PEOPLE OF MI V HANANDIS LATHAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 22, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 222687
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 98-011305
HANANDIS LATHAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Wilder and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant Hanandis Lathan of second-degree murder1 for the death of
Derek Elliott, two counts of assault with intent to commit murder2 for assaults against Michael
Colet and Nancy Harris, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felonyfirearm).3 The trial court sentenced Lathan to concurrent prison terms of twenty-four to fifty
years for murder and ten to twenty-five years for each assault, to be served consecutively to a
five-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
At trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony that, in the spring or early summer 1998,
Lathan sold crack cocaine one block away from the location where Elliott and two other drug
dealers operated. Approximately one month before the crimes at issue, Lathan went to Elliott’s
drug house for a social visit. After drinking with Elliott and his fellow drug dealers, Lathan
seized their nine-millimeter gun, which was on a table. He robbed Elliott and one of the other
dealers. The prosecutor’s theory was that Lathan perceived Elliott and his cohorts as
competition for a limited supply of drug customers, some of whom, like Colet, preferred doing
business with Elliott. Under the prosecutor’s theory, when the robbery did not scare Elliott away
from the area, Lathan killed him to secure his own business.
1
MCL 750.317.
2
MCL 750.83.
3
MCL 750.227b.
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Harris testified that on July 6, 1998, she and Colet went to buy crack cocaine from Elliott.
According to Harris, when they arrived, they saw Elliott sitting on the porch at a house on Sunset
Street. Harris and Colet walked onto the porch and, after a brief conversation, Harris heard a
loud noise. At first, she did not realize it was a gunshot. She then heard a second, similar noise
and knew what it was. She fell over the porch railing and crawled around the side of the house.
As she was crawling, she heard three more shots. While at the side of the house, Harris heard
Colet’s voice inside and tried to get his attention. Unsuccessful in this attempt, she remained on
the ground for what seemed like fifteen or twenty minutes. She then crawled to the front of the
house and peeked inside before returning to the front porch where she heard a man talking to
Elliott. When she whispered for Elliott and Colet, the man told her that Elliott was hurt. She
immediately left. According to Harris, she never saw the shooter.
Colet testified that he had bought crack from Elliott hundreds of times before the
shooting. On occasion, he also bought from Lathan. Colet testified that on July 6, 1998, he and
Harris went to the house on Sunset Street. Elliott was on the porch and they started talking.
When Elliott began turning to the door of the house, shots rang out. Colet testified that the shots
sounded like they came from a handgun. He heard two shots before he realized that the shots
were directed at them. Colet jumped to the right and “hit the ground.” When he pulled his head
up to see what was happening, he was shot in the arm. He heard four or five shots total but did
not see the shooter.
Colet managed to crawl into the house after Elliott and they crawled upstairs. Colet said
that he and Elliott saw Kim Jones, and Elliott asked her to call an ambulance. Within minutes,
after not hearing any more action, Elliott went downstairs and Colet followed. Colet said that he
barely made it down the stairs because he and Elliott were badly hurt. When the police arrived,
Colet heard Elliott say that “Hanandis” was the shooter.
Kim Jones could not be located to testify at trial, despite the prosecutor’s due diligence in
attempting to locate her. Consequently, Jones’ preliminary examination testimony was read into
the record. In that testimony, Jones stated that she knew both Elliott and Lathan. On July 6,
1998, at approximately 11:50 p.m., Jones awoke from her sleep because, she believed, she heard
gunfire. Jones went into her living room and spoke with Andre Gunn, who also lived at the
house. Subsequently, she went upstairs and found Elliott and Colet. Both had been shot. Jones
assisted Elliott when he went down the stairs. At first, Elliott was able to talk but, eventually, it
became more difficult for him to talk and breathe. Jones heard Elliott tell the police that the
shooter was “Hanandis.”
Officer Herman Hope testified that he and his partner responded to a radio report about a
shooting in the area of Sunset and Davison Avenue. They patrolled the area for three to five
minutes before being flagged down by someone who indicated that two people were shot at
13444 Sunset. Officer Hope and his partner notified dispatch and went into the residence. They
were inside within ten minutes of receiving the radio call. They found Colet sitting on a
stairwell. He informed the officers that he had been shot. Elliott had also been shot but when
Officer Hope initially arrived, Elliott was talking and coherent. He was standing and moving in
circles. Shortly thereafter, however, Elliott began complaining that he could not breathe and that
he wanted an ambulance. Though Elliott lapsed into unconsciousness, Officer Hope first had an
opportunity to speak with him, and Elliott indicated that “Hanandis” shot him. Elliott did not
give Hanandis’ last name to Officer Hope. However, he described Hanandis and indicated that
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Hanandis sold drugs from a Justine Street apartment building. According to Officer Hope,
Elliott was dead on arrival at the hospital.
The prosecution and defense entered into numerous stipulations at trial. One of the
stipulations involved a diagram of where police found items eventually submitted in evidence,
including a number of bullets found at the scene: four spent, nine-millimeter cartridge casings,
one twelve-gauge fired shot gun shell, and one twelve-gauge live bullet. While the diagram is
not part of the lower court record, it apparently showed that the spent shotgun shell was by the
side of the house and not in the area where the police found the nine-millimeter casings. The
prosecutor argued that the shotgun shell evidence was not related to this case at all. All four of
the nine-millimeter casings were determined to have come from the same weapon.
One of Lathan’s two alibi witnesses was Mark Elswick, who was in the same cell block
as Lathan at the time of trial. Elswick, who had been convicted of armed robbery and was facing
other charges, recalled that on July 6, 1998, he went to a “weed” house on Sunset at
approximately 11:30 p.m. On his way back from the “weed” house, he saw Elliott standing on
the porch with two people. Elswick also saw two men between Elliot’s house and an abandoned
house; neither of these men was Lathan. One man stepped out from behind the bushes with a
shot gun. Elswick never approached the police with the information because he had outstanding
warrants for his arrest. On cross-examination, Elswick admitted that he never spoke to or had
dealings with Lathan before the shooting and had only seen him around the neighborhood on five
or six occasions. After the July 1998 shooting, Elswick next saw Lathan a month before trial
when they were housed in the same cell block and talked about the murder. Elswick said that he
told Lathan that he saw the incident and knew Lathan was not there.
Lathan’s second alibi witness was Dorothy Garrett, his aunt, who testified that Lathan
arrived at her house for a family gathering on July 6, 1998, at approximately 1:30 p.m. Garrett
said that Lathan was still there the following morning when she left for work at 5:30 a.m. As for
the time between his arrival and the next morning, Garrett said that she had stayed awake until
about 3:00 a.m. and knew that Lathan left the premises only one time the entire evening, which
was around 9:30 p.m., to buy beer and that he was gone for five or ten minutes.
II. Prior Bad Acts Evidence
A. Standard Of Review
Lathan argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to use evidence at her
trial of his previous drug dealing activities and robbery of Elliott. We review a trial court’s
decision to admit prior bad acts evidence to determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion.4
4
People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
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B. MRE 404(b)(1)
MRE 404(b)(1) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.[5]
In People v VanderVliet,6 the Michigan Supreme Court clarified the test used to determine
whether prior bad acts evidence is admissible, stating:
First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b);
second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third,
that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting
instruction to the jury.
It is insufficient for the prosecution to merely recite one of the purposes articulated in MRE
404(b).7 Rather, the prosecution must also demonstrate that the evidence is relevant.8
Relevance is a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at
issue that must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences that make a material
fact at issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
. . . The logical relationship between the proffered evidence and the ultimate fact
sought to be proven must be closely scrutinized.[9]
In this case, the prosecution filed a notice of its intent to use the prior bad acts evidence
to establish Lathan’s motive and identity. MRE 404(b) itself lists these as proper purposes for
prior bad acts evidence.
The next inquiry is whether the evidence was relevant. The prosecution charged Lathan
with committing first-degree murder and two counts of assault with intent to commit murder.
The prosecution used the evidence of Lathan’s drug dealing activities and robbery to
demonstrate why he would have killed Elliott, namely intense competition. Though the
5
Emphasis added.
6
People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205
(1994).
7
Crawford, supra at 387.
8
Id.
9
Id. (citation omitted).
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prosecution did not have to prove Lathan’s motive as an essential element of the homicide, and
irrespective of the fact that the jury actually convicted Lathan of second-degree murder, this
evidence was “generally relevant to show the intent necessary to prove [the charged degree of]
murder.”10 Evidence of the robbery also demonstrated that Lathan had possession of, or had
access to, a nine-millimeter weapon. This tended to support Elliott’s dying declaration that
Lathan shot him. It also tied Lathan to the nine-millimeter rounds fired at the house. In sum, the
evidence of Lathan’s drug dealing and robbery were relevant because they made the essential
element of intent and the critical issue of identity more probable than they would have been
without the evidence.
Though relevant and admissible for proper purposes, the prior bad acts evidence still had
to pass the MRE 403 threshold to be admitted in evidence. The evidence gave the jury a full
picture of what occurred in the case. Without this background information, the jury would have
been unable to have an adequate picture of the events or accurately assess Lathan’s motivation
and intent.11 While Lathan claims that his possession of the nine-millimeter gun and his drug
dealing activities could have been presented in a less prejudicial way without reference to the
robbery, this argument lacks the merit necessary to conclude that the evidence should have been
excluded. Though any evidence the prosecution submits to the jury is likely to cause the defense
some prejudice, the evidence in this case was not so unfairly prejudicial that it substantially
outweighed its probative value.12 The prosecutor limited his use of the evidence to give the jury
background in the case and to make motive, intent, and identity arguments. The prosecutor did
not use the evidence for impermissible character reasons. The jury was also aware that all the
witnesses, except the police witnesses, were members of the criminal culture in one way or
another. Further, the trial court gave a limiting instruction that, in relevant part, informed the
jury it could not use the evidence to show that Lathan was a bad person or that he was a person
likely to commit crimes. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence.
Within this argument, Lathan also takes issue with the scope of the trial court’s limiting
instruction. However, he failed to present this issue for appeal.13 Therefore, we decline to
review the alleged instructional error.
10
People v Herndon, 246 Mich 371, 413; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
11
See People v Scholl, 453 Mich 730, 741; 556 NW2d 851 (1996).
12
See People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod 450 Mich 1212, 539 NW2d
504 (1995) (“All evidence offered by the parties is ‘prejudicial’ to some extent, but the fear of
prejudice does not generally render the evidence inadmissible. It is only when the probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that evidence is excluded.”)
(emphasis in original).
13
MCR 7.212(C)(5).
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III. Elswick’s Impeachment
A. Standard Of Review
Lathan argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the prosecutor asked
defense witness Elswick whether he had been charged with criminal sexual conduct and had
previously escaped from prison, which violated MRE 609 and was not relevant to his
truthfulness. Because Lathan failed to preserve this issue for appeal by objecting at trial, we
review the issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.14
B. MRE 609
By its plain terms, MRE 609 provides limited circumstances under which a party can
introduce evidence that a witness was convicted of a crime in order to impeach the witness’s
credibility. However, “MRE 609 applies only to the use of past convictions . . . .”15 There was
no evidence that Elswick was convicted or even charged with the prison escape. As far as we
can tell from the record, the criminal sexual conduct charges were still pending. Because the
evidence in question does not involve past convictions, MRE 609 clearly does not apply. Even if
this evidence was inadmissible under other rules of evidence, the issue Lathan presents for
appeal is limited to whether admitting the evidence violated MRE 609. Thus, it is not necessary
to consider this issue.
IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct
A. Standard Of Review
Lathan argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly impeaching
Elswick and by using improperly elicited evidence during closing argument. Because this issue
is also unpreserved, we review it for plain error affecting Lathan’s substantial rights.16
B. Questioning And Closing Arguments
Lathan contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking Elswick about his
criminal past and incorporating Elswick’s answers in closing arguments. In essence, he claims
that the prosecutor’s actions denied him a fair trial because the prosecutor knew that Elswick’s
criminal sexual conduct charges and prison escape were inadmissible under MRE 609 and that
he asked the jury to disbelieve Elswick solely because he was a felon. Because Lathan has failed
to demonstrate that asking these questions was erroneous, we have no basis to conclude that
asking these questions and making related arguments also constituted misconduct meriting
reversal. Moreover, he has failed to demonstrate that there was sufficient prejudice flowing from
the way the prosecutor used this information that doing so was misconduct. As we have
explained previously:
14
People v Carines, 460 Mich App 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
15
People v Layher, 464 Mich App 756, 771; 631 NW2d 281 (2001).
16
Carines, supra at 763-764.
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In order to warrant reversal, “it is necessary to show some prejudice or
pattern of eliciting inadmissible testimony.” Where the defendant was not
prejudiced by the . . . questions, reversal is not required. “[T]his Court does not
believe a case should be reversed merely because a few technically improper
questions are asked. In fact, it is hard to find a trial where every question is
exactly proper. In order to require a reversal some prejudice or patterns of
eliciting inadmissible testimony must be shown.”[17]
In this instance, the prosecutor’s questioning was brief and isolated, and the trial court informed
the jury that the prosecutor’s questions were not evidence. Assuming for the sake of argument
that the evidence was inadmissible, we can find no indication in the record that the prosecutor
asked these questions hoping to exploit any improper effect. Elswick also denied that he was
facing any criminal sexual conduct charges, thereby limiting the effect that this evidence would
have had on the jury regardless of the prosecutor’s intent in asking these questions.
With respect to Lathan’s contention that the prosecutor committed misconduct during
closing arguments by calling Elswick a felon, we cannot agree. “Generally, ‘[p]rosecutors are
accorded great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct.’ They are ‘free to argue the
evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence as it relates to [their] theory of the
case.’”18 A prosecutor is not required to state inferences or conclusions in the blandest terms
possible.19 The evidence supported the prosecutor’s argument that Elswick was previously
convicted of armed robbery. Critically, Lathan does not argue that this evidence was
inadmissible under MRE 609 to impeach Elswick’s credibility. In fact, in closing arguments, the
prosecutor specifically used this evidence to impeach Elswick’s credibility with respect to the
alibi he provided for Lathan shortly after becoming his cellmate. This alibi defense was a matter
hotly debated at trial and squarely the subject of a credibility contest given the victim’s contrary
dying declaration. While this was, clearly, a harsh attack on Elswick, it was not an improper
tactic because, as a whole, it tended to demonstrate that the alibi Elswick provided for Lathan
was fabricated recently, and therefore not believable.20
Lathan also points to Washington v Hofbauer,21 to support his argument that the
prosecutor committed misconduct by using this impeachment evidence during closing
arguments. Washington, however, is distinguishable on a number of relevant grounds. Notably,
the prosecutor in Washington commented extensively on evidence concerning the defendant that
was plainly inadmissible under MRE 404 – not MRE 609 – during closing arguments, implying
that the defendant had acted in conformity with his previously demonstrated propensity to
commit bad acts in committing the charged offenses.22 Setting aside the differences between
17
See People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587-588; 629 NW2d 411 (2001) (citations omitted).
18
People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995) (citations omitted).
19
People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 361; 551 NW2d 460 (1996).
20
See People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 678-679; 550 NW2d 568 (1996).
21
Washington v Hofbauer, 228 F3d 689 (CA 6, 2000).
22
Id. at 699.
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these two separate rules of evidence, the evidence and arguments Lathan now challenges
attacked Elswick’s character, not his own. The prosecutor in Washington also made arguments
that the evidence did not support simply to bolster the complainant’s credibility.23 While the
prosecutor in this case certainly gained some advantage by discrediting Elswick, the prosecutor
did so without misrepresenting the facts in this case, much less to bolster the credibility of any
particular prosecution witness. The circumstances in Washington simply are not present in this
case and, therefore, that case does not require us to reverse here.
Even assuming that the prosecutor’s questions and comments amounted to plainly
erroneous misconduct, Lathan’s entitlement to relief depends on whether this alleged misconduct
prejudiced his substantial rights.24 We cannot attribute such effect to the prosecutor’s questions
and arguments. Other evidence properly admitted at trial directly contradicted Elswick’s
testimony. The jury had an obvious choice to believe one version of events over the other. The
jury simply found the prosecutor’s evidence more believable, even rejecting Garrett’s alibi
testimony though the prosecutor did not treat it as harshly as the evidence concerning Elswick’s
background. There was no error requiring reversal.
V. Judicial Misconduct
A. Standard Of Review
Lathan argues that the trial judge committed misconduct when it expressed its “hope”
that, unlike Elswick, the other defense witnesses were not “guests of the county,” meaning
individuals in jail. Because Lathan failed to preserve this issue for appeal by objecting at trial,
we review this issue for plain error affecting his substantial rights.25
B. Judicial Neutrality
In People v Cheeks,26 this Court explained that a “defendant in a criminal trial is entitled
to expect a ‘neutral and detached magistrate.’” A trial court judge denies a criminal defendant
this right if “the judge’s questions and comments may have unjustifiably aroused suspicion in the
mind of the jury concerning a witness’ credibility and whether partiality quite possibly could
have influenced the jury to the detriment of the defendant’s case.”27 Lathan claims that the trial
court did just this, suggesting to the jury that Elswick and other defense witnesses were not
credible because they were “guests of the county.” We cannot similarly draw that inference from
the context in which the trial court used this phrase.
23
Id. at 700-702.
24
See Carines, supra at 763.
25
Id. at 763-764.
26
People v Cheeks, 216 Mich App 470, 480; 549 NW2d 584 (1996), quoting People v Moore,
161 Mich App 615, 619; 411 NW2d 797 (1987).
27
Cheeks, supra at 480.
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According to the record, the trial court referred to “guests of the county” twice during a
pause between witnesses. In the first instance, the trial court evidently referred to Elswick as a
“guest of the county” while instructing court officers where to take him following his testimony.
His inmate status was never a secret, and the comment itself was completely unrelated to the
substance of his testimony. Consequently, nothing in the comment could have led the members
of the jury to believe that the trial court found Elswick incredible and that they should also find
him incredible.
The second instance in which the trial court referred to “guests of the county” occurred
only a moment later. The trial court explained to the jury that both defense and prosecution
witnesses had been sequestered, which is why it was allowing defense counsel an opportunity to
check the hallway to determine whether any scheduled defense witnesses had appeared. When
defense counsel returned to the courtroom and indicated that the two defense witnesses that were
supposed to be at court had not arrived even though they had been told when to appear, the trial
court remarked:
I know you did, ma’am [defense counsel]. But we’re not going to – we’ll
give you some time. We won’t – we do realize you couldn’t go pick them all up
or they couldn’t all be guests of the County, I hope. But, anyway, let’s say this.
Um, why don’t we take out [sic] break. It’s a little early, but maybe you want
some coffee . . . .
Again, viewed in context, the trial court was not commenting on the substance of any testimony
or its perception regarding any witness or defense witnesses in general. Rather, the trial court
was commenting on the difficulty in getting witnesses to appear at court on time. Neither of
these comments disparaged anyone, much less revealed that the trial court was biased or
conveyed that bias to the jury.
VI. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
A. Standard Of Review
Lathan argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel
failed to object to: (1) the prosecutor’s improper impeachment of Elswick; (2) the prosecutor’s
closing argument, which emphasized testimony elicited by impeaching Elswick improperly; and
(3) the trial court’s prejudicial comment. De novo review is appropriate for this issue because it
presents a constitutional question28 and does not require us to defer to the trial court in any
respect.29
28
See Houstina, supra at 73.
29
See, generally, People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 303-305; 613 NW2d 694 (2000) (Supreme
Court directly examined the evidence on the record).
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B. Performance And Prejudice
As this Court has explained:
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for defense counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). A defendant must
affirmatively demonstrate that counsel’s performance was objectively
unreasonable and so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial. People v Pickens,
446 Mich 298, 303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). The defendant must also overcome
the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466 NW2d 315 (1991),
citing Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674
(1984).[30]
Lathan has failed to demonstrate that defense counsel’s failure to object to questioning
about pending charges against Elswick caused Lathan the prejudice necessary for us to reverse
his conviction. In this case, there was ample, admissible evidence to cast serious doubt on
Elswick’s credibility without considering the prison escape. Further, Elswick denied that
criminal sexual conduct charges were pending against him and the jury was instructed that
questions were not evidence. More importantly, Elswick was not the only alibi witness that
Lathan produced; the jury also rejected Garrett’s testimony on behalf of Lathan. Even if the jury
disregarded Elswick’s testimony because of the prosecutor’s improper questioning, it
nevertheless had an independent and proper basis to reject the alibi defense as a whole by
concluding that Garrett’s testimony was not believable. Defense counsel also presented a sound
defense attacking the paltry identification evidence the prosecutor provided. Consequently, we
see no reasonable probability that the result in this case would have been any different if defense
counsel objected to the prosecutor’s questions.
Though Lathan’s trial counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s arguments
concerning this evidence, defense counsel’s failure to object to these arguments does not appear
to have played any critical role in the jury’s decision. The jury heard ample evidence that was
properly admitted indicating that Elswick was not credible and that Lathan committed the crime.
Thus, we have no basis to conclude that defense counsel’s failure to object to these closing
arguments had any effect on the outcome in this case.
With respect to counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s allegedly improper comment
regarding “guests of the county,” we have already concluded that the remarks, though perhaps
not tactful, did not cross the boundary between proper and improper commentary. Having failed
to demonstrate that the comment was improper, it follows that defense counsel was under no
obligation to make a meritless objection.31 Further, had defense counsel objected to the remarks,
30
People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 385-386; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
31
See People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
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she would have risked drawing the jury’s attention to something it could have easily overlooked.
This was not ineffective.
VII. Cumulative Error
In his final argument, Lathan argues that we must reverse his convictions because of
cumulative error. Minor errors that do not merit reversal independently may, nevertheless,
require granting a criminal defendant’s request for relief when the errors cumulatively denied the
defendant a fair trial.32 In this case, the only actual errors brought to our attention were defense
counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s questions and closing arguments designed to
impeach Elswick. However, though damaging to Elswick’s testimony, we do not think that
defense counsel’s failure to object in these instances denied Lathan a fair trial, especially when
considering that Garrett also provided alibi testimony.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
32
See People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 46; 597 NW2d 176 (1999).
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