PEOPLE OF MI V RECO FITZGERALD POWELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 26, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 227955
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 00-005495-FH
RECO FITZGERALD POWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Griffin, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of second-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(3), and was
sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to six to thirty years’ imprisonment. He
appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to identify him as the
perpetrator of the home invasion. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal
case, the reviewing court “must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution
and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime
were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Hoffman, 225 Mich App 103, 111; 570
NW2d 146 (1997) (citation omitted). All conflicts with regard to the evidence must be resolved
in favor of the prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997).
Further, this Court should not interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight of the
evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Id. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn from it may be sufficient to prove the elements of the crime. People v Watson, 245 Mich
App 572, 595; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
While we agree with defendant that possession of stolen property alone is insufficient to
sustain a conviction of home invasion, possession of stolen property may be evidence from
which a jury can draw an inference that the defendant is guilty of breaking and entering.1 People
v Barker, 101 Mich App 599, 602; 300 NW2d 648 (1980).
1
The home invasion offenses, MCL 750.110a, entail conduct covered by the former offense of
breaking and entering a dwelling. People v Warren, 228 Mich App 336, 347-348; 578 NW2d
692 (1998), rev’d in part on other grounds 462 Mich 415 (2000).
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Possession of stolen property, immediately subsequent to a larceny, may
sometimes be almost conclusive evidence of guilt, but the presumption weakens
with the time which has elapsed, and may scarcely arise at all if others besides the
defendant have had equal access to the place where it was discovered, but the
unexplained possession of stolen property is some evidence of guilt. [People v
Benevides, 71 Mich App 168, 174; 247 NW2d 341 (1976), quoting 4 Gillespie,
Michigan Criminal Law and Procedure (2d ed), § 2271, p 2484.]
In People v McDonald, 13 Mich App 226, 236-237; 163 NW2d 796 (1968), this Court stated:
[U]nexplained possession of property recently stolen, unaccompanied by
other facts or circumstances indicating guilt, will not sustain a conviction for
breaking and entering, even though it is some evidence that the possessor is guilty
of theft. [Emphasis in original.]
In McDonald, the Court found that muddy tire tracks showing that the defendant’s vehicle was in
the parking lot of the building in question was an additional circumstance that justified sending
the case to the jury. Id. at 237. The question is whether the additional circumstances in the case
justify sustaining a defendant’s placement at the scene of the home invasion. See Benevides,
supra at 175.
In the present case, the strong circumstantial evidence, viewed in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, supports the jury’s verdict. There was evidence that an eyewitness saw a
person dressed in dark clothes, wearing a skullcap, enter the complainant’s house. The person
exited the house carrying a white bag. The eyewitness watched the suspect walk east on
McClellan Street until she lost sight of him between Martin Luther King Drive and Alexander
Drive; during this time, the eyewitness was on the telephone relaying this information to a 911
operator. Officers responding to the information were one-half mile away and drove
immediately to McClellan Street. They observed a man walking east on McClellan, less than
four blocks away from the complainant’s home, who matched the eyewitness’s description and
carried a white bag. He ran when the police called out to him and as he fled, he dropped the
white bag, found to contain items stolen from the complainant’s house, and a video camera
identical to the one missing from the house. When apprehended, the suspect, identified as
defendant, was wearing the complainant’s blue Tommy Hilfiger coat and had a very fresh cut on
the palm of his hand. There was evidence that the porch and front door windows of the
complainant’s house were broken, and the complainant testified that he saw blood around the
area in front of his home.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the prosecution did not rely solely on the unexplained
possession of the stolen property to obtain defendant’s conviction as the perpetrator of the home
invasion. The overwhelming circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it
were sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction.
On appeal, defendant also argues that the trial court improperly refused to instruct the
jury on the crime of receiving or concealing stolen property as a lesser offense of home invasion.
Specifically, defendant requested that the jury be instructed on misdemeanor receiving or
concealing stolen property. We hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the
requested instruction.
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The court’s duty to instruct on the law applicable to the case depends on
the evidence presented at trial. . . . The test to determine whether an instruction
on a cognate lesser included offense must be given is as follows: The record must
be examined, and if there is evidence which would support a conviction of the
cognate lesser offense, then the trial judge if requested, must instruct on it. . . .
Under this standard, there must be more than a modicum of evidence; there must
be sufficient evidence that the defendant could be convicted of the lesser offense.
Only then does the judge’s failure to instruct on the lesser included offense
constitute error. . . . If the evidence presented could not support a conviction of
the lesser offense, then the judge should not give the requested instruction.
[People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382, 387; 471 NW2d 346 (1991) (emphasis added
and citations omitted).]
See also People v Hendricks, 446 Mich 435, 442; 521 NW2d 546 (1994) (whether a trial judge
must instruct on a lesser included offense is determined by whether the evidence presented will
support the lesser offense and whether the lesser offense is of the same class or category, or is
closely related to the charged offense.)
In People v Malach, 202 Mich App 266, 276; 507 NW2d 834 (1993), this Court indicated
that, when properly requested, the trial court should instruct the jury on an appropriate lesser
included misdemeanor if a rational view of the evidence could support a guilty verdict on the
misdemeanor, if the defendant requested the instruction, and if the instruction would not result in
confusion or injustice. See also People v Stephens, 416 Mich 252, 261-265; 330 NW2d 675
(1982).
The elements of receiving or concealing stolen property (RCSP) are:
(1) that the property was stolen; (2) the value of the property; (3) the
receiving, possession or concealment of such property by the defendant with the
knowledge of the defendant that the property had been stolen; (4) the identity of
the property as being that previously stolen; and (5) the guilty constructive or
actual knowledge of the defendant that the property received or concealed had
been stolen. [People v Harris, 82 Mich App 135, 137; 266 NW2d 477 (1978),
overruled in part on other grounds in Hendricks, supra at 450-451, n 20 (citation
omitted).]
In this case, there was no evidence to support the value of the stolen property. While the
store receipt for stolen toys was admitted into evidence and the victim testified that one of the
stolen items cost eight dollars, no evidence was introduced regarding the value of the other
property stolen, including the video camera and the Tommy Hilfiger coat. Certainly, there was
no evidence to suggest that the value of the items was less than two hundred dollars such that the
jury could convict defendant of misdemeanor RCSP. At trial, defendant conceded that there was
“[n]o evidence of value” presented. In People v Kamin, 405 Mich 482, 496; 275 NW2d 777
(1979), overruled in part on other grounds in People v Beach, 429 Mich 450; 418 NW2d 861
(1988), the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s request for an
instruction on RCSP as a lesser offense to breaking and entering:
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Neither receiving and concealing stolen goods nor larceny are necessarily
included offenses of breaking and entering. Receiving and concealing, a cognate
lesser included offense of breaking and entering, is unsupported by the evidence
presented at this trial due to the lack of any proof as to the value of the stolen
goods. Proof of value is a necessary element for conviction on that charge.
Because there was no proof of the value of the stolen property to support a conviction for
misdemeanor RCSP in this case, the trial court properly denied defendant’s request for an
instruction on that offense.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
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