper bolstering of those victims’
accusations and testimony. The court gave a curative instruction to the jury regarding one
witness’ testimony, thereby rendering any error in its admission harmless, People v Graves, 458
Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998), and the testimony of another witness was harmless
because it did not include any statements by the victims. However, the two other witnesses did
repeat out-of-court statements made by the victims, and the court admonished the witnesses and
prosecutor in response to defendant’s objections.
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As a general rule, neither a prosecutor nor anyone else is permitted to bolster a witness’
testimony by referring to prior consistent statements of that witness. People v Rosales, 160 Mich
App 304, 308; 408 NW2d 140 (1987). However, prior consistent statements are admissible to
rebut a charge of recent fabrication or as evidence of whether a witness has made a prior
inconsistent statement. People v Washington, 100 Mich App 628, 632; 300 NW2d 347 (1980).
The hearsay statements of the victims do not fit either of these exceptions. Therefore, their
admission was an error of law. Rosales, supra at 308.
Errors in the admission of evidence are nonconstitutional and subject to harmless error
analysis. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 297; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). A defendant must show
the error more probably than not caused a miscarriage of justice. Carines, supra at 774. A
miscarriage of justice results when the reliability of the verdict has been undermined. People v
Whittaker, 465 Mich 422, 427; 635 NW2d 687 (2001). Whether that has occurred depends on
“the nature of the error in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence.” Id.
In People v Straight, 430 Mich 418; 424 NW2d 257 (1988), the Supreme Court faced this
issue in a similar context. The defendant was convicted of CSC II involving a four-year-old girl.
Id. at 420. The victim testified to the assault, and her mother and father also testified regarding
statements she had made one month after the alleged incident. Id. at 421, n 1. Because the case
was a “one-to-one credibility contest between the child and [the] defendant,” the Court found
admission of the parents’ testimony constituted a miscarriage of justice requiring reversal
because it improperly bolstered the child’s accusation. Id. at 427-428. In so finding, the Court
noted that the prosecution had emphasized the prohibited hearsay in its closing. Id. at 426-427.
This case was similarly a credibility contest between defendant and the victims because
there were no witnesses to the alleged assaults. However, the prohibited hearsay in this case
amounted to a few general words, as opposed to the specific, detailed testimony by the child’s
parents in Straight. The strength of the parents’ testimony in Straight outweighed the untainted
testimony of their five-year-old child and placed the reliability of the verdict in question.
Whittaker, supra at 427. The minor character of the hearsay in this case was more than offset by
the untainted testimony of the teenage victims. Therefore, the reliability of the verdict was not
placed in question, and the error was harmless. Id.; Carines, supra at 774.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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