PEOPLE OF MI V ALBERT ALAN WRIGHT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 26, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224920
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-168476-FH
ALBERT ALAN WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Gage and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(3). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to
four to twenty years’ imprisonment, with no credit for time served. Defendant appeals as of
right. We affirm defendant’s conviction, but remand for further proceedings with respect to his
sentence.
We first address defendant’s contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance. This Court reviews for an
abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for a new trial, but reviews de
novo a trial court’s determination whether counsel was ineffective. People v Kevorkian, 248
Mich App 373, 410-411; 639 NW2d 291 (2001).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms. The defendant further must demonstrate that a reasonable probability exists that but for
counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different and that the attendant
proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702,
714; ___ NW2d ___ (2001).
Defendant primarily argues that he received ineffective assistance because trial counsel
lacked experience in trial procedure. Defendant asserts that trial counsel had difficulty admitting
evidence, cross examining witnesses, and that he did not know how to request that the jury be
permitted to view the crime scene. After reviewing the record, we note that certain portions of
the trial transcripts raise an inference that trial counsel was somewhat inexperienced in trial
procedure. However, inexperience alone is not a sufficient reason to conclude that defense
counsel acted deficiently or in a manner that prejudiced the defendant. Kevorkian, supra at 415.
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While defendant complains that his counsel had difficulty entering exhibits into evidence, the
record reflects that defense counsel entered several exhibits into evidence and defendant provides
no specific example of any evidence that counsel failed to successfully admit. That the trial
court sustained several objections to defense counsel’s sometimes repetitive cross examination of
witnesses did not detract from counsel’s otherwise thorough questioning of the police
surveillance team members regarding their opportunities to observe defendant at the time of the
crime and the inconsistencies in their testimony. Defense counsel did seek to recall the victim to
the stand after she had been excused, but defendant does not explain why counsel should have
reserved the right to recall her. We further note that although it does not appear that trial counsel
requested that the jury be allowed to view the crime scene,1 both defense counsel and the
prosecutor introduced many photographs of the victim’s house and the surrounding
neighborhood, the trial witnesses testified with the aid of the photographs and a map of the area,
and defendant fails to explain how a view of the crime scene would have affected his case.2
We cannot conclude that any of defense counsel’s conduct qualified as objectively
unreasonable. Moreover, defendant fails to even allege that any of defense counsel’s conduct
prejudiced him. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by not granting him credit toward his
sentence for jail time that he served in Macomb County before the instant trial. Following his
October 1997 arrest for the instant offense, defendant obtained release on bond and absconded.
On August 1, 1998, defendant was arrested in Macomb County on unrelated charges. Defendant
stood trial and was convicted for the Macomb County offense. Defendant was sentenced for the
Macomb County conviction on April 19, 1999 and remained incarcerated for this crime until
June 16, 1999 when his conviction was overturned. According to defendant, he was not released
from custody, however, because of the existing warrant relating to the instant charge. The record
is unclear exactly when defendant arrived in Oakland County, but defendant apparently arrived
sometime during August or September 1999. Defendant’s preliminary examination took place
on September 23, 1999, after which he was bound over on the instant charge, and on October 18,
1999 the trial court reinstated defendant’s personal bond. Defendant’s trial began on December
16, 1999.
The trial court determined that defendant was entitled to no credit for any of the time that
he served. The court reasoned that with respect to “the period of incarceration on the Macomb
County conviction, Defendant was not incarcerated as a result of the instant offense.” The trial
court also concluded that no time that defendant spent incarcerated between the vacation of his
Macomb County conviction and his instant conviction could be credited against his sentence for
1
Defense counsel did request that part of a witness’ testimony be completed at the scene of the
crime, but the trial court denied the request as irrelevant and cumulative.
2
Defendant also suggests that his counsel won a motion to strike a key prosecution witness, but
then inexcusably allowed the prosecutor to call the witness to testify. This argument wholly
lacks merit because a reading of the transcript reveals that defense counsel lost his motion to
strike the witness. Moreover, defendant offers no explanation how the witness’ testimony
prejudiced him.
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the instant crime because “Defendant was on parole at the time he committed the instant
offense.”
The trial court correctly determined that defendant should receive no credit toward his
instant sentence for the time that he spent in jail between his August 1, 1998 arrest on the
Macomb County charge and the vacation of the Macomb County conviction. The relevant
statutory provision provides as follows:
Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state
and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or
unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, the trial court in
imposing sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such
time served in jail prior to sentencing. [MCL 769.11b (emphasis added).]
Section 11b neither requires nor permits sentence credit in cases like this where a defendant is
incarcerated as a result of charges arising out of an unrelated offense or circumstance and then
seeks credit in another case for the unrelated period of confinement. People v Ovalle, 222 Mich
App 463, 468-469; 564 NW2d 147 (1997), quoting People v Prieskorn, 424 Mich 327, 340; 381
NW2d 646 (1985). Because the record reflects that defendant spent time incarcerated in
Macomb County on a charge unrelated to the instant crime, and contains no indication that
defendant spent any time incarcerated in Macomb County because of his inability to post bond
for the instant offense, we conclude that defendant is entitled to no credit for the time he served
related to his Macomb County offense.
With respect to the period that defendant spent incarcerated between the vacation of his
Macomb County conviction and his conviction of the instant offense, the trial court correctly
observed that defendant could not receive any credit toward his instant sentence for this period if
defendant was on parole when he committed the instant offense. The Legislature has provided as
follows:
If a person is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a
felony committed while the person was on parole from a sentence for a previous
offense, the term of imprisonment imposed for the later offense shall begin to run
at the expiration of the remaining portion of the term of imprisonment imposed
for the previous offense. [MCL 768.7a(2).]
See also People v Johnson, 205 Mich App 144, 146-147; 517 NW2d 273 (1994) (explaining that
when a parolee violates parole he becomes liable to serve out the unexpired portion of maximum
imprisonment for the paroled offense, which must be served before a sentence for a second
offense may begin); People v Watts, 186 Mich App 686, 687; 464 NW2d 715 (1991) (observing
that “[b]ecause defendant was on parole at the time of the instant offense, the sentence for the
instant offense must be consecutive to the sentence for which he was on parole).
While it is clear that defendant’s status as a parolee would preclude him from applying
any time served between the vacation of his Macomb County conviction and his instant
conviction toward satisfaction of his instant sentence, defendant’s parole status appears less
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clear. The trial court stated that defendant was on parole, but the existing record leaves us
unable to substantiate this fact.3 Defendant’s presentence information report also states that
defendant “was on parole at the time of the instant offense,” but does not explain for which of his
several convictions he was on parole. None of the parties’ arguments before the trial court or on
appeal explain for exactly what offense defendant was on parole. The prosecutor merely asserts
that defendant indeed was paroled when he committed this offense, and defendant, while initially
conceding this fact, avers that he nonetheless is entitled to credit toward his instant sentence
because “he has been discharged from parole on his prior sentence.”
The legal issue presented remains clear: if defendant was on parole when he committed
the instant crime he cannot receive any credit toward his instant sentence for the time he served
between the vacation of his Macomb County conviction and his instant conviction. Without
more specific information, however, regarding (1) the exact amount of time defendant spent
incarcerated between the vacation of his Macomb County conviction and his instant conviction
and (2) defendant’s parole status at the time of the instant offense, i.e., for what crime defendant
was serving a sentence and what sentence term he received for this crime, we cannot determine
whether the trial court properly denied defendant any credit for time served. Accordingly, we
remand this case to the trial court for the limited purpose of ascertaining these matters and
granting defendant credit for any time served, limited to the period between the vacation of his
Macomb County conviction in June 1999 and his instant conviction in January 2000, that does
not apply to a previously imposed sentence for which defendant was on parole.
Defendant further suggests that he is entitled to credit as a matter of due process because
the denial of credit violates his protection against double jeopardy and his equal protection
rights. We decline to address this issue, however, because defendant failed to raise it in his
statement of questions presented on appeal and offers minimal analysis and relevant authority to
support his claim. People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735, 748; 610 NW2d 234 (2000); People v
Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
We affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence, but remand to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
3
Defendant’s instant judgment of sentence does not mention his parole status at the time of this
offense and does not state that his instant sentence is to be served consecutively to any
previously imposed term, but merely reflects that defendant received no credit for any time
served and that “[t]his sentence shall be executed immediately.”
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