PEOPLE OF MI V CARL BOONE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 22, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee
v
No. 229131
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-009662
CARL BOONE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Wilder and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction for armed robbery, in violation of MCL
750.529, following a jury trial. We affirm.
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for a new trial,
offered on the basis that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree.
We review challenges to a trial court’s decision on a motion to set aside a conviction for
being against the great weight of the evidence for abuse of discretion. People v Daoust, 228
Mich App 1, 16; 577 NW2d 179 (1999). We find such an abuse of discretion “only where the
trial court’s denial of the motion was manifestly against the clear weight of the evidence.” Id.
(citations omitted). In so doing, we do not interfere with the jury’s functions of deciding the
weight to be given evidence and of determining the credibility of witnesses. People v Terry, 224
Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997). Viewed in that light, the conviction does not merit
reversal.
Defendant has shown that there were inconsistencies in the complaining witness’s
testimony. These inconsistencies were brought to the attention of the jury, as was the conflict
between this witness’s testimony and that of his alleged accomplice. The jury was also made
aware of the explanations the complaining witness gave for these inconsistencies, asserting that
he initially concealed his use of cocaine from the police because he did not want his wife to
know that he was a drug user, and that he had forgotten some of the details about how specific
items were taken from him during the robbery as a result of being rendered unconscious when he
was hit over the head with a metal pipe during the robbery. We cannot agree with defendant that
these explanations or the rest of the complaining witness’s story suffer from “inherent
implausibility,” and we reiterate that it was the function of the jury, and not of the trial court or
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of this Court, to resolve credibility questions.
credibility questions in favor of the prosecution.
Terry, supra, 452.
The jury resolved the
It is proper for a court to set aside a jury verdict as being against the great weight of the
evidence “only where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict and a serious
miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642; 576
NW2d 129 (1998). In making this determination, a court may not function “as a thirteenth
juror.” Id. at 647. When the testimony of the complaining witness, the testimony of police
officers and the physical evidence corroborating the broad outlines of the complaining witness’
complaint that there was a physical struggle in which he was injured and that property was
removed from his home, and the undisputed fact that defendant was in the victim’s home on the
night the property was taken and that the missing property was found in the trunk of his vehicle
the next day, we cannot say that the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict;
therefore, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new
trial.
Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel failed to move for a mistrial when a hostile prosecution witness unexpectedly
volunteered the statement that defendant was on parole when the crime was committed – a
statement the trial court immediately told the jury to disregard – and because counsel failed to
object to a jury instruction as to the consideration to be given to the flight of a suspect. Again,
we disagree.
The standard for review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is set forth in
People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 5-6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999), where, citing People v Pickens, 446
Mich 298; 521 NW2d 797 (1994), and quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S
Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court stated:
“A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so
defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two
components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes
both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the
result unreliable.”
In attempting to persuade a reviewing court that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must also
overcome the presumption that the challenged action was trial strategy, and must establish “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have been
different.” People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996).
We conclude that defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective when evaluated under the
above standards. There is no reasonable probability that the result would have been different had
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counsel moved for a mistrial when the reference to parole was made. The court, on its own
initiative, immediately admonished the jury that it was not to consider whether this reference was
accurate, and that whether defendant was on parole was not an issue in the case. Moreover, to
the extent that defendant is arguing that he was seriously and irretrievably prejudiced by the
obvious inference that he was a criminal, he had already told the jury as much himself, admitting
quite frankly that he was a cocaine dealer. The effect of the witness’s statement, which the jury
was immediately admonished to ignore, was at most cumulative and comparatively slight in light
of defendant’s own admissions. Moreover, the statement by the witness was unresponsive and
volunteered, and was neither anticipated nor encouraged by the prosecutor; accordingly, it would
not have justified a mistrial, People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516, 531-532; 455 NW2d 358
(1990), and it was not ineffective for counsel to fail to object to it.
We further find the trial court’s instruction on flight to have been proper, as the
prosecutor did in fact introduce evidence that defendant attempted to evade arrest through the
testimony of the arresting officer. Because the instruction was not improper, any objection
would have been futile. Counsel is not required to advocate a meritless position. People v
Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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