PEOPLE OF MI V CECIL RAYMOND HAWKINS JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 29, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 226718
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 99-002089-FC
CECIL RAYMOND HAWKINS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Griffin and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case centers upon the kidnapping and sexual assault of a female victim. After a
five-day trial, the jury convicted defendant on three counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520(b)(1)(c), and one count of kidnapping, MCL 750.349. The trial
court sentenced defendant to a term of thirty-three to fifty years’ imprisonment for each of the
CSC convictions, as well as life imprisonment for the kidnapping conviction. Defendant appeals
as of right from his convictions and sentences. We affirm.
Defendant first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to subpoena
a newspaper reporter to testify regarding an article which appeared in a local newspaper after the
jury had rendered its verdict. Defendant argues that the article raised the possibility that the jury
had been exposed to unadmitted evidence, during trial. In People v Morris, 12 Mich App 411,
416; 163 NW2d 16 (1968), this Court made clear that a trial court has discretion over whether to
subpoena a witness requested by a criminal defendant. Further, in People v Riley, 156 Mich App
396, 403; 401 NW2d 875 (1986), overruled on other grounds by People v Lane, 453 Mich 132,
138-139; 551 NW2d 382 (1996), this Court held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion to
subpoena witnesses where it does not prevent a defendant from issuing a subpoena and does not
otherwise interfere with a defendant’s right to compulsory process. In this case, the trial court
noted that the newspaper reporter was unwilling to voluntarily present himself for examination,
but that the reporter would be available if subpoenaed. Defendant did not move the court to
issue a subpoena, and did not exercise his right to compulsory process. Therefore, under Morris
and Riley, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to subpoena the
witness sua sponte.
Further, the trial court had good reason to believe that the reporter’s testimony was
unnecessary. Both jurors who testified after trial denied that they gained any knowledge of the
unadmitted evidence during trial. Juror Horstmann testified that her comments in the newspaper
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article related to evidence which was admitted at trial. Detective Peters testified that the other,
unadmitted evidence alluded to in the article was not physically present in the courtroom during
trial. This statement confirmed Horstmann’s testimony that she had not seen any exhibits lying
on the prosecution’s table during the trial. Given the absence of a motion by the defense to
subpoena the reporter as a witness, combined with the above testimony, we cannot say the trial
court abused its discretion in this regard.
Defendant also asserts that the jury improperly gained knowledge regarding his criminal
history, during trial. As evidence of this exposure, defendant points to a juror’s comment in the
above-referenced newspaper article that defendant was “frightening, not only for what he did . . .
but also for the plans he appeared to be making to do the same to more women.” However, the
juror testified that her comments related to a sheet of notebook paper which contained a plan of
how defendant would prepare for his attack, as well as a notebook listing names of other
companies which offered exotic dancing services. Both of these items were properly admitted
into evidence at trial. Given the lack of evidence that the jury was improperly exposed to
defendant’s criminal history during trial, defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.1
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor made improper remarks during his closing and
rebuttal arguments. We find no record support for defendant’s contention that the prosecutor
either referred to him a serial rapist or suggested that defendant would commit rapes in the
future. The closest any of the prosecutor’s comments come to what defendant alleges are the
following rebuttal comments:
[Defendant] tells her he’ll get away with it. He tells the police on the 22nd when
he’s panicking – he found out that we searched his house – and he tells the police,
there’s no way the victim could find me.
***
But he gets away with this. It absolutely is unsolved. And he’s free to do it again
if the mood strikes him. He has reason to feel confident. He’s done a lot of
planning. He has no need to rush and get rid of evidence; he’s not going to get
caught. And he wouldn’t have gotten caught except that Rachel Dornak had
caller ID.
These comments do not rise to the level of referring to defendant as a serial rapist. In
context, these comments refer to defendant’s state of mind regarding the crime and explain why
so much incriminating evidence was found in defendant’s home. Moreover, the prosecutor’s
comments were supported by evidence admitted at trial, including evidence that defendant had
names and telephone numbers of other exotic dancing companies, which tended to show that
1
Because defendant failed to present evidence that the jury actually gained knowledge regarding
his criminal history during trial, we need not address defendant’s argument that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to move for a new trial based on the jurors’
exposure to newspaper articles. Because defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to
raise this issue in the trial court, defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is without merit.
People v Sharbnow, 174 Mich App 94, 106; 435 NW2d 772 (1989).
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defendant might have been planning to commit similar crimes in the future. A prosecutor is free
to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence, as it relates to the
prosecutor’s theory of the case. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Given the supporting evidence for the prosecutor’s comments, no error occurred.2
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor exposed the jury to extraneous evidence when
he displayed white, nylon rope found inside the duffel bag seized at defendant’s home.
However, defendant did not file a contemporaneous objection in the trial court. “Appellate
review of allegedly improper conduct by the prosecutor is precluded where the defendant fails to
timely and specifically object; this Court will only review the defendant’s claim for plain error.”
People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
As defendant asserts, the record contains no indication that the rope was admitted into
evidence at trial. While the duffel bag itself was admitted, along with a photograph that showed
some of the bag’s contents, the transcript does not indicate which contents were revealed in the
photo. We conclude that plain error occurred because it does not appear that the rope was
admitted into evidence during trial. However, once plain error has been shown, a defendant must
establish that this plain error affected his substantial rights. This “generally requires a showing
of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Defendant fails to establish such prejudice.
The prosecutor made only brief reference to the rope, in context of other comments regarding
properly admitted evidence, such as a notebook containing a description of the victim, a ski mask
used when kidnapping the victim, a hood used by defendant when photographing the victim, and
flex cuffs used to bind the victim’s hands. We conclude that the presence of the rope in the
duffel bag and the prosecutor’s display of the rope to the jury did not create any real possibility
that the verdict would have been different without reference to this unadmitted evidence.
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during trial.
To establish that his right to effective assistance of counsel was so undermined that it justifies
reversal of an otherwise valid conviction, a defendant must show that his counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the representation so
prejudiced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Further, because no Ginther3 hearing was held in this case, our
review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Williams, 223 Mich App 409,
414; 566 NW2d 649 (1997).
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he advised
defendant to exercise his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf. US Const, Am XIV;
People v Solomon, 220 Mich App 527, 533; 560 NW2d 651 (1996). On the record before us,
2
Because the prosecutor did not commit misconduct with regard to his comments, we need not
address defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to those
comments. Defense counsel is not required to raise a meritless objection, and the failure to do so
does not constitute ineffective assistance. People v Kulpinski, 243 Mich App 8, 27; 620 NW2d
537 (2000).
3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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there is no evidence that would allow us to determine whether defendant independently decided
to exercise his constitutional right, or trial counsel urged defendant to take advantage of this
right. However, even assuming that it was trial counsel’s decision, we do not believe that this
denied defendant the effective assistance of counsel.
Defendant’s testimony was consistent with a trial strategy of showing that defendant and
the victim had consensual sex. In light of the victim’s testimony, along with the corroborating
evidence produced at trial, it was imperative for the defense to present some explanation of the
events that occurred on the evening in question. Defendant was the only witness, other than the
victim, who was present during the evening and his explanations were needed to support the
defense theory. Accordingly, we conclude that trial counsel’s representation did not fall below
an objective standard of reasonableness, even if counsel did urge defendant to testify on his own
behalf.
Defendant next claims that he was denied effective assistance by his trial counsel’s
failure to “move to quash based on a defective bind-over.” Defendant claims that the evidence
used to support his bindover was inadmissible and that he should not have been charged with
these crimes. However, defendant fails to indicate what evidence he believes to be inadmissible.
Indeed, the preliminary examination evidence used to support defendant’s bindover consisted of
the victim’s testimony regarding the kidnapping and sexual assaults, as well as Detective Peters’
testimony that the victim was kidnapped from a location within the jurisdiction of the 63rd
District Court. Therefore, we find no merit in defendant’s argument.
Defendant next argues that he was denied effective assistance by his trial counsel’s
failure to investigate and produce the two res gestae witnesses who worked at the gas station
where defendant stopped on the evening of the kidnapping. Defense counsel’s failure to call a
particular witness is presumed to be trial strategy, and this Court will not substitute its judgment
for that of trial counsel in matters of trial strategy. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 508; 597
NW2d 864 (1999). Moreover, the record is silent as to what these two proposed witnesses would
have testified. Accordingly, defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that, if defendant
counsel had called these witnesses, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
Id.
Defendant also argues that he was denied the right to have witnesses testify on his behalf
because the prosecutor did not produce the two above-referenced witnesses. However, defendant
does not assert that he requested police assistance in locating these witnesses, and does not assert
that the witnesses were unknown to him. The prosecutor does not have a duty to produce res
gestae witnesses. Rather, the prosecutor has a duty to provide notice of known witnesses and to
render reasonable assistance to locate witnesses on defendant’s request. People v Burwick, 450
Mich 281, 288-289; 537 NW2d 813 (1995). Because defendant knew of the witnesses and did
not request assistance in producing them for trial, defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.
Defendant next asserts that Kent County Sheriff Detectives illegally arrested him in
Mecosta County. We disagree. An officer from the Mecosta County Sheriff’s Department made
the initial traffic stop, and Kent County detectives then arrested defendant. We conclude that the
arrest was legal because Kent County detectives were working “in conjunction with” the
Mecosta County Sheriff’s Department when they arrested defendant. MCL 764.2a.
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Defendant next contends that police performed an unconstitutional search of his vehicle
during the a roadside stop. Defendant argues that during the traffic stop by Mecosta County
police, two Kent County officers shined their flashlights into defendant’s vehicle and noted that a
tissue box was inside. This, defendant complains, constitutes a warrantless, unreasonable search
of the car. We disagree. Both the Michigan and United States Constitutions prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. Const 1963, art 1, § 11; US Const, Am IV. In order to
enjoy a protected privacy right under either of these constitutional provisions, a defendant must
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object of the search and seizure. People v
Powell, 235 Mich App 557, 560; 599 NW2d 499 (1999). In this case, there is no allegation that
the officers entered defendant’s vehicle. They simply shined their flashlights into the interior of
defendant’s vehicle and noted a tissue box on the floor. Given that the tissue box was not
hidden, but was in plain sight from outside the vehicle, defendant did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. See People v Valoppi, 61 Mich App 470, 479; 233 NW2d 41 (1975).
Therefore, no search took place and no error occurred.
Defendant next contends that the Mecosta County police officer who stopped defendant
lacked a particularized and objective basis for suspecting defendant of criminal activity. In
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to perform an investigatory stop, we must
examine all the facts and circumstances supporting the stop. People v Oliver, 464 Mich 184,
192-193; 627 NW2d 297 (2001). Here, the police had information that defendant worked for
Advantage Electric, from which the attacker had placed the telephone call setting up the meeting
with the victim. Further, the manager of Advantage Electric told police that defendant fit the
attacker’s description. Finally, defendant was driving erratically on the highway and seemed to
be distracted by the vehicles following him. As noted by our Supreme Court, “nervous, evasive
behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 197, quoting Illinois v
Wardlow, 528 US 119, 124; 120 S Ct 673; 145 L Ed 2d 570 (2000). Given these circumstances,
the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Moreover, adding the discovery of the tissue
box inside defendant’s vehicle – which corroborated the victim’s statements – the police also had
probable cause to arrest defendant without a warrant. See MCL 764.15(c); People v Kelly, 231
Mich App 627, 631; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).4
Defendant next argues that police violated his constitutional right to counsel because he
requested the assistance of counsel during his interrogation, yet he was not provided counsel
until after his arraignment. Defendant’s argument confuses the distinct protections of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, which are not necessarily coextensive. People v Marsack, 231 Mich
App 364, 372-373; 586 NW2d 234 (1998). As defendant argues, if an individual “states that he
wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” However, that
principle flows from the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. If no
interrogations occur after defendant’s invocation of that right, defendant’s right to counsel does
4
Although defendant also argues that he was subjected to searches and seizures not supported by
probable cause, he relies upon facts outside the record to support his contentions. Our review is
limited to the record of the trial court and we will allow no enlargement of the record on appeal.
People v Warren, 228 Mich App 336, 356; 578 NW2d 692 (1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on
other grounds 462 Mich 415; 615 NW2d 691 (2000). Thus, we decline to review this issue.
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not attach until adversarial proceedings begin. See People v Crusoe, 433 Mich 666, 687-688;
449 NW2d 641 (1989). Therefore, defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.5
Defendant next asserts that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. When the delay is
less than eighteen months, a defendant must prove prejudice in order to establish a violation of
the right to a speedy trial. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 112; 605 NW2d 28 (1999). In this
case, defendant has failed to make such a showing. He does not assert that his civil liberties
were constrained by his pretrial incarceration and he does not assert that his defense was
compromised by the delay between arrest and trial. Without any proof of prejudice, defendant is
not entitled to relief, and any failure of defense counsel to file a motion based on this issue would
have been futile. Because defense counsel is not required to make frivolous or meritless
motions, defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. People v Darden, 230
Mich App 597, 605; 585 NW2d 27 (1998).
Next, defendant claims that that his kidnapping conviction was based upon insufficient
evidence because the asportation of the victim was merely incidental to the criminal sexual
conduct. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
Asportation of a victim is a judicially required element of the crime of kidnapping by
forcible confinement or imprisonment. People v Green, 228 Mich App 684, 696-697; 580
NW2d 444 (1998). “To establish the element of asportation, there must be some movement of
the victim taken in furtherance of the kidnapping that is not merely incidental to the commission
of another underlying lesser or coequal crime.” Id. at 696-697. We conclude that the asportation
element was met because defendant forced the victim into a car, drove her to another location,
sexually assaulted her, and then drove the victim back and released her. See People v Sawyer,
222 Mich App 1, 5-6; 564 NW2d 62 (1997). Further, in People v Barker, 411 Mich 291, 300 n
5; 307 NW2d 61 (1981), our Supreme Court indicated that increased threat or danger to the
victim is one factor to consider in determining whether asportation took place. In the present
case, the movement added a threat of increased danger to the victim, due to the extent of the
movement and the fact that the victim was unable to see during that time. We conclude that the
prosecutor presented sufficient evidence of asportation and the jury could have reasonably found
that the asportation was not merely incidental to the criminal sexual conduct. Therefore,
defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.6
5
Defendant also contends that police violated his right against compelled self-incrimination by
questioning him in the back seat of a police vehicle, after he had asserted his right to counsel.
We decline to address this contention because it was not raised below and there is no record to
review. Warren, supra at 356.
6
Because defendant’s kidnapping conviction was based on sufficient evidence, we need not
address defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for dismissal
of that charge. Darden, supra at 605.
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Defendant next argues that his convictions for kidnapping and first-degree criminal
sexual conduct violate the double jeopardy protections contained in the Michigan and United
States Constitutions because the criminal sexual conduct conviction is based upon the crime of
penetration under circumstances involving another felony. Const 1963, art 1, § 15; US Const
Am V; MCL 750.520b(1)(c). Because our Supreme Court rejected this argument in People v
Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 489-490; 355 NW2d 592 (1984), defendant is not entitled to relief on
this basis.
Defendant next contends that he is entitled to resentencing based on the prosecutor’s
failure to file a notice of intent to seek an enhanced sentence under the habitual offender statute.
MCL 769.13(2). In People v Walker, 234 Mich App 299, 314-315; 593 NW2d 673 (1999), this
Court found that failure to file a sentence enhancement notice under the habitual offender statute
can constitute harmless error. In this case, as in Walker, defendant does not contend that he did
not receive notice of the intent to seek enhancement; he argues only that the notice was not filed
in the lower court record. However, because the felony complaint indicated that the prosecutor
would seek enhanced sentences, and because defendant did not object to his status as an habitual
offender during sentencing, the failure to file the notice of intent in this case was harmless error.
Defendant next challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court.7 The trial court
sentenced defendant to a term of thirty-three to fifty years’ imprisonment for each of the CSC
convictions, as well as life imprisonment for the kidnapping conviction. The guidelines, as
scored by the trial court, indicated a minimum sentence range of 225 to 562 months (18 years, 9
months to 46 years, 10 months), or life imprisonment. Thus, defendant’s minimum sentences
fall within the appropriate guideline ranges. MCL 769.34(10) provides, in pertinent part:
If a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range, the
court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not remand for resentencing
absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information
relied upon in determining the defendant’s sentence.
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously scored Offense Variables 3, 4, 7, 8, 10,
11, and 12. We disagree. First, defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly scored OV
3 is without merit because the trial court adjusted OV 3 to reflect zero points. Second,
defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly scored OV 4 is without merit because the
guidelines instructions clearly state, “the fact that [psychological] treatment has not been sought
is not conclusive.” Given defendant’s treatment of the victim in this case, we conclude that ten
points were appropriately scored under OV 4 because the victim suffered “serious psychological
injury [that] may require professional treatment.” [Emphasis added.]
Third, we believe the score for OV 7 was correct. Defendant assaulted the victim while
wearing a mask and dark clothing. He covered her head and drove her to an undisclosed
location, where he bound her hands and covered her eyes with duct tape. Defendant then
sexually assaulted the victim, while still preventing her from seeing. These circumstances amply
7
Because the instant offenses occurred on February 13-14, 1999, the statutory sentencing
guidelines apply, rather than the previous judicial sentencing guidelines. MCL 769.34(2).
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support a finding that defendant engaged in “terrorism,” which is defined in the guidelines
instructions as “conduct designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffers
during the offense.” The record clearly supports a score of fifty points for OV 7.
Fourth, defendant’s contention that the trial court improperly scored OV 8 is without
merit, because the guidelines state that fifteen points should be scored when the “victim was
asported to another place of greater danger or was held captive beyond the time necessary to
commit the offense.” Given the length of time that defendant held the victim captive, fifteen
points were clearly appropriate under OV 8 for the CSC offenses.8
Fifth, according to the guidelines for OV 10, fifteen points should be scored if “predatory
conduct” was involved in the crime. Predatory conduct means “pre-offense conduct directed at a
victim for the primary purpose of victimization.” Defendant asserts that this variable was
incorrectly scored because there was no evidence that his pre-offense conduct was directed
exclusively at the instant victim. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the variable does not state
that the pre-offense conduct be directed at a specific victim chosen before the offense occurs.
Rather, the variable states that the pre-offense conduct be “directed at a victim.” We conclude
that the record supports a score of fifteen points for OV 10.
Sixth, the trial testimony supported a finding that at least six acts of sexual penetration or
sexual touching occurred in the present case. However, defendant’s convictions were based on
only three acts of sexual penetration. Thus, fifty points were appropriately scored under OV 11
for more than two charged penetrations, and twenty-five points were appropriately scored under
OV 12 for three contemporaneous felonious acts which will not result in a separate conviction.
Because the trial court correctly scored the guidelines and because defendant’s minimum
sentences fall within the guidelines ranges, we must affirm his sentences. MCL 769.34(10);
People v Babcock, 244 Mich App 64, 73; 624 NW2d 479 (2000).
Finally, defendant argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective because appellate
counsel: “(1) failed to acquire a full record for review; (2) failed to investigate potentially
meritorious claims of error, (3) failed to move for necessary evidentiary hearings, and (4) failed
to assert claims of error which are supported by facts of the record.” Defendant’s claims are
simply too general to support a conclusion that he was denied the effective assistance of
appellate counsel. Without more specificity, it is impossible to determine whether the alleged
error would have been outcome determinative. A defendant may not leave it to this Court to
search for a factual basis to sustain or reject his position. People v Traylor, 245 Mich App 460,
464; 628 NW2d 120 (2001). Thus, defendant is not entitled to relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
8
We note that the trial court correctly scored zero points under OV 8 for the kidnapping offense.
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