PEOPLE OF MI V ERIC DUSHAN CRISP JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 23, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224307
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 98-029506-FH
ERIC DUSHAN CRISP, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Hood and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 225 or
more, but less than 650 grams, of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii). Defendant was sentenced as
a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to twenty-four to forty-five years’ imprisonment. He
appeals as of right. We affirm.
The police obtained information from an informant that defendant would be arriving at
the Detroit Metropolitan Airport and that he would be carrying a large quantity of cocaine.
Based on this information, the police set up surveillance and followed defendant as he left the
airport in a car being driven by Derrick Mitchell. Eventually, Trooper Carlson pulled the car
over for exceeding the speed limit and having a cracked windshield. During the traffic stop, the
police officer obtained consent from Mitchell and defendant to search the car and the black
duffle bag in the trunk.
After a cursory search of the vehicle and defendant’s luggage, Trooper Carlson requested
a narcotics search dog. The narcotics search dog alerted to defendant’s luggage and the front
floor boards on the passenger side of the car.1 Trooper Carlson asked defendant to remove his
shoes and socks. The dog bit into one of the shoes and white powder began seeping out of it.
Trooper Carlson removed the insoles from defendant’s shoes and located a clear plastic bag of
white powder in each of the hollowed-out heels. The shoes in defendant’s black bag were also
searched and a total of eight bags were found.
1
During trial, Toro, the narcotics search dog, was described as an “aggressive alert dog.”
According to Officer Michael Corbett, Toro’s handler, Toro bites or scratches at an object to
indicate the presence of narcotics.
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I. Derrick Mitchell
Defendant argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when
the trial court declined his request to call Derrick Mitchell, who was revealed during trial to be
the police informant, to testify. Further, defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to
give an instruction to the jury that Mitchell refused to testify. We disagree. Because this
argument implicates defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, we apply review de
novo. People v Beasley, 239 Mich 548, 557; 609 NW2d 581 (2000). However, to the extent
defendant’s claim involves matters of evidentiary error, we review the trial court’s decision for
an abuse of discretion. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Claims of
instructional error are reviewed de novo. People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459,
487; 552 NW2d 493 (1996).
A. Defendant’s Right of Confrontation
In People v Gearns, 457 Mich 170; 577 NW2d 422 (1998), overruled on other grounds in
Lukity, supra at 494, a majority of justices concurred with the following principles set out in
Justice Brickley’s opinion:
A defendant has the constitutional right to confront witnesses against him,
primarily secured by the right to cross-examination. In the instant cases, there
was no testimony given by the witnesses on which the defendants could have
cross-examined them. . . .
[T]he principal protection provided by the Confrontation Clause to a
criminal defendant is the right to conduct cross-examination. Moreover, the
Confrontation Clause only guarantees “an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish.”
***
Implicit in the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence is that
a witness must put forth some testimony before the defendant’s right of
confrontation comes into play. A defendant has no right to confront a witness
who does not provide any evidence at trial. A mere inference is simply
insufficient for a Confrontation Clause violation.
. . . A defendant is only guaranteed an opportunity for cross-examination;
however, there must first be something of substance to cross-examine. We agree
with the Colorado Supreme Court that, where a witness does not testify about
matters beyond preliminary information, i.e., matters that have no bearing on the
outcome of the case, there is nothing for the defendant to cross-examine, and the
policies underlying this constitutional right do not come into play. Thus, before a
defendant can be denied effective cross-examination, some substantive testimony
or its equivalent must come to pass in order for the right to confrontation arise.
[Gearns, supra at 185-187 (citations omitted).]
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In the case at bar, the prosecution downplayed Mitchell’s role and referred to him only to
the extent that he was the informant who provided the information that led to the surveillance
and stop of defendant. Indeed, the prosecution never called Mitchell as a witness. Rather, to
prove its case the prosecution relied on the evidence gathered during the stop of the vehicle,
Trooper Carlson’s testimony, testimony from the dog handler, and testimony about defendant’s
post-arrest confession.
It was only at defendant’s request that Mitchell was produced at trial outside of the jury’s
presence. Nonetheless, when questioned regarding his involvement, Mitchell adamantly refused
to testify on the grounds that he was in fear for his life. Indeed, Mitchell stated this sentiment
repeatedly and without any indication that he was going to change his mind and testify. Because
Mitchell refused to testify, there was no substantive testimony or its equivalent upon which
defendant could cross-examine him. See Gearns, supra at 185-187. Thus, defendant was not
denied his right of confrontation and his claim that Mitchell was a key to conviction is
unsupported by the record. Id.
B. Evidentiary Error
At the very least, defendant argues that he should have been allowed to call Mitchell to
the stand so that the jury could hear his refusal to testify. Defendant’s contention that he had the
“right to compel the witness to testify, however limited that testimony might be, even if that
testimony only consisted of a statement that the witness was fearful of law enforcement” is
unsupported by any authority. An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it
to this Court to rationalize the basis for his claims. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641;
588 NW2d 480 (1998). Thus, this issue is not properly presented for appeal.
We note, nevertheless, that defendant’s argument presents a claim of evidentiary error.
See Gearns, supra at 193. However, there is no authority supporting defendant’s position that he
is entitled to call a witness to the stand, knowing that the witness will refuse to testify. In People
v Dyer, 425 Mich 572, 580-582; 390 NW2d 645 (1986), the Court held that neither the defense
nor the prosecution could call a witness solely to have him assert his Fifth Amendment privilege
in front of the jury. While defendant agrees with this argument, he claims that the Fifth
Amendment privilege was never asserted in this case and that the jury should have been allowed
to hear Mitchell’s refusal to testify.
In Gearns, supra, a majority of justices agreed that the validity or invalidity of the
privilege being asserted by a witness did not change the analysis of whether the jury should hear
a witness’ refusal to testify:
[T]he matter should be treated without the presence of the jury, and, if the
court determines that the privilege is not valid, it should be determined outside the
jury’s presence whether the witness will continue to refuse to testify. If the
witness does refuse, contempt of court and removal should also take place outside
of the jury’s presence.
Thus, the judge must hold a hearing outside the jury’s presence to
determine if the witness’ privilege is valid, explaining the privilege to the witness.
If the court concludes the privilege is not valid, it must determine whether the
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witness intends to proceed with asserting an invalid privilege. If the witness does
so intend, then the witness may not be called. [Id. at 202.]
Mitchell’s explanation that he would not testify on the grounds that he feared for his life, as
opposed to invoking the Fifth Amendment, is an invalid reason for refusing to testify.
Regardless, silence should not be allowed to support an inference for either the prosecution or
the defense. Dyer, supra at 581. The Court in Gearns, supra at 202, clearly states that if a
witness refuses to testify on the basis of an invalid privilege then the witness may not be called.
Moreover, defendant fails to explain how Mitchell’s testimony was relevant to any determination
the jury was asked to make. See MRE 401; MRE 402. The fact that Mitchell felt threatened
does not have a tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it precluded the jury from hearing Mitchell.
C. Jury Instruction
Defendant further argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury that defense
counsel put a witness on the stand to testify “on behalf” of defendant and that the witness
“simply refused to testify.” However, there was no evidence that Mitchell would have testified
“on behalf” of defendant. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the Court in Gearns did not
indicate that such an instruction should be given. In Gearns, supra at 202-203, the Court
realized that where “a party does not produce or call a codefendant or a witness to substantiate a
claim of innocence or guilt, the jury may draw an adverse inference from the absence of this
evidence.” Therefore, a neutralizing instruction, explaining that the jury may not draw an
inference from the absence of certain witnesses or speculate about the possible nature of their
testimony “should be given when requested.” Id. In this case, defendant did not request a
neutralizing instruction. Moreover, defendant’s requested instruction would improperly imply
that testimony favorable to him was not heard. Thus, the trial court properly refused to give the
instruction.
II. Instructional Errors
Defendant also alleges that the trial court committed several instructional errors. It is the
function of the trial court to clearly present the case to the jury and instruct them on the
applicable law. People v Katt, 248 Mich App 282, 310; 639 NW2d 815 (2001).
We review jury instructions in their entirety to determine if error requiring
reversal occurred. The instructions must not be “‘extracted piecemeal to establish
error.’” Even if the instructions are somewhat imperfect, reversal is not required
as long as they fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected the
defendant's rights. . . . With regard to unpreserved claims of instructional error,
this Court reviews such claims for plain error that affected substantial rights.
[People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 124-125; 631 NW2d 67 (2001) (citations
omitted).]
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A. Specific Intent
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it refused to give CJI2d 3.9, the standard
specific intent instruction, upon defendant’s request. We agree that CJI2d 3.9 was applicable to
this case because intent was a disputed issue.2 Thus, prudence would dictate that the specific
intent instruction should have been given. Nonetheless, we do not find that reversal is required.
In this case, the jury was instructed that defendant could not be convicted unless it determined
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly possessed cocaine, that he intended to
deliver it to a third person, and that the cocaine was in a mixture that weighed 225 grams or
more, but less than 650 grams. The trial court also instructed the jury that “delivery means that
the defendant transferred or attempted to transfer the substance to another person knowing that it
was cocaine and intending to transfer it to that person.” Reading the instructions as a whole, the
jury could not have convicted defendant unless they found that he specifically intended to
transfer it to a third person. Because the jury instructions substantially covered the requisite
intent for the crime, they adequately protected defendant’s rights and there was no error
requiring reversal. See People v Canales, 243 Mich App 571, 574; 624 NW2d 439 (2001);
People v Moldenhauer, 210 Mich App 158, 159-160; 533 NW2d 9 (1995). “[F]airness, not
perfection, is the standard for jury instructions.” People v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 361; 619
NW2d 413 (2000).
B. Lesser Offenses
Defendant also requested that the jury be instructed on the lesser included offense of
possession with intent to deliver 50 or more, but less than 225 grams, of cocaine, MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(iii). Delivery of a lesser amount of cocaine is a cognate lesser offense. People v
Marji, 180 Mich App 525, 530-531; 447 NW2d 835 (1989). “When the lesser crime in question
is a cognate offense, the court must examine the evidence presented and give the instruction
when the evidence adduced would support a conviction for the lesser offense.” Id. at 530. In
this case, there was no evidence that defendant possessed less than 225 grams of cocaine.
Defendant failed to argue or present evidence that the cocaine discovered in his luggage did not
belong to him. Rather, the evidence at trial, including defendant’s confession, demonstrated that
all the cocaine recovered was in defendant’s possession. Thus, the trial court properly refused to
instruct on the requested lesser offense.
C. Reasonable Doubt
Defendant further contends that the standard reasonable doubt instruction given by the
trial court mandates reversal because it was structural error.3 Specifically, defendant contends
that the instruction lacked the required “moral certainty” language or “hesitate to act” language.
This argument is meritless. As recognized by this Court in People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393,
2
We note the use of standard criminal jury instructions is not mandatory. People v Stephan, 241
Mich App 482, 496; 616 NW2d 188 (2000).
3
We note that defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
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420-421; 608 NW2d 502 (2000), the standard jury instruction, CJI2d 3.2, properly and
sufficiently conveys the concept of reasonable doubt.
III. Suppression of Evidence
Defendant next alleges that the cocaine seized was the “fruit” of an illegal search and that
the trial court clearly erred in denying his motion to suppress. In particular, defendant claims
that the police officer’s search of his shoes and duffle bag was improper and without probable
cause. We disagree. We review the trial court’s finding that defendant validly consented to the
search for clear error. People v Goforth, 222 Mich App 306, 310; 564 NW2d 526 (1997).
However, the trial court’s ultimate decision to deny defendant’s motion to suppress is reviewed
de novo. People v Beuschlein, 245 Mich App 744, 748; 630 NW2d 921 (2001).
The right against unreasonable search and seizures is protected by both the state and
federal constitutions. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; People v Kazmierczak, 461
Mich 411, 417; 605 NW2d 667 (2000). “The lawfulness of a search or seizure depends on its
reasonableness.” Snider, supra at 406. A warrantless search is generally considered
unreasonable absent both probable cause and a situation establishing an exception to the warrant
requirement. Id. at 407. However, “[o]ne established exception to the general warrant and
probable cause requirements is a search conducted pursuant to consent.” People v BorchardRuhland, 460 Mich 278, 294; 597 NW2d 1 (1999).
Whether consent to search is freely and voluntarily given is a question of fact based on
the totality of the circumstances. Id. An individual’s knowledge of the right to refuse consent is
one factor to consider but is not necessarily a prerequisite for consent to be valid. Id. However,
“the presence of coercion or duress normally militates against a finding of voluntariness.” Id.
Coercive tactics, either from police questioning or conduct, or the existence of a coercive
atmosphere are relevant to determining if consent was voluntary. People v Klager, 107 Mich
App 812, 816-817; 310 NW2d 36 (1981). To this extent, courts must consider whether police
conduct would suggest to a reasonable person that he was free to decline their search request and
leave the area. See People v Bloxson, 205 Mich App 236, 242-243; 517 NW2d 563 (1994). The
scope of defendant’s consent is based on objective reasonableness or what a reasonable person
would have understood by the exchange between defendant and the police. People v Frohriep,
247 Mich App 692, 703; 637 NW2d 562 (2001).
In the instant case, defendant purports that his consent to the search was involuntary
because it was coerced. Defendant claims he was isolated from public contact and informed that
he could not leave. Additionally, defendant argues that the police did not advise him that he had
the right to decline their requests. Regardless, defendant contends that the police officers’ search
exceeded the scope of his consent.
The testimony at trial revealed that defendant was the passenger in a vehicle that was
legitimately stopped by the police for speeding and defective equipment. The driver of the
vehicle was arrested on outstanding warrants and agreed to a search of his vehicle. While
defendant could not drive the vehicle away because he was unlicensed, the police informed him
that he would be taken to the nearest exit, per police procedure, after the traffic stop was
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completed. Thereafter, defendant consented to the police officer’s request to search his person
and belongings. This consent was given without hesitation and defendant does not deny that he
agreed to the search. There is no evidence that defendant was unaware of his right to refuse the
police officer’s request or that he failed to possess sufficient intelligence to understand that he
was consenting to a search.4 Further, there is nothing in the record to suggest that defendant was
threatened or that he was under duress.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court properly
denied defendant’s motion to suppress on the grounds that defendant validly consented to the
search.
IV. Cumulative Errors
Defendant also argues that his conviction should be reversed because of cumulative error.
Because we find that there were no errors, the cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable.
V. Sentencing
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him
to a twenty-four year minimum term. Defendant argues that the trial court should have made a
downward departure from the statute’s mandatory twenty-year minimum sentence. We disagree.
This Court reviews sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. People v Compaeu, 244
Mich App 595, 598; 625 NW2d 120 (2001). There is no abuse of discretion if the sentence is
proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s prior record. Id. “If an
habitual offender’s underlying felony and criminal history demonstrate that he is unable to
conform his conduct to the law, a sentence within the statutory limit is proportionate.” Id. at
599.
According to MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii), the trial court was authorized to impose a
minimum sentence of not less than twenty or more than thirty years’ imprisonment. Thus,
contrary to defendant’s claim, the twenty-four year minimum sentence in this case is within the
permissible range and not an upward departure. Moreover, defendant’s status as a habitual
offender, MCL 769.10, permits sentence enhancement. People v Fetterly, 229 Mich App 511,
540; 583 NW2d 199 (1998). In People v Primer, 444 Mich 269, 271-275; 506 NW2d 839
(1993), our Supreme Court held that a minimum sentence falling within the statutory range was
proper and that a maximum sentence, greater than the statutory maximum, was permissible
where a defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender.
We also note that there is no merit to defendant’s argument that he was entitled to a
downward departure. While this may be defendant’s first drug offense, the objective and
4
We note that there was evidence presented of defendant’s previous exposure to the criminal
system.
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verifiable evidence in this case does not present substantial and compelling reasons warranting a
downward departure. See MCL 333.7401(4), People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 62; 528 NW2d 176
(1995). Indeed, defendant’s past criminal history included a serious assault conviction for which
he was on parole at the time he committed the instant offense.
Furthermore, we conclude that the sentence is proportional because it accurately reflects
the seriousness of the crime and defendant’s criminal history. Defendant admitted to
involvement in gang activity and his prior assault conviction stemmed from a gunfight that
culminated in a seven-year-old child being shot. At twenty-eight years of age, defendant lacked
any “real” employment history and was on “high risk” parole status at the time of the instant
crime. Moreover, the crime in this case involved a large quantity of cocaine that defendant hid
in a devious manner with the intent to deliver. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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