IN RE ESTATE OF SUE ANN SUMMERFIELD, DECEASED
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re Estate of SUE ANN SUMMERFIELD,
Deceased.
PAMELA K. BAUER, Personal Representative,
UNPUBLISHED
March 15, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 226069
Saginaw County Probate Court
LC No. 99-108343-SE
EUGENE R. SUMMERFIELD,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Hood and Sawyer, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right probate court orders granting supervised probate,
removing respondent as independent personal representative of the decedent’s estate, appointing
petitioner personal representative of the estate, and denying reconsideration. We affirm.
The decedent, Sue Ann Summerfield, died intestate on November 27, 1999, as the result
of an automobile accident. Her only child, Sean Michael Summerfield, was injured in the
accident and succumbed to his injuries on December 7, 1999. Respondent Eugene R.
Summerfield is Sue Ann’s ex-husband and Sean’s father. Respondent was appointed as the
independent personal representative of Sean’s estate on December 16, 1999.
Sue Ann’s mother, Virginia Wells, filed a petition for commencement of independent
probate proceedings of Sue Ann’s estate on December 14, 1999, requesting that her daughter,
Pamela K. Bauer, be appointed independent personal representative of Sue Ann’s estate. The
petition did not list Sean as an heir, but did note that Sean was Sue Ann’s son and that he passed
away on December 7, 1999. The Saginaw Probate Court appointed granted independent probate
and appointed Bauer independent personal representative of Sue Ann’s estate on December 14,
1999.
On December 17, 1999, respondent petitioned for commencement of independent probate
of Sue Ann’s estate as the independent personal representative of the estate of Sue Ann’s son.
On that same date, Probate Judge Patrick McGraw entered an order “on the court’s own
initiative” rescinding the order appointing Bauer as independent personal representative and the
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letters of authority on the ground that the “filing [was] contrary to law on priority for filing.”
The court also entered an order granting independent probate and appointing respondent
independent personal representative of Sue Ann’s estate.
On December 27, 1999, Bauer filed a petition for court supervision and for appointment
of an independent personal representative. She asked that she be appointed independent personal
representative out of priority. Following a hearing on January 12, 2000, Probate Judge Faye
Harrison determined that Sue Ann’s estate should proceed under supervised probate. The court
entered an order on January 21, 2000, for supervised proceedings and appointed Bauer personal
representative of Sue Ann’s estate. The order also revoked the December 17, 1999, order
appointing respondent independent personal representative of Sue Ann’s estate as well as
respondent’s letters of authority.
Respondent first contends that the probate court erred in determining that Wells was
qualified under the probate code to file a petition for commencement of proceedings in
independent probate. We agree.
The Revised Probate Code1, MCL 700.1 et seq., provides that an heir of the decedent or
any other interested party may file a petition for commencement of independent probate with
regard to an intestate estate. MCL 700.306(1)(b). The code defines heirs as “those persons,
including the surviving spouse, who are entitled to the property of a decedent under the statutes
of intestate succession.” MCL 700.6(3). Under the succession statutes, if there is no surviving
spouse the estate passes to the decedent’s issue. MCL 700.106(a). The decedent’s son survived
her by more than one hundred twenty hours, MCL 700.107, and therefore was the decedent’s
sole heir. Wells, therefore, was not an heir.
The code defines an “interested party” as “an heir, devisee, beneficiary, a fiduciary of a
legally incapacitated person who is an heir, devisee, or beneficiary, a fiduciary or trustee named
in an instrument involved, or a special party.” MCL 700.7(3). Wells was none of these and,
therefore, was not an interested party. Accordingly, Wells did not qualify under MCL
700.306(1)(b) to file a petition for commencement of independent probate, and any proceedings
pursuant to that filing would be invalid.
However, only three days after granting Wells’ petition for independent probate on
December 17, 1999, the probate court granted respondent’s petition for commencement of
independent probate of Sue Ann’s estate. Petitioner has not challenged respondent’s authority to
petition for independent probate and, therefore, for purposes of analyzing the remaining issues
we assume that respondent qualified under the probate code to petition for independent probate.
Respondent asserts that Judge Harrison erred in determining that Bauer qualified to be
appointed personal representative of the decedent’s estate under either MCL 700.116(1)(b) or
MCL 700.311(2)(b). We agree. These statutory subsections provide that a decedent’s heir may
be appointed personal representative. As discussed, Sean Summerfield was the decedent’s sole
1
A new version of the Revised Probate Code became effective April 1, 2000. 1998 PA 386.
However, all the events at issue here occurred before that date; thus, the previous version of the
code applies.
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heir. Thus, Bauer could not qualify under these specific subsections to be appointed personal
representative. However, the Revised Probate Code provides additional criteria for appointment
as personal representative. See, e.g., MCL 700.116; MCL 700.311. Respondent has not
suggested that Bauer did not qualify to be appointed personal representative under these
provisions and, therefore, we presume that the probate court acted within its authority in
appointing Bauer personal representative under unchallenged provisions of the code.
Respondent next contends that neither Wells nor petitioner qualified to file a petition for
supervised probate. MCL 700.351(1) governs petitions for supervision and provides in part:
At any time in an independent probate proceeding, a petition for
supervision may be filed with the court by an interested person or by an
independent personal representative . . .. (Emphasis added).
An interested person is defined as:
. . . an interested party, creditor, surety, or any other person having a
property right in a trust estate or the estate of a decedent or ward which may be
affected by the proceeding. Interested person includes a person nominated as a
personal representative and a fiduciary representing an interested person. The
meaning may vary as it relates to a particular person and shall be determined
according to the particular purpose of, and matter involved in, any proceeding.
[MCL 700.7(4).]
Respondent does not dispute petitioner’s claim that Wells paid for Sue Ann’s funeral expenses
and therefore is a creditor of the estate. MCL 700.7(4). Thus, Wells would qualify as an
interested person authorized to file for supervision.
Additionally, the definition of interested person is not rigid, allowing the court to
consider the particular person and the purpose of and matter involved in the proceeding in
deciding who is an interested person. MCL 700.7(4). Thus, the probate court could have
determined that either Wells or petitioner was an interested person and qualified to file for
supervision.
Finally, respondent contends that the probate court was required to provide findings of
fact and conclusions of law in revoking respondent’s appointment as personal representative and
appointing petitioner personal representative of the decedent’s estate. We disagree. A court
need not make findings of fact or conclusions of law when deciding motions, unless another
court rule requires a finding. MCR 2.517(A)(4); Michigan National Bank v Metro Inst Food
Service, Inc, 198 Mich App 236, 241-242; 497 NW2d 225 (1993). Respondent points to no court
rule to support his claim that the trial court was required to make factual findings when deciding
the motions herein.
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Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ David H. Sawyer
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